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ABSTRACT
Kent* Philip F., M.A., Spring 1978 History
Problems of Perception in Diplomacy: The Decisions to Intervene 
in Korea and Vietnam (175 pp.)
Director: Paul Gordon Lauren
This work is an analysis of the perceptions of the leading officials of the administrations from President Truman to Presi­
dent Johnson, 1945 to 1965. Specifically, the study centers on how these perceptions influenced the decisions by the government of the United States to intervene in Korea and Vietnam. This involves an examination of the perceptions of key administration 
officials in respect to the lessons of the past, the adversaries of America, particularly the Soviet Union and the communist world, and finally their view of America's role in the international political system.
In conclusion, America's perceptions regarding the lessons of Munich and the Cold War, its fear of a global and monolithic 
communist threat, and its self-image of the United States as the leader of the free world were decisive factors which led to intervention in both the Korean and Vietnamese wars.
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PREFACE
In a time of turmoil like the present, 
historians who deal in praise or blame 
are in danger of sounding shrill. Of 
a major scholarly movement that claims 
the function of a moral judgment we are 
entitled to ask for a widening, not a 
mere reversal of perspectives; an en­
richment of our humanity, not a mere 
confirmation of our likes and dislikes.
This in turn calls for a certain char­
ity: a blend of sympathy and distance, 
a combination of emphatic identification 
with analytical detachment.*
John Higham 1968
The study of the American interventions in Korea and 
Vietnam deserves and demands no less a standard of excel­
lence than that espoused by John Higham. When analyzing 
such recent and traumatic conflicts, the penchant to praise 
or blame in shrill sounds is accentuated and the likelihood 
that the bulk of commentary will be comprised of emotional 
and self-serving polemics is dramatically increased. This 
is especially true in respect to Korea and Vietnam. Many 
historians therefore contend that both conflicts, particu­
larly Vietnam, are subjects conducive to historical analysis. 
Yet, despite the pervasive accusation of being high-minded 
journalism at best, serious study of the era has begun.
Douglas MacArthur as cited in John Higham, Writing 
American History: Essays on Modern Scholarship (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1970), p. 168.
1
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This thesis is no attempt at a definitive work of the 
two conflicts, encompassing all the elements such an ef­
fort would entail. Rather, its goal is more modest: to 
investigate the perceptions•of the key officials of the 
administrations from Harry S. Truman through Lyndon B. 
Johnson. Consequently little attention, if any, will be 
given to deserving topics. The study does not include,
for example, an analysis of how domestic and bureaucratic
2politics shaped White House policy. To ascertain why 
American decision makers determined that intervention in 
these remote areas of the world was necessary. I concen­
trated on how American statesmen perceived reality and on 
how this subsequently shaped their behavior,
Originally my motivation derived impetus from a yearn­
ing to understand why the Vietnam War, the most tragic event 
'■of my life, ever occurred. Though not immune to the painful 
memories of this era in American history, I strove to detach
?For a brief but instructive discussion of the role of 
bureaucratic politics in the formulation of foreign policy, 
see William B. Quant, Decade of Decisions: American Policy
Toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict. 1967-1976 (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1977), pp. 24-28. Also see 
Paul Gordon Lauren, Diplomats and Bureaucrats: The First
Institutional Responses to Twentieth-Century Diplomacy in 
France and Germany (Stanford; Hoover institution Press, 1976), 
pp. 228-234, and Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence: A Conceptual
Analysis (London: Sage Publications, 1977), pp. 101-146. 
Regarding bureaucratic politics in respect to Vietnam, see 
Robert L. Gallucci, Neither Peace nor Honor: The Politics of
American Military Policy in Vietnam (Baltimore: John Hopkins
University Press, 197 5), and Jeffrey Race, "Vietnam Interven­
tion: Systematic Distortion in Policy-Making," Armed Forces 
and Society 3 (May 1976):377-396.
ray personal beliefs and emotions from my study of the wars; 
a goal not easily attained and ultimately elusive. I won­
dered if a member of the generation who reached political 
maturity during the 1960s could understand, though not neces­
sarily agree with, the actions of another generation--actions 
which directly affected my personal life. Our frame of refer­
ences were so dissimilar; their Munich was my Gulf of Tonkin, 
their Pearl Harbor my Kent and Jackson State. To avoid the 
pitfalls of many of the studies on Vietnam, I decided to dis­
cover how these men from 1945 to 1965 viewed the problems of 
their time.
Therefore X have not attempted to write an historical 
account from the perspective of my generation. In fact, I 
always suspected that Carl Becker's dictum that every gen­
eration must write its own history is analogous to General
Motors' policy of planned obsolescence. If history's con-
»
tributions are to be lasting then let us not restrict it 
solely to the preoccupations of each generation. Hopefully 
my minor effort will be a worthy contribution to the his­
torian's attempt to unravel the mysteries of the Korean and 
Vietnamese conflicts.
CHAPTER I
PROBLEMS OF PERCEPTION IN DIPLOMACY: 
THE TRUMAN ADMINISTRATION AND THE 
DECISION TO INTERVENE IN KOREA
The decision of President Truman 
on June 27 lighted into flame a lamp 
of hope throughout Asia that was 
burning dimly toward extinction. It 
marked for the Far East the focal and 
turning point in this area struggling 
for freedom.1
Douglas MacArthur
During a press conference, on November 30, 1950, 
President Harry S. Truman delivered the following state­
ment :
The forces of the United Nations are in 
Korea to put down an aggression that 
threatens not only the whole fabric of the 
United Nations, but all human hopes of 
peace and justice. If the United Nations 
yields to the forces of aggression, no 
nation will be safe or secure. If aggres­
sion is successful in Korea, we can expect 
it to spread throughout Asia and Europe to 
this hemisphere. We are fighting in Korea
U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services 
and Committee on Foreign Relations, To Conduct an Inquiry 
into the Military Situation in the Far East and the Facts 
Surrounding the Relief of General of the Army Douglas 
MacArthur from his Assignment in That Area. 82nd Cong., 
1st sess., 1951, 1:81. [Hereafter cited as the MacArthur 
Hearings.]
4
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for our own national security and 
survival.^
To preserve the sanctity of the United Nations, to resist
communist aggression, and to uphold and maintain the peace
and security of the nation and the free world: these were
the stated reasons justifying American military intervention 
3in Korea. Why did Truman and the vast majority of Americans 
perceive that intervention in Korea was necessary? Before 
discussing the Korean decision one must place Korea and the 
events unfolding during the summer of 1950 in their histori­
cal context.
The contemporary reader, quite likely, greets Truman's 
rationale with skepticism. To the citizen who, since po­
litical maturity, was inudated with continuous warnings of 
the dangers of communism, the declaration's sense of urgency 
is lost. The statement seems typical of the bloated and 
deceptive rhetoric of the "Imperial Presidency." If one 
could temporarily forget the events of the last quarter 
century, however, then the statement ceases to be typical 
and becomes a remarkable and extraordinary historical docu­
ment .
2Harry S. Truman, Memoirs. Volume Two: Years of Trial 
and Hope. 2 vols. (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 
1956), 2:389.
3Throughout the paper communism will be spelled with 
a small c, except when directly quoting other sources. 
Vietnam will appear as just cited, except when directly 
quoting other sources.
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Just ten years prior to America's intervention in
Korea, many Americans were reluctant to aid Britain in its
lone struggle against the greatest threat known to Western
civilization. Indeed, for President Franklin Delano
Roosevelt to have taken up the torch of the free world
against Nazi aggression in 1940 would have constituted
political suicide. Ten years later, however, America would
assume far wider world responsibilities and lead the fight
against aggression, in Korea, which became "the symbol of
4the resistence of a united humanity against, aggression."
What had transpired during those ten years that compelled 
the American public and its leaders to react to hostilities 
in Korea with almost the same intensity as they had to the 
tragic events of December 7, 1941? Why had a country which 
most Americans could not locate on a map become vital to 
American security? Had the world changed that drastically?
1. The Cold War
Truman's reminiscence of a trip to Pearl Harbor in 1950
captured the bewilderment of a generation: "I seemed to
have passed from one epoch of history into another, and yet
c1941 was less than ten years away." As the destruction of 
war swept across the continent of Europe, the world had 
undergone a period of enormous change and turmoil. The
4Truman, Memoirs, 2:368.
5Ibid., 2:364.
7
postwar world bore little resemblance to the world of the 
1930s. From the ashes of war a new international system 
emerged, but the swift decline of the familiar world order 
mystified mere mortals. Europe was no longer the center 
of civilization. The process of European disintegration, 
initiated with the Great War, culminated with the devasta­
tion of World War II. Amidst a war-torn Europe, two 
burgeoning world powers faced each other across an "Iron 
Curtain."
Men wondered if these two powers could cooperate in an 
effort to facilitate world peace. Although both countries 
espoused exclusive and antagonistic ideologies, cherished 
opposing ideals, and were committed to divergent security 
interests, it was hoped that these differences could be 
reconciled. But the areas of controversy underlying these 
two world viewpoints were seldom compatible or amenable to 
compromise. Often the goals of each country were conflict’- 
ing, their disagreements fundamental, and all the aspirations 
and hopes of a war-weary world could not transcend that in­
escapable reality. Truman pursued Roosevelt's policy of 
utilizing the Grand Alliance as an instrument of world peace, 
but the crises over Poland, Iran, Germany, and Greece dealt 
a fatal blow to hopes of a continued collaboration with the 
Soviet Union. The Grand Alliance became a phantom, a relic 
of the past, a reminder of what might have been. By 1947 
American leaders consciously confronted the Soviets, and
8
the policy of cooperation was transformed to a policy of 
containment.^ To use the terminology of another Crisis, 
the two powers were eyeball to eyeball. It would be years 
before either blinked.
The Soviets and Americans became so obsessed with each 
other that their visions of the world excluded other consid­
erations. One can picture the extremity that the confronta­
tion took by imagining two people spying through a keyhole 
on each other. Each saw the opposite of themselves, per­
ceiving what John Stoessinger calls "mirror devil images,"
7of threats to their values and survival. The Soviets and 
Americans, like Narcissus, became possessed by the image 
that they gazed upon. Unlike Narcissus, however, the antag­
onist's wills were paralyzed not by love, but by a pervasive 
and profound fear. These mutual fears and suspicions ac­
quired a peculiar dynamic of their own as the bipolar world 
perspective hardened and crystallized. The eloquent spokes­
man of the Truman Administration, Secretary of State Dean 
Acheson, aptly described this perspective:
^See John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Ori­
gins of the Cold War 1941-1947 (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1972), especially chapters 1, 2, 7, and 9. For the 
Soviet perspective see Adam A. Ulam, Stalin: The Man and his
Era (New York: The Viking Press, 1972), especially chapters 
12 and 13. But one should be cautioned that Stalin's per­
ceptions cannot be appreciated fully unless one reads the 
entire work.
7John G. Stoessinger, Nations in Darkness: China.
Russia and America, 2nd edition (New York: Random House, 
1975), pp. 79-85.
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Only two great powers remain in the 
world . . . the United States and the 
Soviet Union. We have arrived at a 
situation unparalleled since ancient 
times. Not since Rome and Carthage 
had there been such a polarization of 
power on this earth. Moreover, the two 
great powers were divided by an un­
bridgeable ideological chasm. . . .
And it was clear that the Soviet Union 
was aggressive and expanding. . . .  It 
was a matter of building our own se­
curity and safeguarding freedom by 
strengthening free people against Com­
munist aggression and subversion. We 
had the choice . . .  of acting with 
energy to meet this situation or losing 
by default.®
Truman and Acheson reasoned that as the leader of the free 
world, America was engaged in a struggle of survival with 
the Soviet Union. The Soviets would take advantage of the 
chaos and weakness of the postwar era to pursue its ambitions 
of global expansion. Only the resolute opposition of the
9United States could contain the spread of Soviet communism.
O Dean Acheson, as cited in Seymor Brown, The Faces of 
Power: Constancy and Change in United States Foreign Policy 
from Truman to Johnson" (New York: Columbia University Press,
1968), pp. 40-41. An excerpt from Acheson1s briefing to 
Congressional leaders to enlist their support for the Truman 
Doctrine.
9David McLellan, "The Operational Code* Approach to 
the Study of Political Leaders: Dean Acheson's Philosophi­
cal and Instrumental Beliefs,” Canadian Journal of Political 
Science 4 (March 1971):57-59, and Glen D. Paige, The Korean 
Decision June 24-30, 1950 (New York: The Free Press, 1968). 
See p. 54 in Paige, indicating that Truman*s earlier senti­
ment was evolving into a policy (letter to Byrnes, January 5, 
1945): "Unless Russia is faced with an iron fist and strong
language another war is in the making. Only one language do 
they understand - 'how many divisions have you?*"
10
It is within this historical context that the Korean 
decision must be placed if it is to be properly understood. 
In a world controlled by two mutually hostile countries, 
Korea became the symbolic battleground of the Cold War in 
1950. An observation by an American observer in Korea, 
Edwin W. Pauley, on June 22, 1946, now has a prophetic 
ring:
While Korea is a small country, and in terms 
of our total military strength is a small 
responsibility, it is an ideological battle-­
ground upon which our entire success in Asia 
may depend. It is here where a test will be 
made of whether a democratic competitive 
system can be adapted to meet the challenge 
of a defeated feudalism, or whether some 
other system, i.e., Communism will becomestronger.10
Truman's conviction that America must take the lead in the 
postwar era was aided by his belief in the necessity of a 
strong chief executive.
2. Truman's Conception of Power
Truman's conviction that a President must vigorously 
use his power combined, with his vision of America's role in 
world politics to exercise a profound influence upon the
10Edwin W. Pauley, as cited in Truman, Memoirs, 2:321. 
For additional evidence that prior to June 24, 1950, Korea 
was considered militarily insignificant, see Edwin C. Hoyt, 
"The United States Reaction to the North Korean Attack: A
Study of the Principles of the United Nations Charter as a 
Factor in American Policy Making," American Journal of Inter­
national Law 55 (January 1961):52, and Ernest R. May, "Les­
sons" of the Past: The Use and Misuse of History in American
Foreign Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 197 2).
11
Korean decision. Truman envisioned an administration of 
positive action guided by resolute presidential leadership. 
Man's greatest achievement and noblest profession was poli­
tics and Truman's faith in the efficacy of politics to
11guarantee man's security never wavered. His love for 
politics and strong sense of duty bolstered Truman's belief 
that the President guarded the sacred trust of the people.
Thus whenever he perceived the security and welfare of the 
American people to be threatened, Truman felt compelled to 
act decisively. As the highest elected representative of 
all the American people, the president was morally obligated 
to use the power necessary to ensure the future safety of 
the United States. In times of national emergency or inter­
national crisis, "the President must use whatever power the
1 2Constitution does not expressedly deny him." Truman's 
slogan that the "Buck Stops Here" was indicative of his cer­
tainty that the President must be the final arbitrator of 
all issues confronting the American people. Since Truman 
encouraged individual initiative by his cabinet, the views 
of his chief advisers were crucial. In particular, Dean 
Acheson exercised his authority in foreign affairs.
^Raymond G. O'Connor, "Harry S. Truman: New Dimensions 
of Power," in Powers of the President in Foreign Affairs 
1945-1965 Harry S. Truman, Dwight D. Eisenhower. John F. 
Kennedy. Lyndon B. Johnson, ed. Edgar E. Robinson (California: 
Lederer, Street and Zues Co., 1966), pp. 23-26. See Paige, 
Korean Decision, pp. 21-25.
^2Truman, Memoirs, 2:471.
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The State Department under Acheson enjoyed a role of 
being chief policy maker in world politics during Truman's 
tenure. In Acheson, Truman found a trusted aide to assist 
him with his inexperience in foreign affairs. A man of 
strong convictions, Acheson believed that power, not 
principle, was the driving force in global affairs. Prin-r 
ciples, regardless of their intrinsic and moral worth, were 
not self-enforcing. Therefore in order to protect its ideals 
and interests, the United States must be willing to use its 
power if necessary. Acheson shared Truman's profound mis­
trust of the Soviets and believed that Russia represented
13the greatest threat to world peace. Together Truman and 
Acheson formed an effective team.
Truman's reading of history reinforced these convictions 
that America's mission and security were best served when a 
strong president manned the helm. His use of history gives 
insight into an essential facet of Truman’s character.
Oliver Wendell Holmes's dictum that a page of history is
“I Aworth a volume of logic was a favorite of Truman's: "I had
trained myself to look back into history for precedents be­
cause instinctively I sought perspective in the span of his­
tory for the decisions I had to make. That is why I read and
13John Lewis Gaddis, "Harry S. Truman and the Origins of 
Containment," in American Foreign Policy Makers From Beniamin 
Franklin to Henry Kissinger, ed. Frank J. Merli (New York: 
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1974), pp. 508-509.
"^O'Conner, "Harry S . Truman," p. 24.
13
re-read history. Most o£ the problems a president has to
15face have their roots in the past." Truman thought his­
tory an unambiguous moral teacher, whose lessons must be 
deciphered if the pitfalls and tragedies of the past were 
to be averted.
Strong presidential leadership, though crucial, would 
be wasted if America neglected its world obligations. The
United States was and must remain "a strong bulwark of
17freedom" against communist encroachment. Truman affirmed
that "throughout the world our name stands for a world based
on principles of law and order," and thus obligated the
United States to lead the crusade against Soviet designs of
18world domination. Yet America’s strength relied upon more 
than just ethical and spiritual strength. Its moral might 
was sustained by America’s prestige, which Acheson desig­
nated as "the shadow cast by its power, which is of great
19deterrence power." America symbolized the moral strength 
of the free world, but it was its military capabilities 
which committed it to contain the Soviet threat to world 
peace. Armed with his conception of a strong presidency,
15Harry S. Truman, as cited in ibid.
1 f%Paige, Korean Decision, pp. 21-25.
17Ibid., p. 52.
^Truman, Memoirs, 2:428.
19Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in
the State Department (New York: W. W. Norton and Company,
1969) , p. 405.
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Truman took the necessary steps to ensure the world that
America would fulfill its responsibilities. One authority
contends that ''Truman combined a vision of America's role
20with a firm notion of the President's role in office."
The invasion of South Korea challenged Truman's image of 
America and he resolved to use the inherent powers of the 
office to thwart the threat. Cold War ideology, Truman's 
and Acheson's world view, and the belief in decisive action 
provide the general framework in which the events of Korea 
were perceived.
3. War in Korea
The June 24, 1950 invasion of South Korea was greeted 
by the Truman administration with dismay and shock. Though 
no contingency plan for such an occurrence existed, within 
the week Truman authorized U. S. military troops to combat 
communist aggression in Korea. The factors which shaped 
Truman's decision included: his perceptions of the lessons
of the immediate past, the concern for a viable collective 
security, the fear of the consequences if unprovoked aggres­
sion went unchecked, and the belief that the invasion rep­
resented the first step in a Soviet plan for world expansion
Truman, as did most of his administration, reached po­
litical maturity during the late 1930s, a decade rich with 
profound but costly political lessons. For many Americans
70O'Connor, "Harry S. Truman," p. 2 5.
15
those ten years contained vivid and painful memories. The
aggressions of the totalitarian regimes, the subsequent
failure of Western democracy to unite against these acts,
and the tragic war that followed, collectively inflicted
a permanent scar and reminder upon the consciousness of a
generation. Never again would evil be mitigated. Never
again would the Western democracies fail to resist unwanton
aggression and thereby plunge the world into the horrors of
another war. By embracing a policy of appeasement in the
past the West had abdicated its responsibilities and world
chaos, suffering and torment followed on an unprecedented
scale. The invasion of Korea tapped those memories and
Truman vowed that it would not happen again:
Communism was acting in Korea just as Hitler, 
Mussolini, and the Japanese had acted ten, 
fifteen, and twenty years earlier. I felt 
certain . . .  if this was allowed to go un­
challenged it would mean a third world war.
It was also clear to me that the foundations 
and the principles of the United Nations 
were at stake unless this unprovoked attack 
on Korea could be stopped.21
If future wars were to be avoided and world peace ensured,
then the major powers, especially the United States, must
maintain a constant vigilance against breaches of world
order.
This was a deeply held conviction of Truman’s; Pearl
22Harbor had eliminated any trace of isolationist sentiment.
^Truman, Memoirs, 2:333.
22In 1934, when Truman was a freshman Senator, he sup­
ported the Neutrality Acts. See May, ,fLessons pp. 83-86.
16
After December 7, 1941, Truman became an avid proponent of
collective security and internationalism as indicated by an
excerpt of a Senate speech made on November 2, 1943:
I am just as sure as I can be that this World 
War is the result of the 1919-1920 isolation­
ist attitude, and I am equally sure that 
another and worse war will follow this one, 
unless the United Nations and allies and all 
other sovereign nations decide to work 
together for peace as they are working for 
victory.23
Truman, as President, strengthened Roosevelt's commitment to 
an international body dedicated to the preservation of world 
peace. By reconciling national and supranational interests, 
Truman convinced the American people that support of the
A A
United Nations served their best interests. Assured that 
the failure of the League of Nations had rested upon the 
shoulders of the major powers--and especially the United 
States--Truman utilized the resources of his office to garner 
congressional and public support for the United Nations. The 
ideals of the United Nations could not stand alone against 
aggression; the major powers must assert their wills if these 
ideals were to remain effective standards of international 
behavior. Truman conveyed his dedication to the United 
Nations in a despondent whisper at the first Blair House
23Harry S. Truman, as cited in O'Connor, "Harry S. 
Truman," p. 60.
2^Ibid., pp. 60-64. O'Connor states on p. 18 that 
"Truman's concept of presidential responsibilities and na­
tional obligation to this organization contributed vastly 
to its success."
17
25Conference on Korea, "We can't let the UN down!"
Not only did the Korean invasion conjure up apprehen­
sions regarding appeasement and the failure of collective 
security, it also raised the spectre of Soviet and com­
munist expansion. That the Soviets instigated the attack 
the Truman Administration never doubted. With their bi­
polar world perspective American officials confidently 
reasoned that "It seems close to certain that the attack
had been mounted, supplied, and instigated by the Soviet 
26Union." Edward A. Bennet, Assistant Secretary of State 
for Public Relations, categorized the relationship between 
Russia and North Korea as analogous to the one between 
"Walt Disney and Donald Duck."^
2 5Harry S. Truman, as cited in Paige. Korean Decision, 
p. 125. See p. 18 for Truman's impassioned defense of the 
UN, This occurred on June 25, 1950, in response to Dean 
Acheson's failure to mention the UN during a briefing to 
Congress on the Korean invasion.
'7 Acheson, Creation, p. 405.
27Edward A. Bennet, as cited in Paige, Korean Decision, 
p. 188. It should be pointed out that Truman's interpreta­
tion of the origins of the Korean War is not the only one.
See Robert R. Simmons, The Strained Alliance: Peking, Pyongyang, 
Moscow and the Politics of the Korean Civil War (New York:
The Free Press, 1975), pp. 102-136. Simons argues that the 
government of North Korea was neither a Soviet puppet nor the 
instrument of a monolithic communist bloc. Though the Soviets 
supported the North Koreans, the timing of the war was due to 
internal circumstances and the Korean aspiration of unifica­
tion. Therefore the conflict in essence was a civil war. For 
two other interpretations which stress the civil war interpre­
tation, see Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, The Limits of Power: The 
World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1954 (New York: 
Harper and Row, Publishers, 1972), pp. 565-600. See also I. F. 
Stone, The Hidden History of the Korean War (New York: Monthly 
Review Press, 1952).
18
Prior to the Korean crisis, it had not been expected 
the Soviets would engage in overt operations to further 
their ambition of world domination, let alone invade South 
Korea. A New York Times editorial reflected the govern­
ment 's attitude by stating that "while the Russians would 
continue trying to gain their ends by indirect aggression
through Communist parties, they would hesitate to use 
28force." The recent invasion of Korea would prompt a 
reappraisal of that basic tenet. Hence, Korea marked a 
turning point regarding American perceptions of the Soviet 
Union and of the nature of the Cold War. No longer was it 
perceived that the Soviets were content to rely primarily
upon deceitful yet peaceful means; they were now willing to
29employ armed force to achieve their objectives. A speech
by Truman in San Francisco on October 17, 1950, demonstrates
how the Soviet aggression affected Washington's attitude.
"So long as they persist in maintaining these forces and in
using them to intimidate other countries," he said, "the
free men of the world have but one choice if they are to re-
30main free. They must oppose strength with strength."
The invasion of Korea raised a number of difficult and
28Alexander L. George, "American Policy Making and the 
North Korean Invasion," World Politics 7 (January 1955):210.
29Denis Stairs, The Diplomacy of Constraint; Canada. 
the Korean War and the United States (Toronto: Toronto Uni^ 
versity Press, 1974), pp. 29-30.
Truman, Memoirs, 2:320.
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perplexing questions. The participants of the Blair House
Conferences pondered why the Soviets acted and how the
attack fit their broader plans. Was it the beginning of
a general war or merely a probing action, a Soviet hope
for a quick and painless victory? Was it a diversionary
tactic with Europe the ultimate target, or a test of Ameri-
31can prestige and will? Truman's answers to these ques­
tions would determine the course of action he would take.
Truman perceived the invasion as a test of America's 
will with the ultimate target being Western Europe. Korea 
would transform the Cold War into a global conflict, but 
Europe remained the primary concern of key administration 
officials. Truman reflected:
From the very beginning of the Korean ac­
tion I had always looked at it as a Russian 
maneuver, as a part of the Kremlin's plan 
to destroy the unity of the free world.
NATO, the Russians knew, would succeed only 
if the United States took part in the de­
fense of Europe.52
The key to world peace was Europe, therefore the Soviets hoped
to weaken NATO by diverting American energy in Korea. Truman
stated that "the first commandment of Soviet foreign policy
31George, "American Policy Making," pp. 210-215. See 
Paige, Korean Decision, pp. 115, 133-136. See p. 134 for evi­
dence of American uncertainty over Soviet intent: State Depart­
ment world-wide alert, "Possible that Korea is only the first 
series of coordinated actions. . . . Maintain utmost vigilance 
and report immediately any positive or negative information;" 
and Morton H. Halperin, "The Limiting Process in the Korean 
War," Political Science Quarterly 78 (March 1963):16-20.
3 ?Truman, Memoirs, 2:437.
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has always been to divide the enemies of the Soviet Union,
and the unity that United States leadership had created in
Europe was the most important target for world communism*s 
33attack." With Soviet aggression Korea became "the test 
of all the talk of the last five years of collective se-* 
curity."34
The attack on South Korea was perceived as an ominous 
act of aggression by the Soviets testing America’s prestige, 
threatening the system of collective security, and upsetting 
the foundations of world order and peace. Truman concluded 
that decisive, resolute action was needed to avoid another 
world war. Once again, as in the 1930s, an ambitious power 
confronted the United States and the free world with a 
challenge that threatened its very existence. The decade 
symbolized by Munich had proven forever the futility of 
appeasement. Given Truman’s intellectual perspective and 
his interpretation of recent events, the president reasoned 
that only one viable option was opened to him. After weigh­
ing the alternatives, Truman responded with characteristic 
resoluteness:
I prayed that there might be some way 
other than swift military action to meet 
this Communist aggression, for I knew the 
awful sacrifices in life and suffering it 
would take to resist it. But there was 
only one choice facing the free world - 
resistance or capitulation to Communist
33Ibid., 2:380.
34Ibid., 2:344.
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military aggression. It was my belief 
that if this aggression in Korea went un­
challenged, as aggression in Manchuria in 
1931 and Ethiopia in 1934 had gone un­
challenged, the world was certain to 
plunge into another world war.
This was the same kind of challenge 
Hitler flaunted in the face of the rest 
of the world when he crossed the borders 
of Austria and Czechoslavakia. The free 
world failed then to meet the challenge, 
and World War II was the result. This 
time the free nations - the United Na­
tions - were quick to sense the new dan­
ger to world peace. The United Nations 
was born out of the ashes of two world 
wars and organized for the very purpose 
of dealing with aggression wherever it 
threatened to break out or actually 
occurred.
That is why the United Nations responded 
with such spontaneity and swiftness. This 
was the first time in the history of the 
world that there was international ma­
chinery to deal with those who would re­
sort to war as a means of imposing their 
will or systems on other people.35
The lessons of the thirties had been learned, Korea would
not be the Munich of the fifties. "We will not yield to
aggression," Truman vowed, "appeasement of evil is not the
road to peace."3**
35Ibid., 2:463. For similar statements by world leaders 
see Stairs, Diplomacy of Constraint, pp. 34-35, Trygve Lie, 
Secretary General of the UN: "this to me was clear-cut aggres­
sion . . . which reminded me of the Nazi invasion of Norway - 
because this was aggression against a 'creation' of the United 
Nations." See Paige, Korean Decision, p. 200, Clement Atlee: 
"The situation is of undoubted gravity, but I am certain that 
there will be no disagreement, after our bitter experiences 
in the past 35 years, that the salvation of all is dependent 
on prompt and effective measures to arrest aggression wherever 
it may occur. . . . This is naked aggression and it must be 
checked."
3^Truman, Memoirs, 2:428.
22
Communist aggression in Korea constituted a political
and legal threat to America. If the United States acquiesced
in Korea, then its prestige would be dealt a potentially
lethal blow. If the illegal breach of international peace
was permitted, then the legitimacy of the United Nations and
37the principle of collective security would be undermined.
Truman felt compelled to act with decisive force since a
policy of inaction could prove too costly. As scholar
Alexander George contends, "the decision to oppose the
North Koreans was motivated by a fear of the consequences
of inaction and was influenced by considerations which
stemmed from uncertain interpretations of broader Soviet
38strategic intentions behind the North Korean attack."
From the perspective of Truman and his advisers intervention
was the necessary and proper course of action. Everyone
readily agreed to support "whatever had to be done to meet
39this aggression." Ambassador at Large Philip C. Jessup 
maintained that there was a "hard core of resolve" to take 
the action necessary to avoid the intolerable evil of ap­
peasement.^®
The conviction of Truman's that unchecked Soviet
■^Hoyt, "The United States Reaction," pp. 54-55.
38George, "American Policy Making," p. 222.
39Truman, Memoirs, 2:344.
^°Philip C. Jessup, as cited in Paige, Korean Decision, 
p. 143,
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aggression endangered the security of Western Europe, Asia,
and the viability of the United Nations as an instrument of
peace weighed heavily among the factors contributing to the
Korean decision: "The attack on Korea was . . .  a challenge
to the whole system of collective security, not only in the
Far East, but everywhere in the world. . . . This was a test
which would decide whether our collective system would sur-
41vive or crumble." A year after the attack on Korea,
Truman restated to Congress his justification of interven­
tion:
Our action in the crisis was motivated by 
our deep conviction of the importance of 
the international security system and of 
the principles of the Charter. I was con­
vinced then, and I am convinced now, that 
to have ignored the appeal of Korea for 
aid, to have stood aside from the assault 
upon the Charter, would have meant the end 
of the United Nations as a shield against 
aggression.42
The Soviet Union and its client state North Korea must 
be deterred in Korea, otherwise inaction would encourage the 
launching of other attacks thus increasing the likelihood of 
another world conflagration* Acheson justified the firm re­
sponse since if the Soviets could "utilize their satellites 
as stooges to take aggressive action without serious danger 
of becoming involved themselves, they will be likely to em-
41Ibid., p. 175.
4^Harry S. Truman, as cited in Hoyt, "The United States 
Reaction," p. 54.
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43employ this device with increasing boldness." The events 
of the recent past reinforced the lessons of the 1930s and 
hardened the administration's resolve in the face of aggres­
sion.
If Hitler's unrestrained ambition proved the futility 
of appeasement, then Stalin's recent behavior confirmed the 
wisdom of a tough stance. When confronted in Iran, Berlin 
and Greece the Soviets drew back, therefore they would re­
spond realistically to American resolve. Pointing to a map 
on the morning of June 26, Truman analyzed the situation in
Korea, "This is the Greece of the Far East. If we are tough
44enough there won't be any next step." . He later confided to 
his advisers "that what was developing in Korea seemed to me 
like a repetition on a larger scale of what happened in Ber­
lin. The Reds were probing for weakness in our armour; we
had to meet their thrust without getting embroiled in a
4 5world-wide war." The Soviets must not win by default, 
aggression could not be rewarded.
As the crisis in Korea deepened, it became painfully 
evident that South Korea would succumb to the communist
^Secretary of State Dean Acheson (Washington) to the 
Embassy in the Soviet Union, June 26, 1950, in U :. S., Depart^ 
ment of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1976) , 7 :177 . 
[Hereafter cited as FRUS.]
44Harry S. Truman, as cited in May, "Lessons", p. 71.
^Truman, Memoirs, 2:337.
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attack. The Minister at the American Embassy in Paris,
Charles E. Bohlen, sent a dispatch to the Secretary of 
State:
This is . . . the first time overt vio­
lation of a frontier . . .  has occurred 
since the end of the war and you may be 
sure that all Europeans to say nothing of 
the Asiatics are watching to see what the 
United States will do. It is a situation 
requiring maximum f i r m n e s s . 46
As Dirk Stikker, the Netherlands Foreign Minister, proclaimed, 
"all eyes are on A m e r i c a . T r u m a n  did not disappoint world 
opinion. On June 30, 1950, in the early morning hours,
Harry S. Truman committed American combat troops to the 
peninsula of Korea.
The reasons for American intervention were multiple and 
complex. A leading authority explained Truman's reasoning:
"He wanted to affirm that the U.N, was not a League of Na­
tions, that aggression would be met with counterforce, that
'police action' was well worth the cost, that the 'lessons
48of the 1930s' had been learned." The lessons were learned, 
perhaps too well, perhaps they were ingrained in the American 
psyche too deeply. Now a new element had been added to the
^Minister Charles C. Bohlen (Paris) to Secretary of 
State, June 26, 1950, in FRUS 1950, 7:174. Actually the 
cable was intended to be read by George Kennan.
^Ambassador Chapin (Amsterdam) to Secretary of State, 
June 26, 19 50, in FRUS, 19 50, 7:186.
48Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power: The Poli- 
tics of Leadership (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 
1960), p. 126.
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lessons of the past. This was not just aggression, it was 
by the Soviet Union, the leader of the communist world. The 
prestige and survival of the United States, the United Na­
tions, and collective security, and the resolve of the forces 
of anticommunism were considered well worth the costs and 
risks of war.
Given the perception of a bipolar world, with the forces
of Good combating the forces of Evil, Truman’s options were
severely limited. Truman favored intervention because he
believed the alternatives unacceptable. Decisive action was
necessary to "demonstrate that aggression will nqt be accepted
by us or by the United Nations and to provide a rallying point
around which the spirits and energies of the free world can be
mobilized to meet the world-wide threat of which the Soviet
49Union now poses." The consequences of American inaction
were too horrible to contemplate. The fear that America would
fail to respond dissipated with Truman's decision. The
exuberant response by Senator Hubert Humphrey to the Korean
decision represented the sentiment of most Americans:
I believe this is a fatal hour. I believe the 
decision the President has made may save the 
lives of millions of people, and may ultimately 
save the peace of the world. I pray God in all 
reverence that all the people will give sup­
port to this policy, so that we shall not find 
ourselves driven by our indecision into the 
cataclysm of a third world war. This may be 
the greatest move for peace in the twentieth 
century.50
49Truman, Memoirs, 2:435.
^Hubert Humphrey, as cited in Paige, Korean Decision, p. 197.
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Humphrey failed to anticipate the consequences of the Ameri­
can intervention in Korea.
The Korean War forced a reappraisal of the world situa­
tion and areas of prior insignificance now were perceived as
51critical to America’s strategic interests. If other 
Koreas were to be prevented, then America must strengthen 
its position throughout the world. Truman shared his 
thoughts concerning the significance of Korea with British 
Prime Minister Clement Atlee; in Truman's opinion ’’the prob­
lem we were facing was part of a pattern. Aftbr Korea, it
52would be Indo-China, then Hong Kong, then Malaya.” For
now the administration was preoccupied with the prosecution
of the Korean War: As the Ambassador to the Soviet Union
wrote to the Secretary of State; "the issue has been put to
the test of the battle and [the] entire world is watching
53and waiting for the results of this test.”
^Brown, Faces of Power, p. 55.
5?Truman, Memoirs, 2:399.
53Ambassador Kirk (Moscow) to the Secretary of State, 
July 1, 1950, in FRUS, 19 50, 7:278.
CHAPTER II
PROBLEMS OF PERCEPTION IN DIPLOMACY: 
THE TRUMAN ADMINISTRATION AND THE 
PROSECUTION OF THE KOREAN WAR
Plainly, the government has moved 
into an area where there is a reluc­
tance to recognize the finer dis­
tinctions of the psychology of our 
adversaries, for the reason that 
movement in this sphere of specula­
tion is all too undependable, too 
relative, and too subtle to be com­
fortable or tolerable to people who 
feel themselves confronted with the 
grim responsibility of recommending 
decisions which may mean war or 
peace.
George F. Kennan1
"One of the most terrible disasters that has occurred
to American foreign policy and certainly . . . the greatest
2disaster which occurred to the Truman Administration."
These are the words that Dean Acheson once used to describe 
the Chinese intervention in Korea. How an initial American 
policy of restraint in the Korean War was transformed and
■^George F. Kennan, Memoirs: 1925-1940, 2 vols. (Boston: 
Little, Brown and Co., 1967), 1:499.
2Dean Acheson, as cited in Barton Bernstein, "The 
Policy of Risk: Crossing the 38th Parallel to the Yalu," 
Foreign Service Journal 54 (March 1977): 29.
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expanded to provoke such Chinese intervention will be the 
subject of this chapter.
1. A Policy of Restraint
Immediately after the outbreak of hostilities in Korea, 
caution, restraint, and uncertainty characterized the admin­
istration's prosecution of the conflict. Washington's 
apprehension about its own capabilities and Soviet inten­
tions, plus its firm resolve to localize the hostilities: 
these were the dominate factors which shaped American policy.
By August 1950, North Korean troops forced American-led units 
back to the Pusan perimeter, a rectangular area bordered by 
the Naktong River and the sea of Japan., Washington considered 
the situation critical, fearing a bloody war of attrition,
and gravely doubting the likelihood of United Nations success 
3m  Korea. American power faced a severe test. As the Secre­
tary of Defense, George Marshall, later commented, "A myth had 
been exploded - we were not the powerful nation we were thought
4to be." To say the least, America's faith in its military 
might had been shaken.
As noted, the actual intentions of the Soviet Union con­
stantly concerned and perplexed the administration.5 The
3David Rees, Korea: The Limited War (London: Macmillan, 
1964), pp. 43-54.
4George Marshall, as cited in MacArthur Hearings, 1:371.
^See Alexander George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in 
American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York:
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North Korean aggression challenged the assumption that neither 
the Soviets nor their satellites would resort to force in 
peripheral areas of the world, particularly in Asia. A dis­
traught Dean Acheson proclaimed, "The attack upon Korea makes 
it plain beyond all doubt that communism has passed beyond the 
use of subversion to conquer independent nations and will now 
use armed invasion and w a r . T r u m a n  and his closest advisers 
surmised that either the Kremlin hoped in Korea to demonstrate 
American impotence, thereby destroying the collective security 
system in the process or that the Soviets wanted to entangle 
the United States in an indecisive yet costly theatre of war. 
According to historian Gaddis Smith, "Acheson was convinced 
that the North Korean attack was part of a ’grand design1 
whose ultimate purpose was to weaken the West and upset the 
balance in the most important of all theatres - Europe." 
Nevertheless, as the comment by Chief of Staff Omar Bradley
Columbia University Press, 1974), especially chapter two for 
a thorough discussion of possible interpretations of the 
actual intentions of the Soviets. The interpretation favored 
is that the Soviets perceived action in Korea as a low-risk 
venture, with limited goals, and not part of a plan of world 
conquest. See also Gaddis, "Origins of Containment," where 
Gaddis contends that though Stalin's goals were limited, one 
must qualify the theory by acknowledging that except for 
Truman's containment policy and intervention, his aims may 
have become more ambitious. Refer to footnote 27 in chapter 
one.
^Dean Acheson, as cited in Robert H. Ferrell, ed., The 
American Secretaries of State and their Diplomacy, vol. 16: 
Dean Acheson, by Gaddis Smith (New York: Cooper Square Pub­
lications , Inc., 1972), p, 185.
7Ibid., p. 189.
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indicates, Soviet designs continued to mystify high officials 
of the administration: "It is very difficult to try to fathom
the intentions of the Soviet Government. They make their de­
cisions in a very small group . . . and there is no way of 
knowing their intentions."
The anxiety over Soviet intentions led American policy 
makers to prosecute the war in such a manner as to diminish 
the risk of provoking Soviet intervention. Marshall stressed
that "we have persistently sought to confine the. conflict to
9Korea and to prevent its spreading to a third world war."
Truman concurred with this sentiment:
Every decision I made in connection with 
the Korean conflict had this one aim in mind: 
to prevent a third world war. . . . This 
meant that we should not do anything that 
would provide the excuse to the Soviets and 
plunge the free nations into full-scale 
all-out war.10
These pervasive fears, regarding Soviet aims and the possibil­
ity of general war, temporarily acted to restrict American 
ambitions in Korea.
Early in the conflict Washington's war aims were limited 
to the restoration of the status quo ante bellum borders of 
Korea. While addressing the Newspapers Guild on June 29, 1950, 
Acheson stated that the United Nations actions were "solely to 
be for the purpose of restoring the Republic of Korea to its
8Omar Bradley, as cited in MacArthur Hearings, 1:755.
9George Marshall, as cited in MacArthur Hearings, 1:324.
10Truman, Memoirs, 2:345.
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status prior to the invasion by the north.Nevertheless 
the State Department planned for the possibility of a reversal 
in the military situation. On July 22, the Policy Planning 
Staff concluded that "from the view of U.S. military commit­
ments . . .  we should make every effort to restrict military
12ground action to the area south of the 38th parallel."
Apparently the risks of war outweighed the advantages of a
final solution. Crossing the 38th parallel could conceivably
provoke intervention by the Soviets or Chinese thus aborting
13the United Nations mission to repel aggression. The Ameri­
can posture of restraint and willingness to accept partial 
victory was eroded by mounting pressure for unification. By 
July 25, the Planning Staff recommended that any decisions 
regarding the course of action as troops approached the 38th 
parallel should be deferred until further military and politi­
cal plans developed.Despite the uncertainty regarding the 
outcome of MacArthur*s upcoming offensive, Truman approved 
a National Security Council recommendation (NSC 81/1) which 
advocated the unification of Korea. The report stressed that 
this desired objective must be abandoned in the likelihood 
that either the Soviets or Chinese actively opposed this
■^Acheson, Creation, p. 450.
l2Draft Memorandum Prepared by Policy Planning Staff,
July 22, 1950, in FRUS, 1950, 7:453.
13Ibid., 7:451-4 53.
14Draft Memorandum Prepared by Policy Planning Staff,
July 25, 1950, in FRUS, 1950, 7:473.
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aim.1  ̂ Consequently no final decisions could be made. With 
the phenomenal success by MacArthur the moment of decision 
could no longer be delayed.
2. Transformation of War Aims
In the early morning hours of September 15, 1950, United 
Nations combat troops, against seemingly insurmountable odds, 
successfully secured a beachhead on the shores of Inchon, a 
port near the capital of South Korea, Seoul. MacArthur's 
stunning victory turned the tide for American fortunes in 
Korea, and dramatically influenced Washington's aspirations 
and war aims. The military and psychological impact of the 
Inchon operation revitalized morale in Washington, freeing 
the administration from previous constraints which trammeled 
America's freedom of action in Korea. The breakthrough at 
Inchon rekindled Washington's sense of mission and power.
With renewed confidence and purpose the United States altered 
its earlier and moderate war aims. As the military initiative 
of Inchon gathered momentum, the administration now abandoned 
its policy of restoring the status quo. A more ambitious and 
venturesome goal was adopted--the unification of the Korean 
peninsula.
■^Report by the National Security Council to the Presi­
dent, NSC 81/1: "United States Courses of Action with Respect 
to Korea," September 9, 1950* in FRUS, 1950 , 7:712-716. On 
September 11, 1950, Truman approved the report and directed 
its implementation.
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One should be cautioned against underestimating the im­
pact which Inchon had upon the prosecution of the war. Two 
noted and respected scholars depicted the mood after Inchon
as a "period of enormous euphoria at the dramatic reversal
16at our military fortunes," claiming it transformed "not
the war alone but the emotions felt in Washington. .
17Appetite's arose as the troops went forward." The mail who
eventually replaced General Douglas MacArthur as United
Nations commander, General Matthew Ridgeway, captured the
electrifying atmosphere:
It is true . . . that our original objec­
tive - to repel aggression, to expel the 
invaders from South Korea, and restore 
peace in the area - underwent drastic 
change once the Inchon success had put 
us in a position to push north across the 
38th parallel. We then tacitly altered 
our mission to encompass the occupation 
and unification of Korea. - the goal that 
had long been the dream of Syngman Rhee 
and the prize that beckoned MacArthur.18
The attractive prize also enticed the policy makers in Washing­
ton, who were soon blinded by a dream that soon became a 
nightmare. Even Acheson fell victim to the hubris he later 
accused MacArthur of monopolizing:
"^Bernard Brodie, War and Politics (New York: The 
MacMillan Co., 1973), p. 71.
l^Neustadt, Presidential Power, p. 130.
18Matthew P. Ridgeway, The Korean War (New York: Double­
day and Co., 1967), p. 230. See also J. Lawton Collins, War 
in Peacetime: The History and Lessons of Korea (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin and Co., 1969), p. 277. Collins notes:
"The prestige of General MacArthur after Inchon was so great 
that the JCS leaned over backward not to contravene his oc­
casional strayings from military directives."
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One must understand the trememdous risks as­
sumed by General MacArthur at Inchon, and 
the equally great luck that saw him through, 
to understand the hubris that led him to 
assume even more impossible chances in his 
march to the Yalu at a time when his luck - 
and, unhappily, the luck of the United 
States - also ran out.19
Yet the Inchon operation also swayed Acheson's behavior. He
must bear as much responsibility as does MacArthur for
America's turn of fortune in Korea.
The hope of an easy victory gradually eroded the caution 
and restraint previously exercised by the administration.
What was once a secondary goal now became the central objec­
tive of the war. Truman declared, "We believe the Koreans
have a right to be free, independent, and united - as they
20want to be. . . . The U. S. has no other aim in Korea."
On October 6, 1950, Warren Austin, America's Ambassador to 
the United Nations, officially sanctified the shift in 
American war aims:
In June and July of this year, the Se­
curity Council gave all the necessary 
military authority to the United Nations'
Commander to repel the aggressor army and 
restore peace in Korea.
The United Nations forces have pursued 
that task with vigor and some success.
Two things appear necessary to be done 
how:'first, to carry out the objectives of 
the United Nations in the northern area 
where United Nations observers have never 
yet had the opportunity to ascertain the 
political wishes of the people; second,
19Acheson, Creation, p. 448.
20Harry S. Truman, as cited in Smith, Acheson, p. 206.
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to commence forthwith the task of rebuild­
ing the shattered Korean economy.
What the United Nations has worked for 
since 1947 is stability in Korea - a uni­
fied, independent and democratic govern­
ment in a sovereign state.21
Soon the repulsion of aggression and the unification of
Korea were taken for granted.
Now the administration devised a policy to strengthen
the United Nations and the free world by shifting its efforts
from repelling the communists to constructing a viable peace.
Dean Acheson forcefully voiced this aspiration: "Just as
Korea has become the symbol of resistance against aggression,
so can it become the symbol of renewal of life. . . . Out of
the ashes of destruction the United Nations can help the
Korean people to create a society which will have lessons
22in it for people everywhere." According to Acheson, Korea
was "the workshop in which the United Nations has the chance
to make the prototype of the kind of world which it wants to
23make universally." Underlying all the preparation for a
reconstructed Korea was the assumption that a unified, non-
24communist Korea would be secured on the battlefield.
21Warren Austin, "The Korean Case in the General Assembly," 
U. S., Department of State, Department of State Bulletin 23 
(October 23, 1950):648. [Hereafter cited as Department of 
State Bulletin.]
2 2Dean Acheson, "Peace the World Wants," Department of 
State Bulletin 23 (October 2, 1950):528-529.
23Dean Acheson, "Events in Korea Deepen Interest m  
United Nations," Department of State Bulletin 23 (September
18, 1950) :451.
^Neustadt, Presidential Power, p. 127.
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The euphoria following Inchon continued to boost the 
prospects for success. The•confidence inspired by the 
triumph spread throughout the administration like wildfire, 
with unification acquiring the aura of an accomplished fact. 
This self-congratulating attitude contained flaws which di­
verted the administration's attention from the storm clouds 
that loomed above the horizon. Dean Acheson later testified;
In the period shortly after the Inchon 
landings until the intervention of the 
Chinese Communists, it looked as though 
both these objectives could be attained.
That is, that the forces of the North 
Koreans, who had been attacking South 
Korea, were rounded up, destroyed 
surrounded, that the country could be 
put together. . . .
The United Nations . . . has always 
since 1947 had the political objective 
of unifying Korea under free and demo­
cratic institutions.
Unhappily, the intervention of the 
Chinese Communisms threw our forces back 
and made it militarily difficult, if 
not impossible, to achieve the politicalobjective.25
Acheson's statement raises a number of critical questions. 
Why, for example, did the administration fail to foresee the 
likelihood of the Chinese intervention, or at least adopt 
realistic precautions to diminish its occurrence? Earlier 
the administration forbade any action north of the 38th
26parallel if Chinese or Soviets even hinted at intervention.
25Dean Acheson, as cited in MacArthur Hearings, 3:1735.
26Truman, Memoirs, 2:359. MacArthur "was to extend his 
operations north of the parallel and to make plans for the 
occupation of North Korea," but "no ground operations were 
to take place north of the parallel in the event of Soviet
38
Yet, Truman and his advisers later behaved contrary to their 
own warnings. They persisted in a policy which undermined 
American prestige and the goals of the United Nations in 
Korea. To determine why this occurred, the Truman Adminis­
tration's perceptions regarding purity of motive, correctness 
of policy, and the lure of easy victory must be analyzed.
3. Washington's Hopes and Motivations
Truman, as did his advisers, saw only the noblest of 
intentions regarding American objectives in Korea.
The only interest of the United States is 
to help carry out these great purposes of 
the United Nations in Korea. We have abso­
lutely no interest in obtaining any special 
position for the United States in Korea, nor 
do we wish to retain bases. . . .  we would 
like to get our armed forces out and back 
to their other duties at the earliest 
moment consistent with our obligations as 
a member of the United N a t i o n s . 27
Hence they failed to anticipate that United Nations policy
could be perceived as hostile behavior by interested parties.
A prevalent characteristic of the administration, historian
John Lewis Gaddis notes, was a "certain casualness about means
or Chinese entry." Earlier Truman had stated that operations 
were to cease if there was indication or threat of entry.
See also Secretary of Defense George Marshall to the Presi­
dent, September 27, 1950, in FRUS, 19 50, 7:795. Marshall 
requested the President approve implementation of the mili­
tary aspects of NSC 81/1; "Your approval would permit the 
Commander of the United Nations' forces in Korea to conduct 
the necessary military options north of the 38th parallel 
to destroy North Korean forces."
27Harry S. Truman, "Preliminary Statement by the Presi­
dent," Department of State Bulletin 23 (October 23, 1950):643.
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28employed to gain their objectives." These factors give 
insight as to why Truman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JSC) 
eased the restrictions placed upon MacArthur*s freedom of 
action. It further explains the insensitivity displayed 
toward Chinese apprehension over the march to the Yalu River, 
the mutual border of China and Korea. If American actions 
posed no threat to China, then the administration reasoned, 
China lacked a legitimate reason to embark upon a military 
campaign against the forces of the United Nations. Conse­
quently, Truman minimized the possibility of a Chinese 
counteraction in Korea. The administration adopted the 
attitude expressed by its ambassador to India: "In the cir­
cumstances direct participation of China in Korea seems
29beyond range of possibility." If they did intervene, then 
Truman concluded they were the dupes of the Soviet Union.
As he stated, "We hope in particular that the people of 
China will not be misled or forced into fighting against the 
United Nations and against the American people who . . . are 
their friends.
Thus confident of victory, the justness of their cause, 
and reassured of the improbability of Chinese intervention, 
the JCS authorized MacArthur to Cfoss the 38th parallel and
^Gaddis, "Origins of Containment," pp. 512-515.
29Ambassador Henderson (New Delhi) to Secretary of 
State, September 20, 1950, in FRUS, 1950, 7:742.
Truman, Memoirs, 2:354.
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to take steps to unify Korea. In a communique issued on 
September 27, the JCS explicitly warned MacArthur to con­
duct operations deep into the north only if "there had 
been no entry in North Korea by major Soviet or Chinese 
forces, no announcement on intended entry, and no threat"
by the communists to counter militarily United Nations 
31operations. On October 7, Marshall recalled that the
General Assembly legitimized MacArthur’s mission when it
"adopted a resolution restating the essential objectives
of the United Nations as the establishment of a unified
and democratic government of Korea, and recommending that
32all appropriate steps be taken" to accomplish this task.
The desire for, and the expectation of, victory gradually
outran all other political considerations. By October 8,
with the wholehearted endorsement of Truman, Marshall, and
Acheson, the JCS issued another directive to MacArthur:
Hereafter in the event of open or covert 
employment anywhere in Korea of major 
Chinese Communist units, without prior 
announcement, you should continue the 
action as long as, in your judgment, 
action under your control offers a rea­
sonable chance of s u c c e s s . 33
31Ibid., 2:360.
32George Marshall, as cited in MacArthur Hearings, 1:361-362.
33xruman, Memoirs, 2:363. [My emphasis.] See also Collins, 
The Koyean War, pp. 175-177. On October 17, 1950, UN operations 
Order #4 "removed the restrictions on the use of non-Korean 
troops North of the Chongju-Kunri-Yongwon-Hamhung line, re­
strictions that had been stipulated by JCS instructions of 
September 27, 1950." Collins adds that the JCS did not object 
to MacArthur’s action.
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The legacy of Inchon and subsequent successes instilled 
a confidence in military victory, thus causing Truman to 
down play the inherent dangers of the actions of the United 
Nations forces. The President forsook his political judg­
ment and sagacity by placing his faith in the military to 
achieve an ultimate solution. Caution was thrown to the 
wind when Washington placed final responsibility in the 
hands of a man known to support an operation if its chances 
for success were 5,000-to-l.The hope, perhaps even the 
psychological need, for a decisive victory compelled the 
United States to pursue a disastrous policy. In short, a 
victory in Korea would achieve all the objectives the admin­
istration desired. The manner by which these goals were to 
be attained and the prospect of a clear-cut triumph, further 
exhilarated the policy makers in Washington. This sentiment 
was expressed in a Department of Defense memorandum:
In this light, the situation in Korea now 
provides the United States and the free 
world with the first opportunity to dis­
place part of the Soviet orbit. If the 
basic policy of the United States is to 
reduce the preponderant power of the USSR 
in Asia and elsewhere, then UN-operations 
in Korea can set the stage for the non­
communist penetration into an area of 
Soviet influence.^5
For once, on the battlefields of Korea, the frustrations and
3dRees, Korea, pp. 81-85.
35Draft Memorandum Prepared in Department of Defense: 
"United States Course of Action as to Korea," July 31, 1950, 
in FRUS, 1950, 7:506.
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statements characteristic of the Cold War could be swept 
away with one telling blow against communism. The only 
obstacle to this feat would be intervention by the 
Chinese.
4. China Threatens to Intervene
By mid-August the Chinese government had made clear 
that American actions threatened the vital interests and 
security of mainland China. According to David Rees, a 
scholar of the Korean conflict, "with the success of Inchon, 
the whole emphasis of Peking's messages to the West now
changed from propaganda accusations to statements of intent
3 6if the 38th parallel was crossed.11 In a cable to the
United Nations on August 20, Chinese Foreign Minister Chou
En-lai emphasized that "Korea is China's neighbor. The
Chinese cannot but be concerned about the solution of the
Korean question. . . .  It must and can be settled peace- 
37fully." After Inchon, General Nieh Yen-jung, Acting Chief
of Staff of the Chinese Army, informed India's Ambassador
K. M. Panikkar, that the Chinese "did not intend to sit
back . . . and let the Americans come to our borders. . . .
We know what we are in for, but at all costs the American
38aggression must be stopped." Chou publicly voiced these
^Rees, Korea, p. 106.
37Chou En-lai, as cited in George and Smoke, Deterrence,
p. 200.
38Nieh Yen-jung, as cited in Bernstein, "The Policy of
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concerns on September 30. "The Chinese people absolutely 
will not tolerate foreign aggression, nor will they
39tolerate seeing their neighbors being savagely invaded.”
The crossing of the 38th parallel became a causus belli
for China. On October 2, Jewaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister
of India, addressed his parliament:
The Chinese government clearly indicated 
that if the 38th parallel was crossed, 
they would consider it a grave danger 
to their own security and that they . . . 
would not tolerate it. We did, as a 
matter of fact, convey our views to the 
governments of the United States ofAmerica.
Throughout October these warnings .persisted, but without ef­
fect; for United Nations and American troops crossed the 
parallel.
On October 10, China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs pro­
claimed that since the parallel had been crossed, "the 
Chinese people cannot stand idly by with regard to such a 
serious situation created by the invasion of Korea . 
and to the dangerous trend of extending the war."^ Yet, 
despite the continued threats, on October 12, the Central
Risk," p. 18.
3®Chou En-lai, as cited in Allen S. Whiting, China 
Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War 
(New York: Macmillan, 1960), p. 108.
40jewaharlal Nehru, as cited in Stoessinger, Nations 
in Darkness, p. 51.
^Ministry of Foreign Affairs Statement, Radio Peking, 
October 11, 1950, as cited in Whiting, China Crosses the 
Yalu, p. 115.
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Intelligence Agency (CIA) conveyed to the President that 
’'there is no convincing indication of an actual Chinese 
Communist intention to resort to full-scale intervention 
in Korea."4  ̂ The report Was indicative of Washington's 
response to China's warnings. There is little evidence 
that they were accorded the serious attention and analysis 
they warranted.
5. America's Response to China
The flaw which continued to plague American policy 
was the inability to imagine how their adversaries viewed 
United Nations troop movements. Dean Rusk, Assistant Sec^ 
retary of Far Eastern Affairs, inadvertently exposed this 
shortcoming in a speech to a veteran's group. "I have not 
tried to look at them [American decisions] through Asian 
eyes. We are Americans, and it is our business to see 
clearly through American eyes."4"̂ Rather than analyzing 
the Chinese threats, Truman and his advisers dismissed them 
either as bluffs, propaganda, or merely wished them away.
In the words of the Consul General at Hong Kong the Chinese 
were "saberrattling," for domestic and foreign consumption.44
42Memorandum by the Central Intelligence Agency,
October 12, 1950, in FRUS, 1950, 7:933.
A 7Dean Rusk, "Fundamentals of Far Eastern Policy," 
Department of State Bulletin 23 (September 18, 1950) :466.
44Consul General Wilkinson (Hong Kong) to Secretary 
of State, September 25, 19 50, in FRUS, 1950, 7:768.
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Rees observes that the administration believed Peking 
"really, thought the same as it did, and saw that a serious
threat to China did not exist."45 A number of interpreta­
tions, often ambivalent and contradictory, were utilized 
to minimize the threats.
During a television interview on September 7, for 
example, Dean Acheson emphatically contended that since 
United Nations action posed no threat whatever to the 
Chinese, they would not intervene:
I think it would be sheer madness on 
the part of the Chinese Communists to do
that, and I see no advantage to them in
doing it.
Now I give the people in Peiping credit 
for being intelligent to see what is hap­
pening to them. Why they should want to 
further their own dismemberment and de­
struction by getting at cross purposes 
with all the free nations of the world 
who are inherently their friends . 
as against this imperialism coming down 
from the Soviet Union I cannot see. And 
since there is nothing in it for them, I 
don't see why they should yield to what 
is undoubtedly pressures from the Com­
munist movement to get into this Korean 
row.46
The Chinese leaders, Acheson believed, would base their 
policy on national interests and not according to the party 
line. Ironically, much to Acheson's discomfort, this is 
precisely what the Chinese did.
45Rees, Korea, p. 113.
4^Dean Acheson, "Foreign Policies Toward Asia - A Tele­
vision Interview," 23 (September 18, 1950)-463-464.
46
Despite Acheson's contention, Truman was reassured that 
the Chinese would not intervene because of their close ties 
with the Soviet Union. According to General Lawton Collins, 
intelligence reported that "although full-scale Communist 
intervention in Korea should be regarded as a continuing 
possibility, a consideration of all known facts led to the 
conclusion that, barring a Soviet decision for global war, 
such an action was not probable in 1950."^
The erroneous intelligence report was compounded by 
Truman's insensitivity to China's apprehension over the ris­
ing tensions in Korea. There is no concrete evidence that 
Truman ever gave the proper attention to the Chinese that 
the situation demanded. Not once did he propose that pos­
sibly the Chinese were sincere and serious. Rather the warn­
ings were treated as bluffs. The Truman Administration, 
Collins asserts, "generally agreed that Chou's threats were 
a bluff, primarily a last-ditch attempt to intimidate the 
United States.
Thus the warnings were brushed aside as inconsequential. 
MacArthur reassured Truman on this point at the Wake Island 
Conference: "We are no longer fearful of their interven­
tion . . . if the Chinese tried . . there would be the
47Central Intelligence Report, as cited in Collins,
The Korean War, p. 17 5.
Ibid., p. 173. See also Truman, Memoirs, 2:362.
Truman recalled that "it appeared that Chou En-lai's mes­
sage was a bald attempt to blackmail the United Nations by 
threats of intervention in Korea."
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49greatest slaughter." Truman exuded confidence in ultimate 
victory, remaining steadfast in his conviction of the cor­
rectness of American policy. On October 17, upon returning 
from the conference, Truman's speech exemplified this atti^ 
tude:
. . .  I am confident that these forces will 
soon restore peace to the whole of Korea.
. . .  We talked about the plans for estab­
lishing a 'united, independent, and demo­
cratic' government in that country in 
accordance with the resolution of the 
General Assembly of the United Nations.
Our sole purpose in Korea is to estab­
lish peace and independence. Our troops 
will stay there only so long as they are 
needed by the United Nations for that pur­
pose. We seek no territory or special 
privilege. Let this be crystal clear to 
all - we have no aggressive designs in 
Korea or in any other place in the Far 
East or elsewhere.
The United Nations forces are growing 
in strength and are now far superior to 
the forces which still oppose them. The 
power of the Korean Communists to resist 
effectively will soon be at an end.50
As Truman uttered these words, Chinese troops had already
entered Korea.
6. China Intervenes
To give an indication of American expectations at this 
time, there was serious consideration given to redeploying
49Substance of Statements made at Wake Island Confer­
ence, October 15, 1950, in FRUS, 1950, 7:953.
^^Harry S. Truman, "Partnership of World Peace," Depart­
ment of State Bulletin 23 (October 30, 1950):683-684.
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51two divisions for more pressing NATO assignments in Europe. 
The American assuredness of success intensified until United 
Nations troops contacted Chinese troops on October 26. Now 
that a flaw in American assumptions had been revealed, would 
the policy of unification remain fixed or would Washington 
halt MacArthur's drive to the Yalu?
On November 6, in a dispatch to the Embassy in the 
United Kingdom, Acheson acknowledged the seriousness of the 
new development. Nevertheless, he refused to adapt American 
objectives to this dramatic change: "We do not believe how­
ever that we should concede to Peiping any interest whatever
in the internal affairs of Korea or in the unification and
52rehabilitation work to be carried out by the.UN." Acheson
later affirmed that the situation demanded maximum firmness
53and energetic action, not reappraisal. On November 7, the 
Chinese suddenly drew back.^ Yet, during the military pause
“̂ Truman, Memoirs, 2:373.
5 2Secretary of State Dean Acheson (Washington) to Embassy 
in the United Kingdom, November 6, 1950, in FRUS, 1950,
7:1053.
53Secretary of State Dean Acheson (Washington) to the 
United States Mission at the United Nations, November 13,
1.950, in FRUS, 1950, 7:1143-1149.
*^See George and Smoke, Deterrence. chapter 7, for a dis­
cussion of Chinese intentions and motivations in Korea. See 
also Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu. p. 152. Whiting con­
vincingly disputes the contention that China was coerced by 
the Soviets; "China entered the war of her own free will."
See especially Memorandum by the JCS to the Secretary of De­
fense George Marshall, November 9, 19.50, in FRUS. 1950.
7:1117. According to the JCS, commenting upon the first con­
tact with the Chinese: "intervention in Korea must have been
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that followed the administration remained steadfast in its 
conviction that neither the intentions nor the actions of 
the United States threatened China's security. They were 
either unwilling or incapable of relinquishing their hope 
for total victory, the fruits of which had been tasted 
since Inchon.
The administration adopted, a strategy of reassuring 
the Chinese of America's benign intent.55 On November 16, 
the President issued this press release:
Speaking for the United States Govern­
ment and people, I can give assurance 
that we support and are acting within the 
limits of the United Nations policy in
Korea and that we have never at any time
entertained any intention to carry hos­
tilities into China. So far as the 
United States is concerned, I wish to 
state unequivocally that because of our 
deep devotion to the cause of peace and 
our long-standing friendship for the 
people of China we will take every hon­
orable step to prevent any extension of 
the hostilities in the Far E a s t , 56
Earlier, Acheson attempted to quell China's fears, "If they
believe, as their propaganda states, that the United States
has any ulterior designs in Manchuria, everything possible
motivated either by pressure of the USSR or by genuine Chinese 
reasons or by a combination of both. There is no conclusive 
evidence at hand upon which to draw sound inferences as to 
what governs." Nevertheless, when the Chinese intervened on a 
massive scale it was assumed that it was due to Soviet pressure.
S^The Secretary of State Dean Acheson (Washington) to the 
United States Mission at the United Nations, November 7, 1950, 
in FRUS, 1950. 7:1093.
56uarry S. Truman, "U.S. to Take Every Step to Prevent
Extending Hostilities in the Far East," Department of State
Bulletin 23 (November 27, 1950) :852-8-53.
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must be done to disabuse them of such an illusion because
57it is not true.” United States actions resounded oyer 
these official pronouncements, The reason for this is 
simple; Washington did not perceive its actions as threaten­
ing to.China, therefore, its policy remained intact.
The following statement by Dean Acheson illustrates 
the inadequacy of America's response to China's "initial 
intervention and demonstrates the wide gulf between Ameri­
ca's and China's frame of reference:
It may be that they have worries about 
their legitimate interests in the border 
river and in the continuous territories 
on either side. If that is so, every­
thing in the world should be done to 
make them understand that their proper 
interests will be taken care of, and I 
should suppose that there is no country 
in the whole world which has a more out­
standing [record] in developing the 
theory of brotherly development of border 
waters than the United States. On both 
our borders, we have taken the lead in 
doing that. We have worked out with 
Mexico on the Rio Grande and on the 
Colorado River . . . which the two coun­
tries share equitably.
. . . So we really are the people who 
have led the world in international de­
velopment of border waters, and, there­
fore, if the Chinese have any doubts 
that our influence in the United Nations 
would be used to bring about a construc­
tive adjustment of Chinese-Korean in­
terests in the Yalu River, they would be 
very much mistaken if we would not do 
that.58
57Dean Acheson, "United States Foreign Policy," Depart­
ment of State Bulletin 23 (November 27, 1950):855.
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It would require a considerable suspension of the iraagina^ 
tion to visualize Acheson being soothed by such advice as 
the Chinese hordes edged closer to the Rio Grande, even if 
their record on border disputes was unblemished. The 
example of the American reaction to Cuba's regime in Cuba 
should suffice.
In light of Chinese actions, on November 9, the NSC 
reevaluated MacArthur's mission during an emergency meeting. 
Representing the JCS, Omar Bradley felt that since Korea 
was strategically unimportant, continued United States in­
volvement would only serve Russian interests, drain American 
resources, and risk the general welfare of the United States. 
Despite this analysis, the mission's purpose remained fixed. 
According to Acheson, the NSC determined "that General 
MacArthur's directive should not be changed and he should 
do what he could in a military way" to unify Korea.^
On November 8, tjie CIA had reevaluated its previous 
intelligence estimates. According to this latest memo, 
the CIA contended that the Chinese were capable of halting 
the United Nations offensive and forcing a substantial re­
treat. Prior to the crossing of the parallel the Chinese
59Dean Acheson, as cited in Bernstein, "The Policy of 
Risk," p. 21. See also Memorandum of Conversation by 
Ambassador at Large Philip Jessup, November 21, 1950, In 
FRUS. 1950. 7:1205. Marshall "expressed satisfaction that 
Mr. Acheson had stated his belief that General MacArthur 
should push forward with the planned offensive.”
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were unwilling to risk war; but, either due to Soviet pres­
sures or to national interests they were now willing to
naccept the risk. Given the risk of general war, or at 
least entanglement in an insignificant theater, what pos­
sible explanation can there be for America's persistence 
in pursuing unification? In Washington's heart and mind 
Korea was already united, a beaming symbol of American suc­
cess against communist aggression and tyranny* The dream 
was too sweet, whereas reality was too bitter to be faced.
In spite of the risk, Truman sanctioned the renewed drive 
for unification. Victory was essential, and MacArthur 
could deliver it. "But under this obvious truth," Acheson 
later reflected, "I felt uneasy respect for the MacArthur 
mystique. Strange as these manuverings [military opera­
tions] appeared, they could be another 5,000-to-l shot by 
the sorcerer of I n c h o n . E v e n  the stoic Secretary of 
State, who prided his ability for realistic appraisal, 
was seduced by the lure of victory. "As I look back,", he 
later wrote, "the critical period stands as the three weeks 
from October 26 to November 17. Then all the dangers
f\ 7of . . . intervention by the Chinese were manifest."
Acheson, too, had been blinded by the flame which had burnt 
brightly in the "lamp of hope" since July 27, 1950.
6QMemorandum by the Central Intelligence Agency, Novem­
ber 8, 1950, in FRUS, 1950, 7:1101.
^Acheson, Creation, p. 467.
62Ibid., p. 468.
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On November 26, Collins, the Army'-s Chief of Staff,
wired to MacArthur that there was no change in his mission,
which, if successful, should include preparations for elec-
fi Xtions and unification. That same day Acheson wired to 
London:
It seems to me of the greatest importance 
that General MacArthur's operation be given 
every support by the UN. . . . The results 
of his operation will make much more clear 
many matters now obscure, the strength and 
effectiveness of the Chi forces, the inten­
tion and capacity of the Commie authorities 
to support and reinforce them, etc.
Two days later the Chinese enlightened Acheson on these
obscure matters.
On November 26, 1950, the massive Chinese intervention 
shattered the dreams, illusions, and hopes of the Truman Ad^ 
ministration. American policy, since it rested upon 
MacArthur's ability to repeat another Inchon, collapsed 
like a house of cards. A military miracle had become a 
nightmare.
7. The American Response
Even the massive intervention prompted no reappraisal 
by the administration of its fundamental perceptions. Rather
^The Chief of Staff J. Lawton Collins, U. S. Army 
(Washington) to the Commander in Chief Douglas MacArthur,
UN Command, November 24, 1950, in FRUS, 1950, 7:1223-1224.
^The Secretary of State Dean Acheson (Washington) to 
Embassy in the United Kingdom, November 24, 1950, in FRUS, 
1950, 7:1228.
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than a response to American actions, the Truman Administra­
tion perceived the intervention as a hostile, unwarranted
act of aggression. During a meeting on November 28, the 
NSC agreed that the Chinese actions were directed primarily 
by the Soviet U n i o n . " T h e  present aggression," the 
President later said, "is thus revealed as a long calculated 
move to defy the United Nations . . . these Chinese have 
been misled or forced into their reckless attack .. . . to 
further the designs of the Soviet Union." Acheson seconded 
Truman1s conviction:
The Soviet Union was behind everyone of 
the Chinese and North Korean moves and 
that we had to think of all that happened 
in Korea as world matters. We should 
never lose sight of the fact that we are
facing the Soviet Union all around the
world.67
The Chinese leaders were "unfaithful to the characteristics, 
traditions and interests of the Chinese people," since the 
communists, Austin asserted, "had put their necks into the 
Soviet collar."^8 The intervention further entrenched the
^Memorandum Conversation by Ambassador at Large 
Philip Jessup, November 28, 1950, in FRUS, 1950, 7:1242-1249.
66Harry S. Truman, "President*s Message to Congress," De­
partment of State Bulletin 23 (December 11, 1950):927. See 
also United States Delegation Minutes of the First Meeting of 
President Truman and Prime Minister Clement Atlee, December 4, 
1950, in FRUS, 1950, 7:1366-1367. Acheson said: "The Communist 
Chinese were not looking at the matter as Chinese but as Com­
munists who are subservient to Moscow. All they do is based 
on the Moscow pattern, they are better pupils even than the 
East European satellites."
67Truman, Memoirs, 2:387.
68Warren Austin, "U.N. Collective Action Urged Against
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American fear of the communists1 willingness to use force. 
"If there was any doubt," Rusk declared, "that the Com­
munist imperialists were prepared to use force to secure 
their ends, there is no reason for doubt anymore."^9 The 
intervention renewed the administration’s fears that Russia 
had embarked upon a plan of world domination. Warren 
Austin’s fear that the intervention was a "part of the
7 0world-wide pattern of centrally directed imperialism,"
echoed Truman’s concern that "this new act of aggression
in Korea is only a part of a world-wide pattern of danger
71to all the free nations of the world."
After the Chinese forced a humiliating retreat upon 
MacArthur, the restraint, which had characterized the ad­
ministration's behavior prior to Inchon, regained top 
priority. The continued viability of the United Nations, 
the collective security system, the prestige of the United 
States, and the risk of general war once again were the. 
primary concerns of Washington. During the despondent days 
of December, with a catastrophic defeat imminent, the
Communist Regime in China," Department of State Bulletin 24 
(January 29, 1951):166.
6^Dean Rusk, "Our Contribution to Peace," Department 
of State Bulletin 2.4 (January 8, 1951): 65.
70Warren Austin, "U.N. Collective Action Urged Against 
Communist Regime in China," Department of State Bulletin 24 
(January 29, 1951):169.
7lHarry S. Truman, "Chinese Communist - Attack on Korea 
Demands Strengthening of Free World's Defenses," Department 
of State Bulletin 23 (December 11, 1950):926.
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administration refused to negotiate under duress, or to
withdraw ignominiously. "If we gave concessions, they would
only become more aggressive. . . . We should make it a policy
7 2not to recognize the enemy's gains.1' "Of course if we got
thrown out of Korea there would be no negotiations, but we
73would have made pur point," since, as Acheson argued, 
there "was a great difference between being forced out and 
getting out."7  ̂ The administration religiously followed 
the respected authority on Soviet Affairs, George Kennan, 
that the "worst time to negotiate with the Communists was 
from a position of defeat."75
Once the United Nations troops reestablished defensive 
positions against the attack, the situation in Korea sta­
bilized. Washington redirected its focus on more urgent 
concerns. Acheson, among others, feared the entanglement 
in Korea would weaken its position in the world:
The Kremlin probably saw advantages to it 
in the U.S.-Chinese war flowing from di­
version, attrition, and containment of 
U.S. forces in an indecisive theater; the 
creation of a conflict between the United 
States and her European allies and obstruc­
tion of NATO plans; the disruption of UN 
unity against the original aggression in
7^Truman, Memoirs, 2:398.
73Ibid., 2:407.
n A
Acheson, Creation, p. 482.
75Ibid., p. 476.
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Korea; thus aiding communist objectives 
in South East Asia.76
The Truman Administration desperately sought to avoid gen­
eral warfare, but also shared Acheson's dread of "being
77sucked into a bottomless pit."
Truman vowed that the Korean crisis would not divert
America from its vital interests: "I had no intention of
allowing our attention to be diverted from the unchanging
aims and designs of the Soviet policy . . . in our age,
78Europe . . .  is still the key to world peace." On Janu­
ary 8, 1951, in the State of the Union message, Truman 
reaffirmed American priorities. "The heart of our common 
effort is the North Atlantic community," he stated. "The
defense of Europe is the basis for the defense of the
7 9whole free-world - ourselves included." The critical 
significance of Europe to America's security mitigated the 
pressures pushing towards general war and entanglement in a 
peripheral area of the world.
An overriding factor which prompted the original 
United States intervention was a commitment to a viable
76Ibid., p. 474.
7 7Dean Acheson, as cited in David S. McLellan, Dean 
Acheson: The State Department Years (New York: Dodd, Mead 
and Co. * 1976), p. 296. ~  ~
78Truman, Memoirs, 2:380.
79Harry S. Truman, "The State of the Union Address," 
Department of State Bulletin 24 (January 22, 1951):125.
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collective security system, therefore the United States 
took care not to weaken or destroy this system during the 
prosecution of the war, "If we go it alone in Asia,"
Truman stated, "we may destroy the unity of free na­
tions . . . the whole idea of going it alone is the op-
80posite of everything we stood for - since World War II."
United Nations actions which might spark escalation were
to be avoided at all costs. According to Acheson, a policy
which threatened America's allies was not feasible:
We cannot expect that our collective- 
security system will long survive if we 
take steps which unnecessarily and dan­
gerously expose the people who are in 
the system with us. . . .In relation 
to the total world threat, our safety 
requires that we strengthen, not weaken, 
the bond of our collective security 
system.81
For these reasons MacArthur's demands to expand the war were 
rejected and explain the subsequent dismissal from his com­
mand. During the MacArthur Hearings, Marshall .testified that:
General MacArthur . . . would have us 
on our own initiative carry the conflict 
beyond Korea against the mainland of Com­
munist China, ; . . He would have us 
accept the risk of involvement * . . in 
an all-out war with the Soviet Union. He 
would have us do this even at the expense 
of losing our allies and wrecking the 
coalition of free peoples throughout the
80Harry S. Truman, "Why We Need Allies," Department of 
State Bulletin 24 (May 14, 1951) :765.
81Dean Acheson, as cited in MacArthur Hearings, 3:1719.
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world. He would have us do this even 
though the effort of such an action 
might expose Western Europe to attack 
by the millions of Soviet troops poised 
in middle and eastern E u r o p e .
Consequently the United States drew back after the Chinese
intervention, resuming a policy of restraint and limiting
its ambitions to the restoration of the status quo ante
bellum. On April 5, ,1951, the JCS conveyed to Acheson that
"For the first time we conceded that 'the Korean problem
cannot be resolved in a manner satisfactorily to the United
83States by military action alone."' America returned to 
its original objectives of maintaining a viable collective 
security system, of avoiding a general war, and of strength­
ening Europe, the key area to world peace. A policy of re­
straint was pursued in order to avoid involvement, in the 
now famous words of Bradley, "in the wrong war, at the
84wrong place, at the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy."
8. The Impact of Korea
As previously mentioned, the intervention by the Chinese 
strengthened the American belief that the communists were 
engaging in a plan of world conquest by force. The Korean
8 2George Marshall, as cited in MacArthur Hearings,
!: 441..
8 3JCS Memorandum to the Secretary of State, April 5, 
1951, as cited in Collins, The Korean War, p. 304.
84Omar Bradley, as cited in MacArthur Hearings, 1:732.
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War, especially China’s actions, globalized the Cold War. 
American ieaders now perceived that the greatest threat 
to the free world, to Europe, might come from the East.
John Foster Dulles, the next Secretary of State, voiced 
this rising concern in a radio address on March 1, 1951:
. . . Many seem to think that our safety 
is linked only to the West, meaning 
Europe, and that the East can be ignored.
But just as the United States would be in
peril if Europe was overrun, so also we 
and Europe would be in peril if the East 
were overrun. We should never forget 
that Stalin, long ago, laid it down that 
as basic Communist strategy that 'the 
road to victory over the West' lies 
through the E a s t . 85
This perspective was shared by high officials in Truman’s
Administration. "The fact that our Far Eastern policy and
our European policy have been separately debated," Acheson
maintained, "should not lead us to the fatal error of re-
86garding these policies as being divorced from one another." 
MacArthur expressed these sentiments held by the administra­
tion when he testified, "I believe the first line of defense 
now, for Europe, is right where we are fighting over there 
in Korea. It is a global effort, and if you breach that, it
8 7will roll around to Europe as sure as the sun rolls around."
85John Foster Dulles, "Laying Foundations for a Pacific 
Peace," Department of State Bulletin 24 (March 17, 1951):403.
o
Dean Acheson, "Our Far Eastern Policy," Department of 
State Bulletin 24 (April 30, 1951):683.
87Douglas MacArthur, as cited in MacArthur Hearings,
1:263.
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America now gave more attention to Asia and to Soviet 
designs in the area. Asia, Washington perceived, was en­
gaged in a life-death struggle with Chinese and Soviet 
communism. Acheson feared the rise of communism in the 
area since "it is really the spearhead of Russian imperi­
alism which would . . . take from these people . . . their
88own national independence." . Omar Bradley considered Asia 
crucial to America's security and declared:
From a global viewpoint - and with the 
security of our nation of prime importance - 
our military mission is to support a policy 
of preventing communism from gaining the 
manpower, the resources, the raw materials, 
and the industrial capacity essential to 
world domination. If Soviet Russia ever 
controls the entire Eurasia land mas$, then 
the Soviet-satellite imperialism may have 
its broad base upon which to build the 
military power to rule t h e  w o r l d . 89
Soon it was believed that communism had to be actively
resisted throughout the world. "I believe the problem is
a global one," MacArthur admonished. "I believe we should
90defend every place from communism. I believe we can."
A respected Cold War scholar notes that "the question of 
whether communism motivated Moscow’s policy was left
00Dean Acheson, "Crisis in Asia - An Examination of 
U. S. Policy," Department of State Bulletin 22 (January 23, 
1950):114.
89Omar Bradley, as cited in MacArthur Hearings, 1:731.
90Douglas MacArthur, as cited in MacArthur Hearings, 
1:81 and 120.
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91unclear,”
The original aggression and then the traumatic inter­
vention by China, reinforced the administration’s suspicions 
that all communist activities were sinister instruments of 
Soviet, and now Chinese, expansion. John Gaddis observes:
By getting into an unnecessary fight 
with the Chinese Communists, the Truman 
Administration encouraged the view that 
international communism was a monolith 
that had to be resisted wherever it 
appeared. . ... . [I]t was easy for suc­
ceeding administrations to jump to the 
conclusion that there was no distinction 
between the peripheral and vital inter­
ests, that threats to order anywhere 
endangered American security elsewhere.
Acheson vehemently argued that America could no longer afford 
to distinguish between big and little aggressions and there­
fore "we must be vigorous everywhere," especially when
93American interests were threatened.
An area now perceived to be vital and threatened was
Indochina. With Korea, Truman asserted, "We are seeing a
pattern in Korea as a challenge to the free world . . .  by
94the Communists." Acheson recalled years later that John 
Ohley, a State Department colleague, had warned that America 
ought to look "at where it was headed in Indochina." Ohley
91Gaddis, "Origins of Containment," p. 515.:
92Ibid., p. 518.
93Memorandum of Conversation, by Ambassador at Large 
Philip Jessup, December 5, 1950, in'FRUS, 1950, 7:1383.
94.Truman, Memoirs, 2:380.
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feared that the United States would supplant the French in 
Indochina and that direct intervention would follow. He 
concluded that "these situations have a way of snowballing," 
but his words went unheeded. Acheson candidly admitted,
"I decided, however, that having put our hand to the plow, 
we would not look back.”95 America would not look back for 
over twenty years.
In his memoirs, Anthony Eden, a former British Prime 
Minister, expressed his admiration for the decisive, yet 
restrained American policy in Korea. He especially praised 
the United States avoidance of entanglement on the Asian 
continent. "They had no taste for war on the Chinese main­
land, They understood the danger of that tar baby. But
future tar babies would be difficult to avoid in Asia, given 
American attitudes and perceptions following Korea.
95John Ohley, as cited in Acheson, Creation, p. 674.
96Sir Anthony Eden, Full Circle (London: Cassell, 1960),
p. 14.
CHAPTER III
PROBLEMS IN PERCEPTION IN DIPLOMACY: THE
TRUMAN AND EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATIONS 
IN VIETNAM, 1945-1960
The course upon which we are today 
moving is one, as I see it, so little 
promising and so fraught with danger,
. . . In Indo-China we are getting our­
selves into the position of guarantee­
ing the French in an undertaking which 
neither they nor we, nor both of us 
together can win.i
George Kennan
Most observers of international politics after World 
War II stressed the further decline of European civilization 
with the ascendance of Russia and the United States as the 
dominant powers of the world. Little attention, however, 
was given to the consequences of the war in Asia. Franklin 
Roosevelt and Harry Truman initially desired to foster a 
new world order conducive to American interests. Stalin 
wanted to consolidate the Soviet Union's security needs in 
Eastern Europe, and Charles DeGaulle aspired to restore to 
France its "grandeur." But these visions and ambitions of
^Counselor George Kennan to the Secretary of State, 
August 21, 1950, in FRUS, 1950, 7:623-624.
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the great actors were of minor concern to the emerging 
leaders of Asia. Instead, Asian peoples hoped to seize 
upon the opportunities which ensued following the postwar 
period. The dream of Asia was to rid their homelands Of 
foreign domination.
Throughout Asia, the outbreak of World War II with the
early victories of the Japanese against the Western powers
inaugurated a period of intense nationalism on the Continent.
Psychologically, these momentary triumphs symbolized the
liberation of Asia. John F. Cady, a Southeast Asian scholar,
contends that the dramatic victories of the Japanese laid
bare "the myth of Western invincibility . . . and Asia for
?the Asiatics became the universally accepted goal." The 
deep-seated resentment toward colonial rule combined with 
this yearning for national independence created a movement 
with a profound emotional and intellectual potency. Na­
tionalism swept across Asia acquiring a fervor which lingers 
to this day.
1. The American Quandry of Colonialism 
Versus Communism
After World War II, the process of rapid decolonization 
left a number of weak emerging states' ]groping~f or’their ’ 
proper place in Southeast Asia. The absence of indigenous
2John F. Cady, The History of Post-War Southeast Asia 
(Athens: Ohio University Press, 1974), p. 1.
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strength or unity attracted outside powers to fill the vacuum.
These countries sought to reassert Western dominance in the
area, a goal antagonistic to the aspirations of Southeast
Asia. A scholar observed that "decolonization . , . opened
a Pandora's box of national rivalries and conflicting na-
3tional interests m  Southeast Asia." Hence Southeast Asia 
became vulnerable to historical forces of enormous complexity 
and endurance. The hornet's nest created by nationalism, 
decolonization, and postwar readjustment demanded a patient 
response cognizant of the nuances and power of these phe-̂  
nomena. During the transitional era of nation building, 
the region's maze of problems refused to yield to.easy or 
pat solutions.
As the promise of national independence enthralled 
Asian nationalists, American policy makers deciphered the 
import Of the forces unleashed by the war from a distinct 
and unique perspective. While Asia embarked upon a period 
of nation building, the United States emerged as a nation 
of awesome and unprecedented strength. Although hopeful 
of a postwar world of peace and order, by late 1946 or 
early 1947 America's leaders surmised that the country's 
proper role in world affairs would be as leader of the free 
-.world against Soviet expansion.^ Consequently, despite an
3Russell H. Fifield, Americans in Southeast Asia: The 
Roots of Commitment (New York: Thomas Crowell Co., 19731 , 
p. 244.
4 -Daniel Yergin, Shattered Peace: The Origins of the
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appreciation of the intensity and legitimacy of Asian na­
tionalism, American decision makers shared a conviction 
that Soviet communism and imperialism constituted the most 
potent and dangerous force of the postwar era.
Thus the seeds were sown that confronted Washington 
with a genuine problem which plagueid its Asian policy for 
years: How could the U.S. reconcile its predominant fear
of Soviet expansion in Asia while at the same time recog­
nizing the authentic goals of the Asian peoples? In 1955, 
a remark by an official of Eisenhower's Administration ex­
posed the dilemma which haunted United States policy from 
Truman until Nixon:
Although in American eyes no problem 
stands out more predominantly in Asia, 
especially in Southeast Asia, than the 
threat of Communist aggression and sub­
version, we realize that to most of the 
leaders and peoples of this vast region 
the threat of communism is no more than 
a secondary concern and that their in­
terests and emotions are centered on such 
questions as 'colonialism,' 'nationalism,' 
and 'neutralism.'̂
As the tensions of the Cold War increased, the gap between
these priorities widened.
Though American policy from 1945 to 1947 favored the
Cold War and the National Security State (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin Co., 1977). See also Robert Donovan, Conflict and 
Crisis: The Presidency of Harry S. Truman 1945-1948 (New 
York: W. W. Norton, 1977), and Gaddis, Origins of the Cold 
War.
^Walter S. Robertson, "The United States Looks at South 
and Southeast Asia," Department of State Bulletin 33 
(August 22, 1955):295.
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restoration of French rule to Indochina, the Truman Adminis­
tration considered Vietnam a peripheral area of the world. 
Therefore even though its consequences proved significant, 
subsequent policy would not be formulated as if vital in­
terests were at stake. George C. Herring, a Cold War his­
torian, contends that since America found itself "caught 
between the demands of European colonialism and nationalism, 
the Truman administration adopted what the State Department 
described as a ‘hands-off p o l i c y w h i c h  remained fixed
f\until at least 1947. Europeanists within the Department 
were the catalysts behind this policy. H. Freeman Mathews, 
the Director of the State Department's Office of European 
Affairs, and James C. Dunn, the Assistant Secretary of State, 
profoundly influenced Southeast Asian policy. Both promul­
gated pro-French sentiments and even prior to 1946 anticipated 
the apprehension of Soviet designs on Europe which later 
characterized American policy. For them anti-colonialism 
remained a mere abstraction, whereas France's security and 
might became linked to America's vital interests. Hence the 
United States casually recognized the return of French 
sovereignty to Indochina, quite oblivious to what this 
acquiescence would portend.
^George C. Herring, "The Truman Administration and the 
Restoration of French Sovereignty in Indochina," Diplomatic 
History 1 (Summer 1977):113.
7Ibid., pp. 97-,117.
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In January 1947 , Abbot Low Moffat of the Division of
Southeast Asian Affairs protested that the hands-off policy
was narrowly based upon European considerations and if con?
tinued would cost Washington its influential role in South- 
8east Asia. As Cold War tensions increased, Moffat's con­
cern went unheeded and his advice formally rejected. The 
administration responded with the Truman Doctrine and the 
Marshall Plan as Soviet-American ill will hardened over 
crises in Greece, Turkey, and throughout Europe. The key­
stone of America's containment policy was Western Europe. 
Therefore as America's interests now coincided with the 
French, its policy in Southeast Asia changed. On May 13, 
1947, Secretary of State George Marshall cabled to the 
American Embassy in France that "we cannot conceive setbacks
to [the] long-range interests [of] France which would not
9also be setbacks to our own." Nevertheless, Marshall 
acknowledged that if France neglected to satisfy Indochina's 
nationalist aspirations then Western democracy would succumb 
to Soviet communism in Asia. But this awareness never com­
pelled the Truman Administration to abandon France's ambi­
tions in favor of Asian nationalism. The dreaded Soviet 
threat to Europe formed the highest priority of the adminis­
tration throughout its tenure. France, not Indochina, lured
8Consul General Josselyn (Singapore) to the Secretary 
State, January 7, 1947, in FRUS, 1947, 6:54-55.
9Secretary of State George Marshall (Washington) to 
the Embassy in France, May 13, 1947, in FRUS, 1946, 6:95,
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America's intention and energies to its cause. America’s 
ideals, interests, and survival were at stake, and France 
was a close, ally.10
With the leaders of America preoccupied by the Cold War, 
it became increasingly difficult for the United States to 
appraise the situation in Asia objectively. Accordingly,
Asia and its complexities were viewed by Washington through 
the prism of the Cold War. Hence the American dilemma of 
maintaining the delicate balance between the forces of anti­
colonialism, nationalism, and communism became acute.
During a later Congressional hearing in 1972, Moffat
testified that toward the end of 1946 the State Department
directed its energies chiefly to the rise of a Soviet
controlled monolithic communist bloc. Previously "we could,
until the fear of Communism affected objectivity, analyze
problems without the handicap of self-interest, prejudice,
11pride or domestic problems." Subsequently, however, "as 
Department concern about the Communist domination of the 
Vietnamese government became more apparent and more uncriti­
cal, we began . . .  to allow our fears of such domination to
12overrule our better judgment." Still from 1946 to 1948
1(̂ See Gaddis, Origins of the Cold War.
■^Abbot Low Moffat, as cited in U.S., Congress, Senate, 
Committee on Foreign Relations, Causes. Origins, and Lessons 
of the Vietnam War. Hearings, 92d Cong., 2d, sess., May 7-
11, 1972, p. 169. (Hereafter cited as Causes and Origins.)
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uncertainty and doubt characterized American policy. The 
United States groped for a coherent and guiding philosophy 
regarding its Southeast Asia policy. The tendency to stress 
the containment Of communism in Asia received added impetus 
from the communist successes in China.
Even prior to the culmination of the Chinese Revolution,
America’s fear of communism in Asia; manifested itself. On
October 13, 1948,. the Acting Secretary of State dispatched
a cable which stated that the Soviet’s aim in Southeast Asia
was "to substitute the influence of the USSR for that of the
western powers in such manner and degree as to ensure Soviet
control being as surely installed and predominant as in the
13satellite countries behind the Iron Curtain." Under the 
guise of nationalism the Soviet Union, according to the 
State Department, exploited Asian aspirations for their own 
ends. The Russian objectives were implemented "almost ex­
clusively [by] Chinese Communist guidance of Southeast Asian 
movements."1  ̂ This dispatch was indicative, claims one 
scholar, of the American disquiet "that the pattern of post­
war expansion in Eastern Europe was now to be repeated in 
Asia, with Peking, as rigidly controlled as European satel­
lites, serving as Moscow's junior partner and Asian bases.
■^Director for European Affairs John D. Hickerson (Wash­
ington) to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices, "Pattern 
of Soviet Policy in Far East and Southeast Asia," October 13, 
1948, in FRUS, 1948, 1:643.
14Ibid.
■^^Evelyn Colbert, Southeast Asia in International Politics
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In this context, the question whether Ho Chi Minh was a com­
munist acquired a sense of urgency within the State Depart­
ment .
Ho Chi Minh, a cross-fertilization between European
communism and Asian nationalism was, according to John
Stoessinger, "probably one of the most complex figures of 
16modern times." Ho did not consider communism and nation­
alism as antagonistic ideologies. Rather, Ho thought they 
were mutually supportive. However, American policy makers 
were unable to make this distinction.
From 1945 to 1946 the Truman Administration's attitude 
towards Ho can best be described as an ambivalent one, 
marred by inattention and ignorance. By late 1946, as un­
easiness about Soviet expansion magnified, the inclination
17to view Ho as a tool of the Kremlin gained respectability.
As Moffat later testified, American leaders allowed the Cold
War to "let the nationalistic feelings of the country recede
in importance and we ignored the father figure that Ho Chi
1 8Minh was becoming for most Vietnamese."
While serving as Acting Secretary of State, Dean Acheson
1941-1956 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), p. 127.
"^Stoessinger, Nations in Darkness, p. 66. •
17Colbert, Southeast Asia, pp. 125-130. See also Cady, 
Southeast Asia, pp. 18-26.
18Abbot Low Moffat, as cited in Causes and Conflicts,
p. 169.
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in late 1946 wired the following cable to the American Consul 
in Saigon: "Keep in mind Ho';s clear record as [an] agent
[of] international communism . . . [since the] least desir­
able eventuality would be [the] establishment [of a]
19Communist-dominated Moscow-oriented state [in] Indochina." 
Later, on February 3, 1947, a State cable to France warned 
of Ho's direct communist connections and registered its op­
position to "seeing colonial empire administration supplanted 
by [a] philosophy and political organizations emanating and 
controlled by [the] Kremlin."20
Still this view had not yet become the basis of American 
policy in Southeast Asia. The American Consuls to Hanoi and 
Saigon, James L. O'Sullivan and Charles Reed II, cautioned 
the State Department not to foreclose debate on the nature 
of Ho's allegiances. Their wires to Washington stated that 
though a communist, existing evidence indicated that Ho was 
first and foremost an ardent nationalist. Both expressed 
concern that if the United States continued its support of
the French, Ho would have little choice but to align himself
21more firmly with the communist camp.
19Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson to Abbot Low 
Moffat, December 5, 1946, as cited in U.S., Congress, Senate, 
Committee on Foreign Relations, A Staff Study Based on the 
Pentagon Papers. 92d Cong., 2d seSs., April 3, 1972, pp.
18-19. (Hereafter cited as Staff Study.)
20Secretary of State George Marshall (Washington) to 
American Embassy in Paris, February 3, 1947, Staff Study,
p. 20.
21Consul Reed (Saigon) to Secretary of State, June 14,
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Secretary Marshall questioned the validity of the grow­
ing acceptance among the French and State Department that Ho 
was merely the pawn of the Soviet Union. Marshall felt that 
’’the impression here [is that] Ho [is] publicly attempting
22to walk [a] chalked line between nationalism and Communism.” 
The same dilemma confronted the Americans; it would prove 
difficult indeed to walk its own chalked line in Southeast 
Asia.
The Chinese Revolution with the establishment of a com­
munist base of operations in Asia accentuated the tendency to 
banish Ho to the communist bloc. For Washington, Mao Tse- 
tung1s victory against the Chinese Nationalists was feared 
as a harbinger of a trend that would sweep across Asia.
The administration dreaded a repetition of the Soviet domi-
23nation of Eastern Europe in Asia. By 1949 Acheson pro­
claimed that:
the question [ofj whether Ho [was] as much 
[a] nationalist as [a] Commie . . . [was] 
irrelevant. All Stalinists in colonial 
areas are nationalists . . .  with [the] 
achievement [of] national aims their ob­
jective becomes subordinate to Commie 
purposes . . .on [the] basis [of] . . .
Eastern Europe it must be assumed JTthat] 
such would be [the] goal [of] H o . ? 4
1947, in FRUS, 1947, 6:103-105, See also Reed’s dispatches of 
July 19, and 24, pp. 119-120, 123-126. See Vice.Consul O’Sul­
livan to Secretary of State, July 19, 1947, in FRUS, 1947, 6:120.
^Secretary of State George Marshall (Washington) to Con­
sulate General at Saigon, July 17, 1947, in FRUS, 1947, 6:116.
23colbert, Southeast Asia, p. 126.
24secretary of State Dean Acheson (Washington) to American
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In October 1949, a State memorandum concluded that any ’'Com­
munist activity, particularly Chinese and Vietnamese expan­
sion into Southeast Asia, is an expression of Soviet imperi­
alism.”25
By late 1949, America’s specific goal of containing the 
Soviet Union began to be blurred by an anxiety of communist 
activity in general. The United States was either unwilling 
or unable to distinguish any fundamental differences between 
Soviet and Asiatic communism. America’s Ambassador to France, 
the late David Bruce, cabled to Acheson that "I assume [that] 
no responsible American official believes that we can afford 
to take a chance that Asiatic Communism will in a reasonable
future become a national Communism more friendly to [the] US
26than to the USSR.” A risk of such magnitude was unthink­
able in a world perceived to be so threatening. One could 
not gamble when world peace was at stake.
2. A Turning Point
Whatever doubts the Truman Administration entertained 
about Ho's loyalties were strengthened by Moscow's and 
Peking’s recognition of his regime on January 22, 1950.
Consul in Hanoi, May 20, 1949, in Staff Study, pp. 21-22.
2 5Assistant Secretary of State Far Eastern Affairs W. 
Walton Butterworth (Washington), October 20, 1949, in FRUS, 
1949, 7:93. “
Ambassador to France David K. Bruce (Paris) to Sec­
retary of State, December 11, 1949, in FRUS, 1949, 7:106.
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"The Soviet acknowledgement of this movement," Acheson 
asserted, "should remove any illusions as to the 'nation­
alist1 nature of Ho Chi Minh1s aims and reveals Ho in his
true colors as the mortal enemy of national independence 
27in Indochina." The administration failed to comprehend 
that an authentic nationalist could espouse communist doc­
trine.
Philip C. Jessup, Truman's Ambassador at Large, best
exemplified the administration's attitude. By 1949, he
states, "the evidence showed that Ho was the most dangerous
28and powerful agent of Soviet Communism in Far East Asia." 
Jessup added that "unless there were proofs to the con­
trary we must assume Ho was and would remain a Moscow 
29stooge." When testifying to Congress on March 29, 1950, 
Jessup rebutted Senator Green's accusation that America 
was blindly embarking on a universal commitment to a status 
quo susceptible to revolutionary ferment: "It is now per­
fectly clear that Ho Chi Minh is a Moscow-trained Communist
27Dean Acheson, as cited in Senator Mike Gravel, ed. ,
The Senate Gravel Edition: The Defense Department History of 
the United States Decisionmaking on Vietnam. 4 vols. (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1971), 1:41. (Hereafter cited as the Pentagon 
Papers.) The other edition, the government version of the 
so-called "Pentagon Papers" will be cited as: U.S., Department 
of Defense, United States-Vietnam Relations. 1945-1967. 12 
vols. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1971). (Here­
after cited as U.S.-Vietnam Relations.)
^Philip C. Jessup, The Birth of Nations (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1974), p. 168.
29Ibid., p. 167.
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and the leading figure in the Communist drive in Southeast 
30Asia." This perception apparently justified America's 
policy of supporting the French over Ho Chi Minh.
As early as July 15, 1948, Marshall informed the French 
that America "would materially assist in strengthening [the]
hands of [the] nationalists as opposed to [the] Communists
31in Indochina." By mid-1949, Dean Acheson endorsed a dip­
lomatic note stating that the paramount issue in Indochina
was whether it would be spared the ordeal of communist 
32domination. However, as indicated by Acheson's testimony,
the United States hoped to wash its hands in respect to
French colonialism:
If we put ourselves sympathetically on 
the side of nationalism, which is the domi­
nant spiritual force in that area, we put 
ourselves on the side of the thing which 
more than anything else can oppose com­
munism. . . .  We will get nowhere, I think, 
by supporting the French as a colonial 
power against Indochina.33
Subsequent events would ease America’s qualms concerning its
association with the French.
30Philip C. Jessup, as cited in U.S., Congress, Senate, 
Committee on Foreign Relations, Reviews of the World Situa­
tion: 1949-50. Executive Session Hearings, 81st Cong., 1st 
and 2d sess., 1950, p. 268. (Hereafter cited as World 
Situation.)
31Secretary of State George Marshall (Washington) to 
Embassy in France, July 14, 1948, in FRUS, 1948, 6:33.
32Director for Far Eastern Affairs W. Walton Butter- 
wroth (Washington) to Embassy in France, in U.S.-Vietnam 
Relations, Book 8, V.B.3., I, pp. 208-209.
33Jessup, Nations, p. 171.
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Shortly after the Chinese Revolution, Acheson revealed 
the administration's Asian policy to Jessup: "You will
please take as your assumption," he said, "that it is a 
fundamental decision of American policy that the United 
States does not intend to permit further extension of Com­
munist domination of the continent or in the Southeast 
34Asian area." Therefore, prior to the Korean War, Wash­
ington hoped to curb Soviet expansion in Asia. On December 
23, 1949, a National Security Council study, NSC 48, con­
cluded that communist domination of China facilitated Soviet
35aims around the globe, especially in Asia. A later NSC 
study contended:
It is important to United States secur­
ity needs that all practical measures be 
taken to prevent further communist expan­
sion in Southeast Asia. Indochina is a 
key area of Southeast Asia and is under 
immediate threat.36
America's concerns were limited to policy statements. Soon
events compelled the administration to act.
34 Instructions of Secretary of State Dean Acheson to 
Philip C. Jessup, U.S. , Congress, Senate, in Nomination of 
Philip C. Jessup. Sub-committee Hearings* 82d Cong., 1st 
sess., September 27 - October 15, 1951, p. 603.
*^NSC 48/1, "Report by the National Security Council 
on the Position of the United States with Respect to Asia," 
December 23, 1949, in U.S.^Vietnam Relations, Book 8, V.B.2., 
I, pp. 226-244. “
7 r
NSC 64, "Report by the National Security Council on 
the Position of the United States with Respect to Indo­
china," February 27, 1950, in U.S.-Vietnam Relations, Book 8, 
V.B.2., II, p. 285. ~
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The United States quickly recognized and praised the
French ratification of the Elysee Agreement on February 2,
371950. The accord promised the future independence of 
Indochina with the French Union. Consequently, the United 
States commenced its program of direct aid to French Indo­
china, thus initiating the formal bi-polarization of Viet­
nam. By May 1, 1950, Truman authorized ten million dollars 
of aid to Indochina. Three weeks later Acheson justified 
the extension of economic and military aid since "neither
national independence nor democratic evolution can exist
38in any area dominated by Soviet imperialism." During the 
first week of June, Acheson explicitly linked France's 
effort in Indochina to the free world's conflict against 
communism by announcing Washington’s resolve to support the 
French "in their struggle to preserve the freedom and inte­
grity of Indochina from the Communist forces of Ho Chi 
Minh."39
Though America increased its effort to contain Soviet 
expansion in Asia, the commitment was restricted largely to 
philosophic outlook and rhetoric. This is evident by
37Gravel, Pentagon Papers, 1:40-41.
38Dean Acheson, "Economic and Military Aid Urged for 
Indochina," Department of State Bulletin 22 (May 22, 1950): 
821.
39Dean Acheson, as cited in U.S., Congress, Senate, Com­
mittee on Foreign Relations, Mutual Defense Assistance Pro­
gram, 1950-1951, p. 8. (Hereafter cited as Mutual Defense.)
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Acheson*s refusal to apply the Truman Doctrine universally 
to China,4  ̂by the hope that a wedge between the Soviets 
and Chinese could be implanted,41 and finally by the ex­
clusion of Korea from America's vital interests in Acheson's 
infamous "defense perimeter" address of January 12, 1950. 
Acheson clarified America's attitude on April 11, 1950:
It is not defeatism r on the contrary it 
is the beginning of victory - to arrive at 
a realistic recognition of the limitation's 
of one's own strength. We will bring our­
selves nothing but confusion by thinking 
that we are so strong that there is some 
way by which our government can determine 
what is to go on in every country every­
where. 42
Nevertheless, the United States had moved gradually away from 
the distinction between nationalism and communism in Southeast 
Asia. In an era of insecurity the fine line between peripheral 
and vital interests blurred as America's security needs proved 
elusive of precise definition.
Three weeks prior to war in Korea Acheson testified to 
Congress that "The interests of the United States are global 
in character. A threat to the peace of the world anywhere is 
a threat to our own security."43 The outbreak of war bestowed
40isjorman A. Graebner, "Dean G. Acheson," in An Uncertain 
Tradition: American Secretaries of State in the Twentieth 
Century, ed. Norman A. Graebner (New York; McGraw-Hill Book 
Company, Inc., 1961), p. 281.
41World Situation, p. 273,
42pean Acheson, as cited in McLellan, "Operational 
Code," p. 67.
43pean Acheson, as cited in Mutual Defense, p. 8.
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upon this judgment a compelling logic. The debate within 
the Truman Administration between a foreign policy reflect­
ing realistic restraint or global universalism ceased.
The reverberations emitted by the Korean conflict 
further entrenched the globalism of America's foreign policy. 
One scholar, asserts that "in many ways Korea did for the 
Cold War what Pearl Harbor had done for World War 11."^ 
Former benefits, doubts, and suspicions held about Soviet 
intentions were transformed to convictions tested by the 
fires of war. In a special message to Congress, Truman 
affirmed that "the communist aggression in Korea dispelled 
any lingering doubts that the Kremlin is willing to threaten 
the peace of the w o r l d . F r o m  now until the late 1960s 
these convictions hardened into dogma, inspiring a loyalty 
usually reserved for truths carved in stone.
The outbreak of war confirmed the validity of the hard­
line approach and the worst-case analysis. The principles 
and speculations espoused in NSC 68 became recognized as 
fact.^6 A response to the Russian atomic blast of 1949,
NSC 68 was a didactic report which advocated reversing the 
policy of accommodation with the Soviets. Although not a
44Lisle A. Rose, Roots of Tragedy: The United States 
and the Struggle for Asia (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 
1976) , p. 242.
45Harry S. Truman, as cited in Rose, Roots of Tragedy, 
p. 241. -------- :----  —
^Commander Robert M. Laske, ed., "NSC-68: A Report to 
the National Security Council," Naval War College Review 27 
(May/June 197 5):51-108.
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blueprint for future action, one scholar believes that "the 
document does reflect the broad perspective that governed 
the major policy decisions of the Korean war period."47 
The major premises of the report stated: the world was
polarized by the forces of freedom and slavery; the struggle 
was ideological in nature, especially in Asia; and only the 
United States could halt Soviet designs of world hegemony if 
it asserted its will. During this period of crises, the re­
port continued, world peace would be jeopardized more by the 
restraint of American power than by its excessive use, for 
"our fundamental purpose is more likely to be defeated from 
the lack of will to maintain it, than from any mistake we may
make or assault we may undergo because of asserting that 
48will." The report concluded:
Our position as the center of power in 
the free world places a heavy responsibility 
upon the United States for leadership. We 
must organize and enlist the energies and 
resources of the free world in a positive 
program for peace which will frustrate the 
Kremlin design for world domination. . . .
Without such a cooperative effort, led by 
the United States, we will have to make 
gradual withdrawals under pressure until 
we discover one day that we have sacrificed 
positions of vital interests.49
Overnight the Korean War, in dramatic fashion, crystallized
these thoughts by giving them legitimacy and an urgency to
47Ibid., p. 52.
48Ibid., pp. 108-109. 
49Ibid., p. 1Q7.
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act. After Korea, America proved willing to frustrate the 
Kremlin's world ambitions and to extend its definition of 
what regions were vital to its security.
America viewed the Cold War now as total, thus the 
United States defined its commitment to peace as a global 
task. Previous distinctions between peripheral and vital 
interests became seemingly irrelevant. The noted commenta­
tor and journalist Edward R. Murrow captured the mood of 
Washington:
This action, this new policy, Commits us 
to much more than the defense of the 
southern half of the Korean peninsula.
We have commitments quite as binding, 
obligations quite as great to Indo­
china, Iran, and Turkey as we have to 
Korea. We have drawn a line, not across 
the peninsula, but across the world.50
After Korea the administration lived up to the rhetoric of
the Truman Doctrine. According to the historian Arthur
Schlesinger, Jr., where "Truman at first applied his Doctrine
sparingly, events, especially after Korea, began to generalize
• +. u 5 i  it."
While initiation of hostilities caught the administra­
tion unaware, the Chinese intervention raised America's fears 
of communist aggressions to a fevered pitch. The following 
remark, though made by a member of Eisenhower's Administration,
“̂ Edward Bliss, Jr., ed., In Search of Light: The Broad­
casts of Edward R. Murrow, 1938-1961 (New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1967).
51Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., as cited in Causes and Origins,
p. 72.
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expressed sentiments similar to those of Truman:
This event demonstrated beyond question not 
only the solidarity of the Peiping regime's 
alignment with the Communist bloc but also 
its willingness and ability to resort to 
open aggression in pursuit of bloc objec­
tives. If there had been any doubt previ­
ously about the nature of the Mao regime 
it was eliminated by Communist China's 
intervention in Korea.52
The significance of the Chinese intervention, according to 
John Gaddis, was that it confirmed the concept of the mono­
lithic nature of communism and put "an end to the assump­
tion that there existed significant differences between
53varieties of communism."
The Chinese Revolution, an increase in communist 
activity, and the Korean War "made very difficult," John F. 
Cady reflects, "any objective assessment by Washington of 
the merits of the Communist-led nationalist in Vietnam in 
particular. In a climate of Crises and tension Washing­
ton perceived Ho's policies as integral to the Kremlin's 
world ambitions. If the United States harbored any qualms 
about France's colonialism, they were now reduced to insig­
nificance. Acheson, in mid-1952, announced that the world
52Edwin Martin, "Considerations Underlying U.S.-China 
Policy," Department of State Bulletin 30 (April 12, 1954): 
544.
53John Lewis Gaddis, "Reconsideration: Was the Truman 
Doctrine Really A Turning Point," Foreign Affairs 52 
(January 1974):397.
^Cady, Southeast Asia, p. 46.
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acknowledged "that the struggle in which the forces of the 
French Union and Associated States are engaged against . . . 
communist aggression in Indochina is an integral part of the 
world-wide resistance by the free nations to Communist . . . 
conquest.
On February 13, 1952, an NSC staff paper sharpened the
administration's thoughts concerning Indochina. Its premises
anticipated the later known "domino theory." It maintained
that a failure to resist communist aggression, especially by
the Chinese, would endanger the rest of Southeast Asia, the
Middle East, and Europe. By 1952, claims Gaddis Smith,
Indochina was "the tightest knot in the tangle of issues
binding Korea, Communist China, the Soviet Union, and the
57defense of Western Europe."
On April 12, 1945, when Truman succeeded Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt he did not envision a postwar world of in­
tense conflict with the Soviet Union. Nor did he foresee 
that nationalism, revolution, and war would plague the Asian
r o
continent for the next seven years. By the end of Truman's
55Dean Acheson, "Conversations on Indochina," Department 
of State Bulletin 25 (June 30, 1952):1010.
^NSC Staff Study, "United States Objectives and Course 
of Action with Respect to Communist Aggression in Southeast 
Asia," in U.S.-Vietnam Relations, Book 8, V.B.2., II, p. 468.
“̂ Smith, Acheson, p. 305.
58Donovan, Conflict and Crisis, pp. 1-45.
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incumbency the Cold War pervaded every aspect of national 
life. During his farewell address to his countrymen, Tru­
man speculated about his years in office:
I suppose that history will remember my 
term in office as the years when the cold 
war began to overshadow our lives. I have 
had hardly a day in office that has not 
been dominated by this all-embracing 
struggle, this conflict between those who 
love freedom and those who would lead the 
world back to slavery and d a r k n e s s . 59
What had been unimaginable in 1945 seemed to have become in­
evitable by 1953.
3. The Eisenhower Years
Dwight D. Eisenhower, unlike Truman, inherited the Cold 
War, a phenomena now entrenched as a way of life in the United 
States. Eisenhower was spared the agony of being the first 
President who had to react to the tensions of the Cold War. 
Whereas Truman's world view and perceptions evolved and 
hardened in response to the Cold War, from the beginning of 
his term, Eisenhower perceived events from a Cold War per­
spective.
To Charles Alexander, a leading scholar of the Eisenhower 
Administration, an intense hostility towards and fear of the 
communist bloc pervaded American life during his term in. 
office. In the fifties a consensus regarding the Cold War
5QHarry S. Truman, "The Challenge of the Cold War," 
Department of State Bulletin 27 (January 15, 1953):127.
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crystallized and most Americans "had few doubts that their 
country faced a worldwide conspiracy whose center was Moscow 
and whose ultimate objective was nothing less than universal 
Communist conquest."^ Since it readily accepted and em­
braced the basic tenets of the era, the Eisenhower Adminis­
tration formulated its foreign policy within the principles 
of the Cold War.
During what another leading specialist on Eisenhower de­
scribed as "the most internationalist speech ever delivered 
as an Inaugural Address,Eisenhower on January 20, 1953,
depicted a world of doom and global strife in which "freedom
62is pitted against slavery; light against darkness." He
later defined the Cold War as the struggle transcending "all
other considerations of our times. To my mind it is the
6 3struggle of the ages." The entire world, he said in another 
speech, "was in the grip of an ideological struggle, and we 
are on one side and the Iron Curtain countries are on the 
other.
Central to the administration's world view was a
^Charles C. Alexander, Holding the Line: The Eisenhower 
Era, 1952-1961 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1975),
p. 60.
^Herbert S. Parmet, Eisenhower and the American Cru­
sades (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1972), p. 165.
62Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Proclaiming Our Faith Anew," 
Department of State Bulletin 28 (February 2, 1953) : 168.
63Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Fundamentals of U.S. Policy," 
Department of State Bulletin 29 (December 14, 1953):811.
64Dwight D. Eisenhower, "The Courage to be Patient," 
Department of State Bulletin 31 (December 15, 1954):887.
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conviction that the communist world was monolithic. The 
Kremlin controlled the communist bloc, subordinating all 
to its goal of world domination. The administration’s 
attitude towards the Soviets was subjected to no careful 
analysis of other alternatives. "This truth requires no . 
elaboration," Eisenhower affirmed, "all Americans recog­
nize it as fact."65 China, according to Alfred Jenkins, 
the Officer in Charge of Chinese Political Affairs, had 
"followed slavishly the leadership of the Soviet Union . . .
[leaving] no doubt about its dedication to . . . world Com-
66munist revolution." The Eisenhower Administration expected
the relationship to survive for many years. The Secretary
of State, John Foster Dulles, recognized that despite power
rivalries between Russia and China, they would remain bound
6 7by ideological ties.
To protect America's interests and security against the 
communist threat, the administration embraced a foreign 
policy distinguished by its globalism and an emphasis upon 
collective security. Both Eisenhower and Dulles shared 
the conviction that the Western response to Hitler had de­
monstrated forever the futility of appeasing aggressive
65Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Principles of U.S. Foreign 
Policy," Department of State Bulletin 31 (September 15,
1954):359.
66Alfred Jenkins, "Present U.S. Policy Toward China,” 
Department of State Bulletin 30 (April 26, 1954):624.
7John Foster Dulles, "Our Policies Toward Communism in 
China,” Department of ,State Bulletin 37 (July 15, 1957) : 94.
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dictatorial states. Therefore only a dynamic foreign policy 
could stem the communist encroachment upon the free world.
It was America's solemn obligation to lead this endeavor.
In so threatening a world it became difficult to differ­
entiate between peripheral and vital areas. In 1958, 
Eisenhower aptly expressed the administration's world view: 
"The Soviets . . .  are waging total cold war. The only 
answer to a regime that wages total cold war is to wage 
total peace.
During his first State of the Union Address, the Presi­
dent espoused a policy of globalism. "The policy we embrace," 
he declared, "must be a coherent global policy. The freedom
we cherish and defend in Europe and the Americas is no dif-
69ferent from the freedom that is imperiled in Asia." Or
as the Ambassador of Belgium said, "What happens in Asia
7 0today affects us tomorrow." Perhaps Livingston Merchant,
Assistant Secretary of European Affairs, best revealed the
administration's attitude when he said that
it is increasingly difficult to draw a sharp 
distinction between national and interna­
tional problems or to separate domestic poli­
tics from foreign policies. . . . A local 
election in a particular country may be of
^Dwight D. Eisenhower, "The State of the Union," De* 
partment of State Bulletin 38 (January 27, 1958):116.
69Dwight D. Eisenhower, "The State of the Union,"De- 
partment of State Bulletin 28 (February 9, 1953) : 207.
70Myron M. Cowen, "The Importance of Asia," Department 
of State Bulletin 28 (March 2, 1953):331.
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merely internal interest, but it may also 
be, on occasion, a decisive battle between 
the forces of freedom and the forces of
slavery.71
Given this world view, American interest in Asia, including 
Vietnam, gained intensity.
4. Eisenhower and Vietnam
The spectre of a Red Asia haunted the administration
throughout its tenure. On March 29, 1954, during a speech
to the Overseas Press Club of America, Dulles reiterated
that the Soviet Union was plotting to amalgamate the people
of Southeast Asia into its orbit to further its aim of world 
72domination. The activity of the Chinese in Southeast Asia
was a matter of grave concern to Washington. The Chinese
Revolution had "violently changed the balance of power in the
Far East," as John Lindbeck, a member of the Bureau of Far
Eastern Affairs observed, "In effect, the Chinese Communist
conquest of the mainland extended Communist power and the
73Soviet world into the heart of Asia."
The continuation of hostilities in Korea encouraged the 
administration's proclivity to devote greater, attention to 
Asian problems. To the administration Korea was not an
71Livingston Merchant, "The New Environment of American 
Diplomacy," Department of State Bulletin 31 (November 22, 
1954):7 61- 7 6 2.
72john Foster Dulles, "The Threat of a Red Asia," De- 
partment of State Bulletin 30 (April 12, 1954):539.
73John Lindbeck, "China and American Foreign Policy," 
Department of State Bulletin 31 (November 7, 1954):752-753.
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isolated conflict but only the most explosive front of an 
area fraught with danger. Korea, according to Dulles, was 
"only a part of the world-wide effort of Communism to con­
quer freedom. . . . [I]t is part of that effort in Asia 
[where] a single Chinese Communist front extends from Korea 
on the North to Indochina in the South,.Eisenhower’s 
Assistant Secretary of Far Eastern Affairs indicated Washing­
ton’s resolve to prevent further penetration of Asia by the 
Soviet Union:
We are probably justified in surmising . . . 
that what the Communists are now aiming at 
is to utilize their assets in China to gain 
control of Southeast Asia . . . faced with 
these ugly facts . . . Asia must be held 
against the pressures of all kinds the Com^ 
munists are bringing to bear against it.-75
In this context the rise of Indochina's value in America's
eyes can better be appreciated.
As early as 1951, Eisenhower viewed Indochina from a
Cold War perspective. The French effort was not an attempt
to sustain their colonial domination, but "was in fact a
clear case of freedom defending itself from Communist aggres- 
7 f\sion." As President,Eisenhower justified the continuation
74Department of State Press Release 469, September 1, 
1953, in U.S.-Vietnam Relations, Book 9, V.B.3., I, p. 142.
75Walter S. Robertson, "Responsibilities of the United 
States in the Far East," Department of State Bulletin 30 
(March 8, 1954):348-349.
7 6Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change: The White 
House Years, 1952-1961 (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and 
Co., 1963), p . 336.
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of aid to the French in Indochina since its goal was "to pre­
vent the engulfment of Southeast Asia by the forces of inter-
77national Communism."
As Washington contemplated the possibility of a French 
failure in Southeast Asia, the administration concluded that 
the loss of the area was unacceptable. An NSC policy state­
ment issued on January 16, 1954, concluded that "the loss of
the struggle in Indochina . . . would have the most serious
78repercussions on United States and free world interests."
The statement argued what would later be called the "domino 
theory," stating that the loss of a single country to com­
munism would lead to the alignment of all of the Southeast 
Asian countries with the communist camp. Such an occurrence 
would threaten the security of Japan, the Middle East, and 
Europe. During 1953, Eisenhower approved NSC 124/2 which 
stated that America’s main objective in Southeast Asia was
79to prevent the area from passing into the communist orbit. 
Hence the United States would be reluctant to relinquish its 
commitment to Indochina after the French debacle in 1954.
77Text of Joint U.S.-French Communique, Department of 
State Bulletin 34 (October 12, 1954):486.
78Statement of Policy by the NSC on United States Ob­
jectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Southeast 
Asia," January 16, 1954, in U.S.-Vietnam Relations, Book 9, 
V.B.3.,, II, p. 220.
79Memorandum for Executive Secretary of NSC: Progress
Report on NSC 124/2, July 23, 1954, in U.S.-Vietnam Rela­
tions , Book 9, V.B.3., I, p. 113. Truman approved NSC 124/2 
on June 25, 1954.
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When it became apparent that the French were failing in 
Indochina, the United States faced the choice of either re­
sisting or accepting the recent turn of events. Given the 
all-encompassing intensity of the Cold War milieu, the Eisen­
hower Administration never gave thought of abandoning Southeast 
Asia to communism any sober consideration. During the fifties 
it was unwilling or unable to renege upon America's mission of 
leading the free world. Therefore, in 1954, America began to 
replace France as the defender of freedom in Indochina,
By mid-1954, the war-weary French opted for a peaceful
resolution of the Vietnamese conflict. During the peace con­
ference in Geneva the Eisenhower Administration gave the ef­
fort a half-hearted endorsement at best. "To the administra­
tion," one scholar notes, "the session at Geneva could easily
become an opening wedge for Communist domination of all South- 
80east Asia." Although sensitive to France's plight, the inces­
sant vision of a communist Southeast Asia compelled Washington
to resist. Dulles adamantly refused to capitulate to "the
81Soviet Communist strategy . . .to take over . . . Asia."
Eisenhower and his advisers feared the consequences of failure
in Indochina would invite catastrophe. The administration
thought the French stand at Dien Bien Phu the equivalent to
82"fighting a modern Thermopylae," and that "the loss of
SOParmet, Eisenhower, p. 375.
SIJohn Foster Dulles, "The Issues at Geneva," Department 
of State Bulletin 30 (May 17, 1954):742.
82Bedell Smith, "The Importance of Indochina/' Depart- 
ment of State Bulletin 30 (April 19, 1954):590.
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Indochina to Communist control, either by negotiation at
Geneva or by force . . . would have grave consequences to
the free world.
In this atmosphere, on April 7, 1954, Eisenhower first
publicly aired the "domino theory." Four days later, Under
Secretary of State Bedell Smith gave this theory dramatic
expression:
Can we allow, dare we permit, expansion of 
Communist Chinese control further into Asia?
. . . the Soviet Union and Communist Chirta 
have made it clear that their purpose is to 
dominate all of Southeast Asia. . . .  If 
Indochina is lost to the Communists, Burma 
is threatened, Thailand is threatened, the 
Mayala Peninsula is exposed, Indonesia is 
subject to the greatest danger . . . there 
is the possible loss of millions and millions 
of people who would disappear behind the 
Iron Curtain.84
From late 1953 until the signing of the Geneva Accords in 
July 1954, the Eisenhower Administration, led by the inde­
fatigable Dulles, hoped to avert the French demise. The hope 
of. avoiding an inglorious defeat by the united action of the 
Allied powers faded and then died. Lack of Congressional sup­
port, Eisenhower’s reluctance to employ force under the cir­
cumstances, and the unwillingness of key allies to commit 
themselves to united action led to the failure of Dulles’
Q *Z"A Concept of Action with Regard to Southeast Asia,” 
May 12, 1954, in U.S.-Vietnam Relations, Book 9, V.B.3.,
II, p. 460.
84Bedell Smith, "The Importance of Indochina," Depart­
ment of State Bulletin 30 (April 19, 1954):590.
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85efforts. Nevertheless, though Eisenhower avoided direct
intervention of American forces in Vietnam, he moved to
bolster the strength of the free world in Southeast Asia.
With French failure imminent, Washington exerted its
energies toward the establishment of a collective security
system in Southeast Asia. The administration hoped to apply
the policy of collective security that had been successful
in Western Europe to Southeast Asia. Dulles observed:
that the Soviet Communist aggression in Europe 
took place only against countries which had 
no collective security arrangements. Since 
the organization of the North Atlantic 
Treaty there has been no successful aggres­
sion in Europe.8°
On July 11, 1954, an official of the administration announced
that "the United States is endeavoring to develop, as rapidly
as circumstances permit, a collective security system to stem
8 7, the spread-of Communist forces into Southeast Asia."
Since it represented a setback, it was no secret that 
Washington regarded the Geneva Accords to be a major defeat 
for Western diplomacy. The United States had suffered a loss 
prestige as a power capable of resisting communist advance in 
Southeast Asia. In August 1954, an NSC memo expressed concern
O CSee Townsend Hoopes, The Devil and John Foster Dulles: 
The Diplomacy of the Eisenhower Era (Boston: Little, Brown and
Co., 1973), pp. 202-221. This is the most detailed account of 
Dulles's effort, to secure allied support for united action.
^John Foster Dulles, "The Lessons at Geneva," Department 
of State Bulletin 30 (May 17,1954):744.
07Thurston Morton, "U.S. Foreign Policy in Perspective," 
Department of State Bulletin 31 (July 26, 1954):121.
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that Geneva and continued communist success as na serious 
loss for the free world, the psychological and political ef­
fects of which will be felt throughout the Far East and around
88the globe." The administration acted promptly to minimize
the losses inflicted by Geneva.
Dulles led the effort to utilize a collective security
system to neutralize the domino effect in Southeast Asia.
On May 11, 1954, he stated:
As the nations come together, then the ’domino 
theory' so-called, ceases to apply. And what 
we are trying to do is create a situation in
Southeast Asia where the domino situation will
not apply.®®
Failure to construct such a system, Walter Robertson feared,
90would end with "the Asian pie" being eaten bit by bit.
Within a month of Geneva, an NSC policy statement proposed
that America should "exploit available means to prevent South
Vietnam from being permanently incorporated in the Soviet 
91bloc." A
The Manila Treaty of September 8, 1954, created the 
88National Security Council memorandum, August 1954, in 
U.S.-Vietnam Relations, Book 1, ill, D. , p. D-15.
89John Foster Dulles, as cited in Colbert, Southeast 
Asia, p. 275.
90Walter S. Robertson, "Communist Tactics in the Far 
East," Department of State Bulletin 31 (August 23, 1954):261.
91Statement of Policy by the National Security Council: 
"Review of U.S. Policy in the Far East: The Consequences of 
the Geneva Conference," March 15, 1956, in U.S.-Vietnam 
Relations, Book 10, V.B.3., III, p . 737.
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Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO). This treaty
"paved the way," Eisenhower later reflected, "for a system
of true cooperation between both [Asian and Western Nations]
in the never-ending struggle to stem the tide of Communist 
92expansionism." The signing of the treaty indicates the
administration took the "domino theory" to heart, resolved
itself to halt the spread of communism, and planned to buy
time to strengthen vulnerable areas of Southeast Asia.
The administration, however, saw little prospect that
South Vietnam would withstand the pressures of communism in
Southeast Asia. According to Dulles, the purpose of SEATO
was "to save all of Southeast Asia if possible it can be
9 3saved; if not, to save essential parts of it." "You have
to draw the line somewhere," was how Under Secretary Smith
94described the treaty. The line ultimately would be drawn 
across the 17th parallel in Vietnam.
United States officials realized that SEATO could not 
prevent further deterioration of the free world's position 
in Indochina. Washington especially expressed skepticism 
concerning the ability of Ngo Dinh Diem's government in South 
Vietnam to survive. On December 24, 1954, in a State cable 
to General Lawton Collins, Dulles acknowledged that the
92Eisenhower, Mandate, p. 375.
07John Foster Dulles, "The Challenge of Freedom," Depart­
ment of State Bulletin 30 (May 24, 1954):782.
9 4 Bedell Smith, "America's Primary Interests in Asia," 
Department of State Bulletin 31 (August 2 , 1954): 192.
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situation in South Vietnam was rapidly disintegrating. Appre­
hension about Diem’s abilities faded before the overriding 
fear of a communist takeover in South Vietnam. No alternative 
to Diem existed, Dulles argued:
Withdrawal [of] our support would hasten [the]
Communist takeover [in] Vietnam and [would] 
have adverse repercussions [throughout all 
of] Southeast Asia, Consequently, [our] 
investment [in] Vietnam [is] justified even 
if only to buy time [to] build up strength 
elsewhere in [the] area.95
Yet by April 1955, the administration still pondered abandon­
ing its commitment to Diem’s regime. Diem's swift and decisive 
victory against his political enemies on April 27, 1955, ef­
fectively quelled these doubts.
Now Washington wholeheartedly endorsed Diem as Vietnam's
genuine and legitimate nationalist leader. On June 1, 1956,
the Eisenhower Administration reflected this shift in policy
by acknowledging that Diem's splendid job in South Vietnam
96far exceeded previous expectations. The dread of a com­
munist victory led the United States to support Diem's refusal 
to hold national elections in 1956. Although expressed by a 
minor military official the following comment represented the 
administration's policy:
95Secretary of State John Foster Dulles (Washington) to 
General Lawton Collins, December 24, 1954, in U.S.-Vietnam 
Relations, Book 10, V.B.3., III, p. 854.
96Walter Robertson, "United States Policy with Respect 
to Vietnam," June 1, 1956, in U .S.-Vietnam 'Relations, Book 7, 
V.A., vol. B., pp. B-28-B-30.
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No one is more aware . , . that the neu­
tralist world, now weighing the course of 
the future, will eventually make a choice 
between Communism and freedom. The ulti­
mate fate of the free portion of Indochina 
will become a critical element in that 
choice. . . .
The loss of the rest of Indochina in 
consequence of the 1956 election or other­
wise, would inevitably sway many of these
millions to Communism. Aside from its 
political aspects, this trend could be 
militarily disastrous. . . .  If another 
free world debacle in Indochina ma­
terializes, . . . the U.S. military posi­
tion in the Western Pacific could be 
jeopardized.97
Now America proudly espoused Diem’s nationalist qualities as
they gradually replaced the French as the sole protector of 
98South Vietnam.
On April 4, 1959, Eisenhower announced the first public
commitment by the United States to maintain South Vietnam as
a separate national state* Eisenhower evoked the harsh 
realities of the Cold War and then used Vietnam to illustrate
the Soviet Union's dedication ”to promote world revolution,
99destroy freedom, and communize the world." Eisenhower 
reiterated his faith in the domino theory and linked the free­
dom of South Vietnam's to America's. Since the Cold War posed
97Lt. Col. Kittner to CIA Director, "Action in Indochina," 
October 20, .1954, in U.S.-Vietnam Relations, Book 10, V.B.3., 
II, p. 776.
QRWalter S. Robertson, "U.S. Policy with Respect to Viet-' 
nam," Department of State Bulletin 34 (June 11, 1956):972-974.
99Dwight D. Eisenhower, Address at Gettysburg College 
Convocation, April 4, 1959, in Gravel, Pentagon Papers,
1:625.
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a total threat to America and the free world, it was in ’’the 
self-interest of each free nation . . .  to resist the loss 
to imperialistic communism of the freedom and independence of 
any other nation.”1^® For these reasons, Eisenhower declared 
"that our own national interests demand some help from us in 
sustaining in Viet-Ham the morale, the economic progress, and 
the military strength necessary to its continued existence in 
Freedom."101
5. The Cold War and Vietnam
Eisenhower's legacy to John F. Kennedy went beyond con­
crete commitments to Vietnam inherent in SEATO and public 
rhetoric. More importantly, his eight years as President 
left the atmosphere of the Cold War intact and unaltered.
More than the specific commitments, this was a decisive fac­
tor which prompted Eisenhower's successors to link Vietnam 
to the vital interests of the United States.
Allen Dulles, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency,
aptly voiced the intensity of this perspective:
The challenge is a global one. As long as the 
principles of international communism; motivate 
the regime in Moscow and Peiping, we must ex­
pect that their single purpose will be the 
liquidation of our form of free society and 
the emergence of a Sovietized, communized 
world o r d e r . 1 0 2
!01Ibid., p. 626.
102Allen W. Dulles, "The Challenge of Soviet Power," 
Department of State Bulletin 45 (April 27, 1959):583.
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In I960, the administration still adhered to its conviction
that the Soviet Union planned to strike at America indirectly
by dominating the nations of Africa, Latin America, Asia, and
Europe; thus shifting the balance of power to favor the 
103Soviets. In his farewell address of January 17, 1961,
Eisenhower described the world situation. "We face a hostile
ideology," he warned, ''global in scope. Unhappily the danger
it poses promises to be of indefinite nature.
Eisenhower bequeathed to Kennedy a delicate situation in
Southeast Asia. On January 19, 1961, Eisenhower privately
alerted the President-elect "that the Communists had designs
10 Son all of Southeast Asia." Eisenhower added that the 
crisis in Laos particularly demanded the immediate attention 
of the United States. He revived the domino theory and then 
emphasized the critical importance of Laos and Southeast Asia 
to America's security and treaty obligations. More important, 
he implores the new President, if necessary, to "go it alone" 
in Southeast Asia.*^
103Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Diplomacy and the Modern World," 
Department of State Bulletin 48 (November 7, 1960):709.
^^Dwight D. Eisenhower, "President Eisenhower's Farewell 
to the Nation," Department of State Bulletin 49 (February 6, 
1961):180.
^Memorandum of Conference of January 19, 1961, between 
President Eisenhower and President-elect Kennedy on the Sub­
ject of Laos, in U.S.-Vietnam Relations, Book 10, V.B.3.,
IV, pp. 1360-1361.
106Ibid., p. 1367.
10*2
Earlier, during 1959, Eisenhower reflected upon the con­
flict between communism and the free world; "The battle is 
now joined. The next decade will forecast its outcome.
The nature of that battle and its outcome would, in large 
part, be'determined'by the successors of Eisenhower.
107Dwight P. Eisenhower, Special Message to Congress on 
Hutual Security Program, March 15, 1959, in U.S.-yietnaai 
Relations, look 7, V.B., p. B-45.
CHAPTER IV
PROBLEMS OF PERCEPTION IN DIPLOMACY: 
THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION 
AND VIETNAM, 1961-1963
Now our great responsibility is to 
be the chief defender of freedom in 
this time of maximum danger. Only the 
United States has the power and the re­
sources and the determination. We have 
committed ourselves to the defense of 
dozens of countries stretched around 
the globe who look to us for independ­
ence, who look to us for the defense of 
their freedom.*
John F. Kennedy
According to popular legend, on January 20, 1961, a young 
and charismatic President passed a torch to a new generation 
of Americans. His inauguration supposedly marked an abrupt 
departure from America's traditional domestic and foreign 
policies. In actuality, the differences between Dwight 0. 
Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy were more a matter of style 
and age than of substance. In foreign affairs the new admin­
istration initially conducted its policy within what Henry 
Kissinger labeled the "undifferentiated globalism" of the
iJohn FKennedy, Democratic Dinner. Party in Chicago, 
April 28, 1961, in Gravel, Pentagon Papers, 2:802.
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2Eisenhower Administration. Coral Bell, a respected scholar
of international affairs, considers Kennedy's inaugural address
3the rhetorical zenith of ideological, Cold War moralism.
The Cold War, for the new occupant of 1600 Pennsylvania 
Avenue, continued to be the overriding concern in interna­
tional politics and the defining characteristic of the age. 
Newsweek's attitude was indistinguishable from that of the 
administration's: "The greatest single problem that faces
John Kennedy - and the key to most of his other problems - is 
how to meet the aggressive power of the Communist bloc."^
Unlike the Eisenhower Administration, Kennedy and his advisers 
displayed an eagerness and readiness to respond to the chal­
lenges of the Cold War. During an interview on February 9, 
1961, Secretary of State Dean Rusk described the new adminis­
tration:
What the United States does or what the United 
States does not do in the world . . . makes 
a great deal of difference to what happens in 
this turbulent tempestuous period. . . . Now 
the United States can make an enormous differ­
ence to the shape of the world to come by 
taking an active and . . . constructive role 
in the world. And I believe that President 
Kennedy's leadership will give us a new in­
volvement and concern with . . . these great 
tides of history.5
2Coral Bell, "Kissinger in Retrospect: The Diplomacy of 
Power-Concert?," International Affairs 53 (April ’1977) : 20-2-
3Ibid.
^Newsweek 57 (January 23, 1961):25v
3Dean Rusk, "Secretary Rusk Interviewed on 'Today' Show," 
U.S., Department of State, Department of State Bulletin 44
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Addressing an audience at the University of California in 
Berkeley, Rusk captured Washington's view of the world and 
of itself: "It would be a mistake for us to underestimate
the formidable contest in which we shall be engaged in the 
decade of the sixties. . . . Our role cannot be passive. . . . 
The United States must lead."^
Washington considered the primary threat to world peace 
and America's security to be an aggressive communist bloc, 
controlled by the Soviet Union. Chester Bowles, Acting Sec­
retary of State, stated clearly the administration's view:
"In Berlin, Southeast Asia, Cuba, and elsewhere the Communist
movement poses an unremitting challenge to our strength of
7will, our firmness of purpose, and our intelligence." Con­
fident of America's strength in conventional and nuclear war­
fare, Kennedy feared that America stood vulnerable to guerrilla 
wars, the "Achilles' heel" of America's defenses.
1. Wars of National Liberation
Kennedy expected confrontation with the Soviets in what 
he called "the lands of the rising peoples:" Africa, Asia,
(February 23, 1961):306-307. (Hereafter cited as Department 
of State Bulletin.
^Dean Rusk, "Charter Day Address," Department of State 
Bulletin 44 (April 10, 1961):516.
7Chester Bowles, "It is Time to Reaffirm Our National 
Purpose," Department of State Bulletin 45 (November 27,
1961):879.
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8and the Middle East. During his first State of the Union 
Address, the President warned that neither the Soviets nor 
the Chinese would relinquish their designs'"for. world domi­
nation - ambitions which they forcefully restated only a
9short time ago.” Kennedy was referring presumably to Soviet 
Premier Nikita Khrushchev's threat to eat away at America's 
security. Though not a major statement of Soviet policy, 
Kennedy took Khrushchev's espousal of wars of national libera­
tion to heart.
Prior to his election, Kennedy and others had voiced
alarm concerning America's capacity of resisting communist 
10aggression. Kennedy was persuaded that America's reliance
on massive retaliation was excessive, unwise, and inadequate.
Since it exposed a weakness in America's military defenses,
communist guerrilla warfare caused particular concern. On
February 29, 1960, Senator Kennedy had revealed his anxiety
regarding America's ability to counter effectively this new
type of warfare:
But both before and after 1953 events have 
demonstrated that our nuclear retaliatory 
power is not enough. It cannot deter Communist 
aggression which is too limited to justify
8John F. Kennedy, "Urgent National Needs,” Department of 
State Bulletin 44 (May 12, 1961):903.
^John F. Kennedy, "The State of the Union," Department 
of State Bulletin 44 (February 13, 1961):210.
10The recently retired General of the Army, Maxwell 
Taylor, expressed similar concern about America's military 
capacity. Taylor became Kennedy's Special Military Repre­
sentative in 1961. See Maxwell Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet 
(New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1960).
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atomic war. It cannot protect uncommitted 
nations against a Communist takeover using 
local or guerrilla forces. It cannot be 
used in so-called brush-fire peripheral 
wars. In short, it cannot prevent the Com­
munists from gradually nibbling at the 
fringe of the free world's territory and 
strength, until our security has been 
steadily eroded in piecemeal fashion.
Guerrilla wars presumably were sponsored by the Soviets.
Hence guerrilla warfare was a dangerous threat to the world's
12balance of power. Armed with this conviction Kennedy came 
to the White House in 1961.
To defeat this ominous threat necessitated a novel ap­
proach to the problem. Khrushchev's lengthy, though routine, 
speech on January 6, 1961, lent urgency to the need of shoring 
up America's capabilities. Khrushchev had espoused communism 
as the wave of the future. He further--but briefly--advocated 
Soviet support of wars of national liberation, specifically 
communist advances in Cuba and Vietnam. Apparently the speech
was also aimed at Chinese ears, with the support of these wars
13a minor point not representative of major Soviet policy.
Due to his previous concerns, fears, and perceptions of Soviet
11Senator John F. Kennedy, Congressional Speech, February 
29, 1960, in Gravel, Pentagon Papers, 2:798.
12Douglas Blaufarb, a leading specialist on counter­
insurgency, asserts that while one can appreciate why this 
school of thought gained prominence; its fears and basic 
premises had little basis in fact. See Douglas Blaufarb, The 
Counterinsurgency Era: U.S. Doctrine and Performance 1950 to 
the Present (New York: Free Press, 1977) , pp. 15-20.
13Blaufarb, Counterinsurgency Era, p. 54.
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ambitions, Kennedy interpreted the speech at face value.
Khrushchev merely confirmed Kennedy's suspicion that theI
communists' reliance on guerrilla warfare presented the free 
world with its greatest challenge of the coming decade. The 
administration viewed the speech as an authoritative state­
ment of Soviet policy. Walt W. Rostow, chairman of the Policy 
Planning Council, elaborated upon its significance:
Thus when we read Mr. Khrushchev's speech 
of January 6, 1961, and the blessing he gave 
to the methods of subversion and guerrilla 
warfare, we took this matter very seriously 
indeed. We regard the challenge not merely 
as a series of regional crises but part of 
a general Communist offensive designed to 
corrode the free world without confronting 
either our nuclear or conventional strength.
All the potentialities existed in January 
1961 for the spread of Communist power by 
these methods into Southeast Asia, Africa, 
and Latin America.14
Kennedy read aloud relevant sections of.Khrushchev's speech
during the first meeting of his National Security Council.
Maxwell Taylor, Kennedy's chief military adviser, stated that
the President "took very seriously Khrushchev's speech of
January 6, 1961, which promised Soviet support on a global
basis for People's Wars or Wars of Liberation on the model
of the guerrilla war in South V i e t n a m . T h e  meeting produced
14Walt W. Rostow, "Where We Stand," Department of State 
Bulletin 46 (June 18, 1962):967.
15General Maxwell D. Taylor, Swords and Ploughshares 
(New York: W. W. Norton, 1972), p. 399. See also Arthur M. 
Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the 
White House (New York: Fawcett World Library, 1967), pp. 282- 
284.
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a National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM 2) which advocated 
an increase in America's counterinsurgency resources.
In April, Cuban exiles with the blessing of the United 
States invaded Cuba with the intention of overthrowing Fidel 
Castro's regime. The Bay of Pigs disaster reinforced Ken­
nedy's conviction that these liberation wars posed a grave 
threat to America's security and world peace. After Kennedy's 
self-admitted failure, he talked of its lessons:
We dare not fail to see the insidious 
nature of this new and deeper struggle.
We dare not fail to grasp the new con­
cepts, the new tools, the new sense of 
urgency we will need to combat it -- 
whether in Cuba or South Viet-nam. . . .
No greater task faces this nation or 
this administration. No other challenge 
is more deserving of our every effort and 
energy. Too long we have fixed our eyes 
on traditional military needs. . . . Now 
it should be clear that this is no longer 
enough -- that our security may be lost 
piece by piece, country by country, without 
the firing of a single missile or the 
crossing of a single border.
We intend to profit from this lesson.
We intend to re-examine and reorient our 
forces of all kinds. . . . Let me then 
make clear as . . . President . . . that 
I am determined upon our system's survival 
and success, regardless of the cost, re­
gardless of t h e  p e r i l . 1 6
Counterinsurgency became the President's personal project. At
a news conference on April 21, 1961, Kennedy specified guer-
17rilla warfare as among the eminent challenges of the sixties.
*^John F. Kennedy, "The Lessons of Cuba," Department of 
State Bulletin 44 (May 18, 1961):660-661.
17U.S., President, Public Papers of the Presidents of 
the United States (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Federal
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The Vienna Summit with Khrushchev during the summer of 1961 
did not assuage Kennedy's apprehension.
Kennedy arrived in Vienna with America’s prestige at 
its lowest ebb since the U-2 incident of 1959. If Kennedy 
hoped to cure Khrushchev of his perception of the President 
as a weak and indecisive leader, then he met great disappoint­
ment. Nor did he resolve with Khrushchev the issue of the 
wars of liberation. The tense and sometimes hostile atmosphere 
magnified Kennedy’s anxiety over Soviet ambitions. One eye­
witness, the respected news columnist, James Reston, recalls 
that Kennedy emerged from the room angry and shaken. Kennedy
fretted that the Soviet statesman thought him young, irtex-
18perienced, and easily intimidated. Kennedy returned to the
United States determined to disabuse Khrushchev of his faulty
perception. With a heightened alarm regarding Soviet Support
of liberation wars, Kennedy conveyed his impressions of
Khrushchev to the American people:
Most of all, he predicted the triumph of Com­
munism in the new and less developed countries.
He was certain that the tide there.was 
moving his way, that the revolution of rising 
peoples would eventually be a Communist revo­
lution, and that the so-called wars of libera­
tion, supported by the Kremlin, would replace 
the old methods of direct aggression and in­
vasion.19
Register National Archives and Record Service, 1961- ), John F. 
Kennedy, 1961, p. 311. (Hereafter cited John F. Kennedy, Public 
Papers.)
James Reston, "What Was Killed Was Not Only the Presi­
dent but the Promise," in John F. Kennedy and the New Frontier, 
ed. Ai'da DiPace Donald (New York: Hill and Wang, 1966), p. 225.
19john F. Kennedy, Public Papers, 1961, p. 444.
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Kennedy concluded emphatically that "it was clear that this
area of the new and poorer nations will be a continuing crisis
20of the decade." In this context Kennedy's initial decisions 
regarding Vietnam were made.
2. Vietnam: The Early Decisions
Cold War tensions throughout the world marked Kennedy's
first year in office. "From Laos . . . to Berlin," according
to New York Times columnist Russell Baker, "crisis after
crisis has fallen across the White House with a rapidity and
gravity that has absorbed Mr. Kennedy's energy since his 
21inauguration." Although the import of Vietnam dwindled in
comparison to the crises in Berlin or Cuba, the very existence
of strains in Soviet-American relations augmented the stakes
in Vietnam. "It would not have been easy for members of the
Kennedy administration," the historian Ernest May notes, "to
see Southeast Asia as anything but a battlefield in the Cold 
22War." Hostilities in Vietnam were interpreted not according 
to the country's history, culture, or traditions but through 
the prism of the Cold War.
In this climate 1961 was a difficult year for the United 
States to make concessions, real or imagined, to what was
20Ibid., p. 445.
21New York Times columnist Russell Baker, as cited in 
Gravel, Pentagon Papers, 2:72-73.
9 9 Ernest R. May, "Lessons," p. 101.
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perceived as an intransigent and dangerous communist bloc.
According to Kennedy's court historian, Arthur Schlesinger,
Jr., "given the truculence of Moscow, the Berlin crisis, and
the resumption of nuclear testing, the President unquestionably
felt that an American retreat in Asia might upset the whole
23world balance." On September 25, 1961, Kennedy himself 
warned that if America failed to defeat communist aggression 
in Southeast Asia then "the gates will be opened wide" to com­
munism throughout the world.24
Was Kennedy's reaction exaggerated, even extreme or 
hysterical? Perhaps from a later perspective it appears to 
be. But Douglas Blaufarb points out that historical hind­
sight distorts as well as illuminates the past:
In the early sixties the threat of a 
monolithic and expansionistic Communism was 
not so easily dismissed. The expansionistic 
thrust of Khrushchev's rhetoric, his pressure 
on Berlin . . . could not be waved aside.
His verbal commitment to 'wars of national
liberation' was easily misread as a new
global initiative in view of events in 
Vietnam, Laos, and Cuba. . . ,'*25
The communist threat, perceived as real, dramatically influ­
enced American policy in Vietnam.
For America's commitment to universal peace, a threat to 
order anywhere represented a threat to peace everywhere. Dean
2 3Schlesinger, Thousand Days, p. 506.
24John F. Kennedy, "Let Us Call a Truce to Terror," De­
partment of State Bulletin 45 (October 16, 1961):623.
25Blaufarb, Counterinsurgency Era, p. 297.
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Rusk's adamant rejection of a newsman's observation that the
United States was bogging down in unimportant areas of the
world epitomized the administration's attitude. Rusk argued
the contrary:
Because if you don't pay attention to the 
periphery, the periphery changes. And the 
first thing you know the periphery is the 
center. I mean, peace and security are 
worldwide. That is particularly true these 
days, when the doctrine of a historically 
inevitable world revolution, backed by ac­
tion, is in confrontation with the world 
right around the globe. And what happens 
in one place cannot help but affect what 
happens in another.26
With this definition of peripheral areas, Vietnam's security
and well-being were linked to America's.
U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Under Secretary of Political 
Affairs, explicitly linked Southeast Asia's future to that of 
America. Johnson calculated that Asia's emergence would be 
among the era's more significant events. Therefore he added 
"these emerging nations may well hold the key to the world of 
tomorrow. . . . our ability to permit this revolution to un­
fold and not be turned back by communism, is crucial to our 
27own future."
By early 1961, the administration feared that Ngo Dinh 
Diem's government lacked the capacity to resist effectively 
communist aggression against South Vietnam. Khrushchev's
o/r
Dean Rusk, "Secretary Rusk's News Conference of May 4," 
Department of State Bulletin 44 (May 22, 1961):763.
2 7U. Alexis Johnson, "The Emerging Nations of Asia," 
Department of State Bulletin 46 (January 15, 1962):53.
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January 6 speech already had alerted Kennedy to the dangers 
of guerrilla war in Vietnam. Actual hostilities were neces­
sary to awaken others to its implications. According to 
Maxwell Taylor, "it required an increase in Vietcong terror­
ism and guerrilla activity in South Vietnam during 1961 to
make clear what Khrushchev was talking about in his January 
28address." Renewed conflict in Vietnam, Taylor continued,
revealed only what history had already made evident:
It was true that a War of National Libera­
tion was but a new name for an old game which 
had been played previously in the Greek Civil 
War, in the Huk insurrection in the Philip­
pines, in the guerrilla warfare in Malaya, 
and in Castro's rebellion in Cuba. They all 
had the common identifying mark of subver­
sive aggression for the overthrow of a non- 
Communist government. . . . This was the new 
technique which Khrushchev in Russia, Mao in 
China, and Ho in North Vietnam united in pro­
claiming as the preferred means for the 
future expansion of militant Communism. . . .
This was the threat which President Kennedy 
perceived and against which he wished to 
erect defenses.29
became the testing ground for the West's ability to
30effectively guerrilla warfare.
April 6, 1961, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense 
Gilpatric issued a Task Force Report on Vietnam. The 
report did not lower Kennedy's apprehension. Hanoi's Central 
Committee of the North Vietnamese Communist Party and the Viet
^Taylor, Swords and Ploughshares, p. 200.
Ibid.
■^Ibid., p. 202. Maxwell Taylor: "The President repeat­
edly emphasized his desire to utilize the situation in Vietnam 
to study the techniques and equipment related to counter­
insurgency. "
Vietnam
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Cong were matching with deeds their professed intention to 
smash Diem's government, it stated, that the situation, though 
not hopeless, had reached a critical stage. Alexis Johnson, 
also a leading specialist of the Far East, linked the Vietnam 
crisis to the Cold War in general: "The turmoil created
throughout the area by this rapid succession of events pro­
vides an ideal environment for the Communist 'master plan'
31to take over all of Southeast Asia."
Although the Bay of Pigs fiasco tempered whatever incli­
nation Kennedy had of sending troops during the Laotian crisis,
he was not disposed to renege on America's commitment to South 
32Vietnam. In fact, the neutralist solution increased the
33pressure to stand firm in Vietnam. On March 28, 1961, a
National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) issued by the CIA stated
that throughout Southeast Asia countries considered Laos to
be "a symbolic test of strengths between the major powers of
34the West and the Communist bloc." But since international 
cooperation defused the Laotian conflict, the "symbolic test" 
shifted to Vietnam. In late 1961, Alexis Johnson drafted a
31Task Force Report, "A Program of Action to Prevent Com­
munist Domination of South Vietnam: Appraisal of the Situation," 
April 12, 1961, in Gravel, Pentagon Papers, 2:36.
32Theodore Sorensen, Kennedy (New York: Bantam Books,
1966), p. 736. Those who advocated intervention in Cuba also 
recommended similar action regarding Laos. Kennedy revealed 
to Sorenson: "Thank God the Bay of Pigs happened when it did. 
Otherwise we'd be in Laos by now--and that would be a hundred 
times worse."
33Gravel, Pentagon Papers, 2:51-55.
34National Intelligence Estimate, March 28, 1961, in 
Gravel, Pentagon Papers, 2:33.
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policy statement, "Concept of Intervention in Vietnam,"
which, according to an anonymous editor of the so-called
"Pentagon Papers," concluded that if the administration was
unwilling to save Laos, it should at least "take a strong
and unambiguous action to make sure that Vietnam would not 
35also be lost." Strong action, the statement implied, 
meant if necessary the introduction of American combat 
troops.
This was not the first time that Kennedy’s advisers had 
confronted him with proposals to intervene in Vietnam. The 
Joint Chiefs of Staff on May 10, 1961, "assuming that the 
political decision is to hold Southeast Asia outside the Com­
munist sphere," recommended to Kennedy, "that U.S. forces be
3 6deployed immediately to Vietnam." The next day, McGeorge
Bundy, the Presidential Adviser on National Security Affairs,
approved NSAM 52, which endorsed the recommendations of the
JCS, including the goal "to prevent Communist domination of
37South Vietnam." Nevertheless, Kennedy refused to make the
issue of combat troops the "touchstone" of America’s good
r ... 38 faith.
35"Concept of Intervention in Vietnam," October 10, 1961, 
in Gravel, Pentagon Papers, 2:76.
3fjJoint Chiefs of Staff memorandum, May 10, 1961, in 
Gravel, Pentagon Papers, 2:49.
37National Security Action Memorandum 52, May 11, 1961, 
in Gravel, Pentagon Papers, 2:642.
"^Sorensen, Kennedy, p. 737.
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Although unwilling to commit troops, Kennedy had not
abandoned the goal of the April Task Force, "that come what
39may the U.S. intends to win this battle." The next few 
months brought little respite in Cold War hostilities; pres­
sures pushing the United States toward greater involvement 
in Vietnam continued unabated. Kennedy had improved a new 
counterinsurgency plan involving a budget of forty-two 
million dollars, increased the number of United States mili­
tary advisers, and used American money to increase the number
40of Vietnamese armed forces. The temporary seizure of
Phuoc Vinh, a provincial capital, on September 27, 1961,
indicated that more aid was needed. Schlesinger observed
that "Kennedy, absorbed as he was in Berlin and nuclear test-
41ing, faced a series of inescapable decisions in Vietnam."
Hence, in October he sent Rostow and Taylor on their fateful 
mission to South Vietnam.
The mission arrived in Saigon on the eighteenth, and on 
November 3 Taylor dispatched an "Eyes Only" report to Kennedy 
and his Secretaries of Defense and State. Forcefully and 
directly, Taylor concluded that the strategy of guerrilla war­
fare, which enabled the communists to Circumvent America's 
traditional sources of strength, had approached the threshold
39 •Task Force Report, "A Program of Action," April 12,
1961, in Gravel, Pentagon Papers, 2:36.
40W. W. Rostow, The Diffusion of Power: An Essay in Recent 
History (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1972), p. 269.
41Schlesinger, Thousand Days, p. 503.
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of victory in Southeast Asia. The weakness of Diem's govern­
ment and America's reluctance to act with decisive force, 
were the reasons Taylor gave for the recent successes by the 
communists. Although Taylor explicitly acknowledged that 
Vietnam constituted a peripheral area, he strongly urged 
Kennedy to introduce "U.S. military force" to Vietnam.42 
The stakes in Vietnam transcended mere regional concerns 
and Taylor implored Kennedy to act decisively:
It is my judgment . . . that the United 
States must decide how it will cope with 
Khrushchev's 'wars of liberation1 which 
are really para-wars of guerrilla aggres­
sion. This is a new and dangerous Com­
munist technique which bypasses our 
traditional political and military re­
sponses . . .  we must declare our inten­
tions to aittack the source of guerrilla 
aggression. 43
Taylor further betrayed his conviction that the Cold War de­
fined the nature of the Vietnamese conflict when he encouraged
Kennedy to instruct Moscow to "use its . influence with Ho Chi
44Minh to call his dogs off."
McNamara and Rusk enclosed Taylor's recommendation. On 
November 8, 1961, Kennedy received a memo from McNamara which 
argued that unless the administration bolstered its commit­
ment to Vietnam with military force, Southeast Asia would be 
lost to communism. Three days later in a joint memorandum,
42"Eyes Only for the President from General Taylor," 
November 3, 1961, in Gravel, Pentagon Papers, 2:89.
43Ibid., 2:98.
44Ibid., 2:99.
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McNamara and Rusk concurred that "the United States should 
commit itself to the clear objective Of preventing the fall 
of South Vietnam to Communism.
Kennedy, though reluctant to go this far or to commit
troops, still faced the prospect of defeat with disquiet.
By the end of 1961, the United States advisory fo'rces had
doubled and concern over communist gains in Southeast Asia
carried over into 1962. The JCS throughout January reiterated
its conviction that the guerrilla war in Vietnam was "a
planned phase in the Communist timetable for world domina- 
46tion." America must resist these moves if it valued its 
credibility as a responsible world leader. Kennedy kept 
abreast of recent developments in Vietnam but other world 
affairs demanded his attention in 1962.
3. The Sino-Soviet Split and the 
Cuban Missile Crisis
Early in 1962, the administration publicly acknowledged 
the existence of the Sino-Soviet split. Yet this recognition 
did not cause fundamental change in the administration’s world 
view. Ironically, the Special Assistant to the Under Secre­
tary for Political Affairs, Theodore Achilles, responded to
^Memorandum for the President, "South Vietnam," Novem­
ber 8, 1961, in Gravel, Pentagon Papers, 2:111.
AfiJCSM-33-62 Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense,
"The Strategic Importance of Southeast Asia," in Gravel, 
Pentagon Papers, 2:664.
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this phenomena with his prior perceptions intact. The basic 
Soviet and Chinese objective of world domination, Achilles 
reaffirmed, remained steadfast. The difference was over 
tactics, not goals. "Let us not be deceived," he warned,
A *7"let us never forget basic Soviet objectives." Then,
directing his attention to Southeast Asia, he maintained that
the communist world displayed "no signs of inhibiting its
predilection for 'wars of national liberation,1 brushfire
wars which it can persuade others to fight . . . proxy as in
48Laos or Vietnam." Given Soviet and Chinese goals, Achilles 
concluded that America must prepare for the worst; this re­
quired the development of forces capable of deterring such 
proxy wars.
The view had acquired official sanction during an inter­
view with Dean Rusk. On the "Today" television show he said:
We . . . ought not suppose that these dif­
ferences are any great comfort to us at the 
present time, because this argument is 
really about how best to get on with the 
world revolution of communism as they see 
it. They're committed to that in Moscow; 
they're committed to that in Peiping.
Their argument is about the difference in 
procedures by which they would accomplish
t h e i r  p u r p o s e . 4 9
Therefore the Sino-Soviet split produced no reexamination of
^Theodore Achilles, "Peaceful Coexistence and U.S. 
Security," Department of State Bulletin 46 (February 26, 
1962):325.
48Ibid.
49Dean Rusk, "Secretary Rusk Interviewed on 'Today' 
Show," Department of State Bulletin 46 (February 12, 1962):
241. :
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the conflict in Vietnam. Quite the contrary, rather than 
soothe American nerves, the split increased Washington's 
fears of an unleashed China in Southeast Asia.
An event which did result in an examination of the basic 
tenets of the Cold War was the Cuban Missile Crisis. Although 
the actual crisis involving the Soviet attempt to place offen­
sive missiles in Cuba is outside the scope of this study, its 
impact on world politics certainly is not. "We may find our­
selves at an important turning point in history, at a water-
50shed of the cold war as we have known it," one administra­
tion official reflected upon the significance of approaching 
the brink of a nuclear war. While it is commonly recognized 
that Soviet-American relations subsequently improved, the 
question that remains is what effect did this have on Vietnam 
policy?
While Kennedy conceded that a foundation for future 
detente with the Soviets existed, he nevertheless understood 
that basic differences imposed limitations upon such coopera­
tion. Speaking at the University of Maine almost a year after 
the missile crisis, Kennedy cautioned that "there still were 
major areas of tension and conflict, from Berlin . . . to 
Southeast Asia . . . [including] wholly different views on
the so-called wars of liberation," which continued to divide
51the superpowers. The avoidance of nuclear war over Cuba
50Harlan Cleveland, "A Most Dangerous Time," Department 
of State Bulletin 47 (December 10, 1962):880.
51John F. Kennedy, "Strength for Peace and Strength for 
War," Department of State Bulletin 49 (November 4, 1963):695.
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did not mollify Kennedy’s misgivings over liberation wars.
In a national address on December 17, 1962, Kennedy reluc­
tantly concluded that Khrushchev still retained his faith 
that Soviet "support of these wars of liberation, small wars,
will bring about our defeat. . . . Mr. Khrushchev does not
52wish us well, unfortunately." Hence, although the missile 
crisis encouraged a cautious reexamination of American atti­
tudes toward the Cold War, the impact of this process on 
American policy in Vietnam was minimal.
Similarly, American attitudes toward the Sino-Soviet 
split did not change after Cuba either. Roger Hilsman ad­
monished that "our problems in Viet-nam and Laos, Cuba and
Berlin have not disappeared because of the Sino-Soviet 
53split." Disquietude about communist activity in Southeast 
Asia actually intensified. U. Alexis Johnson commented on 
the split:
Nor does it mean that Communism is going to 
present fewer dangers to us. In fact, the 
greater belligerence of the Chinese Com­
munists, unrestrained by Soviet caution, 
may present greater dangers, particularly 
in areas around China's borders.54
Rusk displayed impatience with these fine distinctions: "Both
principal Communist powers are committed to a Communist world
52John F, Kennedy, Public Papers, 1963, p. 900.
^^Roger Hilsman, "The Sino-Soviet Split," Department of 
State Bulletin 47 (November 26, 1962): 808.
54U. Alexis Johnson, "Red China and the U.S.S.R.," 
Department of State Bulletin 48 (February 25, 1963):277.
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55system. . . . That gives us no reason to relax our guard."
As Kennedy declared in his State of the Union Address, "A 
dispute over how to bury the West is no grounds for Western 
rejoicing.
Kennedy’s speeches after the missile crisis were often
a mixture of hope and alarm. In Maine he declared, "There
are new rays of hope on the horizon, but we still live in
57the shadows of war." Soon those shadows would loom darkest 
in Vietnam.
4. Vietnam: A Year of Crisis
"The spearhead of aggression," a confident Kennedy pro­
claimed in January 1963, "has been blunted in South Viet- 
58nam." But the optimism expressed in this State of the 
Union Address proved misplaced. A year of continued crisis, 
turmoil and tragedy in South Vietnam would follow.
The year began with hope and on May 6, 1963, McNamara 
announced the withdrawal of a thousand military personnel.
By June, the tenuous nature of Diem's hold on the Vietnamese 
people became evident. The shock waves emitted by the
55Ibid., p. 283.
^John F. Kennedy, "The State of the Union,'! Department 
of State Bulletin 48 (February 4, 1963):162.
57John F. Kennedy, "Strength for Peace and Strength for 
War," Department of State Bulletin 49 (November 4, 1963):695.
58John F. Kennedy, "The State of the Union," Department 
of State Bulletin 48 (February 4, 1963):159.
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Buddhist crisis in June revealed the fragility of South Viet­
nam's government. South Vietnam's internal emergency con­
tinued throughout the summer and fall. But debate centered 
upon Diem and alternatives to his rule, rather than prompting 
a reappraisal of America's commitment to South Vietnam. 
Frederick E. Nolting, America's Ambassador to Saigon, warned 
that if the Buddhist crisis spread "the country might be lost
to the Communists," an outcome the administration was unwilling 
59to accept.
Kennedy, during a mid-July news conference, reaffirmed 
America's commitment to Vietnam: "we are not going to with­
draw from that effort . . . for us to withdraw from that 
effort would mean a collapse not only of South Vietnam, but 
of Southeast Asia."^ Even as the situation became critical 
Kennedy insisted to Walter Cronkite of CBS that America must 
stand firm in its commitment. Seven days later, on Septem­
ber 9, in response to a question asked by NBC's David Brinkley, 
Kennedy frankly declared his faith in the "domino theory:"
No, I believe it. I believe it. I think 
that the struggle is close enough. China 
is so large, looms so high just beyond the 
frontiers, that if South Vietnam went, it 
would not only give them an improved geo­
graphic position for a guerrilla assault 
on Malaya but would also give the impres­
sion that the wave of the future in South­
east Asia was China and the Communists.
So I believe it.^l
59pj.edgj.jxk e . Nolting, as cited in Gravel, Pentagon 
Papers, 2 : 231.
60john F. Kennedy, Public Papers, 1963, p. 569.
61"President Kennedy's NBC Interview," September 9,
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Therefore despite unease and increased exasperation with 
Diem’s rule, America’s commitment to South Vietnam remained 
firm.
McNamara and Taylor returned to Vietnam in October to 
evaluate the situation and to recommend a redirection of 
policy as needed. Though confident regarding the military 
situation, they were vexed about South Vietnam's political 
instability. The White House issued a statement on October 2:
The security of South Viet-nam is a major 
interest of the United States. . . .  We will 
adhere to our policy of working with the 
people of and government of South Viet-nam 
to deny this country to Communism.62
The bloody overthrow of Diem's regime in November would end
temporarily the political unrest of South Vietnam. Though
shaken by Diem's sudden demise, one can surmise that Vietnam's
recent tragedy receded in Kennedy's mind as he triumphantly
toured Dallas on November 22, 1963. Within weeks of each
other, both Diem and Kennedy were dead.
5. An Ambiguous Legacy
When Richard Neustadt evaluated Kennedy's presidency, 
his general remarks also applied to the specific case of 
Vietnam: "We cannot know what Kennedy's full record would
have been. . . . Still more important, we can never know
1963, in Gravel, Pentagon Papers, 2:828.
^"U. S. Policy on Vietnam: White House Statement," 
October 2, 1963, in Gravel, Pentagon Papers, 2:850.
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fi %precisely how to weigh events in his truncated term.*'
Eight days before his untimely death, Kennedy displayed un­
certainty regarding Vietnam when he juxtaposed rhetoric 
about America's global responsibilities with an expressed 
desire to withdraw American personnel. A series of rambling 
questions defined the debate: "What American policy should
be, and what our aid policy should be, how can we intensify 
the struggle, how can. we bring Americans out of there?"^
Would Kennedy have implemented the earlier recommendations 
and endorsements of McNamara, Rostow, Ruslc, and Taylor to 
increase the level of America's force? Or, would he have 
allowed the suggestions of Paul Kattenburg and Robert Kennedy 
to evolve into a policy of disengagements?^ We do not know, 
and we never will.
According to Schlesinger, after Diem's overthrow and
murder, Kennedy "realized that Vietnam was his greatest failure
in foreign policy, and that he had never really given it his
66full attention." Reston's comment supports this contention:
He could be ambiguous and even indecisive on 
secondary questions. . . . He . . . temporized 
with the Vietnamese crisis, partly supporting 
those who wanted to intervene 'to win,' partly 
joining those who reminded him that the French
^Richard E. Neustadt, "Kennedy in the Presidency: A Pre­
mature Appraisal," in Donald, Kennedy, p. 2 34.
^John F. Kennedy, Public Papers, 1963, p. 847.
^Gravel, Pentagon Papers, 2:213-214, 241-243. Katten­
burg was a member of the State Department's Vietnam Working 
Group.
66schlesinger, Thousand Days, pp. 909-910.
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had suffered 175,000 casualties against the 
same Communist army, but never really de­
fining his aims or reconciling his power 
with his objectives.67
For Reston, Kennedy’s qualities of leadership emerged only
during acute crises. Tragically, just as the situation in
Vietnam became critical, Kennedy was killed in Dallas, With
the coup against Diem a crossroad of decision was reached in
Vietnam, A man other than Kennedy would choose what road to
take.
^Reston, "What Was Killed,” p. 225.
CHAPTER V
PROBLEMS OF PERCEPTION IN DIPLOMACY: THE
JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION AND THE DECISION 
TO INTERVENE IN VIETNAM, 1963-1965
So what is our stake? What is our com­
mitment in that situation? Can those of 
us in this room forget the lesson that we 
had in this issue of war and peace when it 
was only 10 years from the seizure of Man­
churia to Pearl Harbor; about 2 years from 
the seizure of Czechoslavkia to the out­
break of World War II in Western Europe? 
Don’t you remember the hopes expressed in 
those days: that perhaps the aggressor
will be satisfied by this next bite, and 
perhaps he will be quiet? Remember that?
. . , But we found that ambition and appe­
tite fed upon success and the next bite 
generated the appetite for the following 
bite. And we learned that, by postponing 
the issue, we made the result more terrible, 
the holocaust more dreadful. We cannot 
forget that experience.^
Dean Rusk
The Kennedy legacy in Vietnam may cause intense debate 
among historians but Lyndon Baines Johnson never participated 
in this fascinating exercise. As President, Johnson empha­
sized his Vietnam policy's continuity with that pf his
TDean Rusk, "Some Fundamentals of American Foreign 
Policy," Department of State Bulletin 51 (March 22, 1965): 
401.
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predecessors. Johnson maintained that his actions in Viet­
nam "were consistent with the goals the United States had
2been trying to accomplish in the world since 1945." Three 
days after Kennedy's assassination, Johnson approved a Na­
tional Security Action Memorandum (NSAM 273) stating that
the United States would "persevere in the policies and ac-
3tions in which we were already engaged." Before a Joint 
Session of Congress on November 27, Johnson vowed that "this 
nation will keep its commitments from South Viet-Nam to West 
Berlin.
1. Vietnam: The Situation Worsens
"Asia is not on fire," Roger Hilsman reflected, but 
"portions of it smoulder with each morning's headlines."5 
From late 1963 until early 1965 South Vietnam burned slowly; 
its eruption into flame would confront Johnson with the 
greatest challenge of his presidency. During the early 
months of its tenure, the administration harbored hopes of 
disengagement and withdrawal from Vietnam. A White House
2Lyndon Baines Johnson, The Vantage Point: Perspectives 
of the Presidency. 1965-1969 (New York: Holt, Rinehart and 
Winston, 1971), p. 42.
5Ibid., p. 45.
^Lyndon Johnson, "An Hour of Sorrow, A Time for Action," 
Department of State Bulletin 49 (December 16, 1963):910.
5Roger Hilsman, "United States Policy Toward Communist 
China," Department of State Bulletin 50 (January 6, 1964):
11.
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statement issued on March 17, 1964 indicated a possible 
recall of American personnel.^ But this sentiment was 
countered by a firm commitment to South Vietnam's security.
McNamara, in a memo to Johnson, acknowledged that though
a withdrawal of American personnel was highly desirable the
high stakes in Vietnam justified an intensive effort by the
United States. Later that month, on January 27, McNamara
testified before the House Armed Services Committee:
The survival of an independent government in 
South Viet-Nam is so important to the se­
curity of Southeast Asia and to the free 
world that I can conceive of no alternative 
other than to take all necessary measures
within our capability to prevent a Communist
victory.®
South Vietnam's predicament disheartened the administration. 
By late March, the administration realized that since Diem's
fall the situation in Vietnam had deteriorated rapidly. The
first coup since Diem's had occurred in January. Within a 
year six more coups would plague the political viability of 
South Vietnam. Washington's concern heightened with the 
expectation that Hanoi and the Viet Cortg (the National Front 
for the Liberation of Vietnam) would exploit the political 
turmoil which afflicted Saigon.
^White House Press Release, March 17, 1964, in Gravel, 
Pentagon Papers, 2:196-197.
7Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara Memorandum to the 
President, February 1964, in Gravel, Pentagon Papers, 2:196- 
197.
8Marvin Kalb and Elie Abel, Roots of Involvement (New 
York: W. W. Norton, 1971), p. 165.
131
On February 13, a disturbing report crossed the Secre­
tary of State's desk. Authored by Walt Rostow, it con­
cluded that South Vietnam was in imminent danger. Rostow 
minimized the internal weakness of South Vietnam's govern­
ment by placing emphasis upon Hanoi*s systematic aggression 
from the north. A later trip taken by Taylor (now Chair­
man of the JCS) and McNamara to Vietnam gave Washington 
little comfort in respect to the precarious position of 
South Vietnam. Their pessimistic assessment was later in­
corporated within NSAM 288. It recommended an enlargement 
of America's efforts and advocated the necessity of a free 
Vietnam:
Unless we can achieve this objective in 
South Vietnam almost all of Southeast Asia 
will probably fall under Communist domi­
nance . . . accommodate to Communism so far 
as to remove effective U.S. and anti­
communist influence or fall under the domi­
nation of forces not now explicitly Com­
munist but likely . . .  to become so.
All of these consequences would probably 
have been true even if the U.S. had not v 
since 1954, and especially since 1961, be­
come so heavily engaged in South Vietnam.
However, that fact accentuates the impact 
of a Communist South Vietnam not only in 
Asia, but in the rest of the world, where 
the South Vietnamese conflict is regarded 
as a test case of U.S. capacity to help a 
nation meet a Communist 'war of libera­
tion. ' 10
9W. W. Rostow memorandum to the Secretary of State, 
February 13, 1964, in Gravel, Pentagon Papers, 2:310-311.
■^National Security Action Memorandum, March 1964, in; 
Gravel, Pentagon Papers, 2:459.
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Therefore, with the continuing political instability of
the South and the gains of the Viet Cong in the countryside,
11the hope for continued American withdrawal dissipated.
NSAM 288 served as a guideline of future policy debates re­
garding Vietnam.
High administration officials met in Honolulu on June 1 
and 2, 1964 to confer about South Vietnam's predicament and 
America's responsibilities. The participants concluded that
"our point of departure is and must be that we cannot accept
12[the] overrunning of Southeast Asia by Hanoi and Peiping." 
Prior to his death, MacArthur had alerted Kennedy to A f r ­
ica's delicate position in Vietnam. "Our chickens are all
coming home to roost," MacArthur warned, "and you are in
13the chicken house." But this was no longer true and John̂ - 
son grasped that "Vietnam and the consequences of Diem's 
murder" were now his concern.^ According to Maxwell Taylor, 
"Diem's overthrow set in motion a sequence of crises . . .  
over the next two years which eventually forced President 
Johnson in 1965 to choose between accepted defeat or
■^George McTurnan Kahin and John W. Lewis, The United 
States and Vietnam, revised edition (New York: Dell Publish- 
ing Co., 1969), p. 153.
12Department of State Memorandum, in Gravel, Pentagon 
Papers, 3:172.
13Arthur Krock, Memoirs: Sixty Years on the Firing 
Line (New York: Funk and Wagralls, 1968), p. 371.
1 A
Johnson, Vantage Point, p. 62.
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introducing combat t r o o p s . I n  order to discern why the 
option of sending troops to Vietnam was eventually favored, 
a brief discussion of Johnson and the men he relied upon is 
imperative.
2. The Johnson Administration's 
World View
Before Johnson became Vice President he was hailed as 
an astute politician of the Senate, where his savvy in do­
mestic politics shone and awed his colleagues. In foreign 
affairs, however, he was very much a part of that generation 
which had learned the so-called "lessons" of the 1930s and 
the failure of appeasement. To him, these lessons were 
simply reinforced by the Cold War. The fundamental problem 
in the twentieth century, Johnson reasoned, was aggression. 
His tenure as Vice President did not free him from this 
superficial knowledge of foreign affairs. Kennedy bequeathed 
to Johnson not only his policies but also his key advisers. 
Uncertain and ill-prepared in the intricacies of interna- 
tional politics, Johnson relied heavily upon his advisers.
Johnson's chief advisers, Rusk, McNamara, Taylor, the 
Bundys, and Rostow, all espoused the basic principles of the
^Taylor, Swords and Ploughshares, p. 302.
■^Robert Sellen, "Old Assumptions versus New Realities: 
Lyndon Johnson and Foreign Policy," International Journal 38 
(Spring 1973):205-229. See also Henry Brandon, Anatomy of 
Error: The Inside Story of the Asian War on the Potomac,
1954-1969 (Boston: Gambit, 1969).
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generation "born in this century, tempered by war, dis-
17ciplined by a hard and bitter peace.” Their assumptions 
were firmly grounded in Cold War perceptions of the world: 
the futility of appeasement, the danger of unchecked aggres­
sion, and the hostility of the communist world. Townsend 
Hoopes, a former Pentagon official and scholar, stated "All 
carried in their veins the implicitly unlimited commitment 
to global struggle against Revolutionary Communism which
18had grown out of their total immersion in World War II."
From this perspective, a communist gain anywhere upset the
world’s balance of power in favor of Moscow and Peking.
Rusk cogently expressed these sentiments shared by Johnson
and his staff:
The free world must prevent the Communists 
from extending their sway through force, 
whether through frontal assault, piecemeal 
territorial grabs, or infiltration of men 
and arms across frontiers. We will con­
tinue to do our part to make aggression not 
only unprofitable to the Communists but in­
creasingly costly and dangerous to t h e m .
According to Rusk, one’s vision of the future world Order
constituted the pivotal international issue: it was a struggle
between "the world laid out in the United Nations Charter .
17John F. Kennedy, as cited in Sorensen, Kennedy, p. 276.
18Townsend Hoopes, The Limits of Intervention (New York: 
David McKay Company, 1969), p. 16.
19Dean Rusk, "Why We Treat Communist Countries Differ­
ently," Department of State Bulletin 50 (March 16, 1964):
391. ' “
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[and] a world constructed around some notion of a Communist
20world revolution." As conditions in Vietnam worsened, 
the administration gradually feared that the outcome of 
this struggle would be decided in the jungles of Southeast 
Asia.
Since the future of the world order was at stake, the
communist threat remained the constant, even as the source
of concern,shifted from Moscow to Peking or to Hanoi.
Despite recent indications of a widening gap between China
and Russia and an easing of tensions between Russia and the
United States, Washington persisted in its view that the
communist threat remained dangerous, formidable, and world- 
21wide. "There can be no full and lasting detente between 
the chief Communist states and the free world," Rusk as­
serted, "without settlement of critical and dangerous
issues, such as . . . the aggression against Laos and South 
22Viet-Nam." In fact, the Sino-Soviet split accentuated 
American concern, since Moscow could no longer curb Peking's 
militancy. The Secretary of Defense concluded that "success 
in Viet-Nam would be regarded by Peiping as vindication for
20Dean Rusk, "Secretary Rusk's News Conference of Febru­
ary 7," Department of State Bulletin 50 (February 14, 1964): 
275.
21See 0. Edmund Clubb, China and Russia: "The Great Game" 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), and Donald S. 
Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956-1961 (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1962).
22Dean Rusk, "Foreign Policy and the American Citizen," 
Department of State Bulletin 49 (December 30, 1963):994.
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23China's views in the worldwide ideological struggle." 
McNamara added that:
For Hanoi, the immediate objective is 
limited: conquest of the South and na­
tional unification . . . for Peiping, 
however, Hanoi's victory would only be 
a first step toward eventual Chinese 
hegemony over the two Viet-Nams and 
Southeast Asia and toward exploitation 
of the new strategy in other parts of
the world.24
In 1947, the President of the United States perceived the 
Soviet Union to be the greatest threat to world peace, but 
years of crises and imprecise rhetoric had transformed the 
nature of this threat as viewed from the Potomac.
The fear of the Soviets had been blurred to include 
communism in general, regardless of which country espoused 
its doctrines. The following comment by Johnson aptly ex­
pressed this prevalent attitude:
Ho Chi Minh and his colleagues in Hanoi 
had long dreamed of controlling all of 
Vietnam and the rest of Indochina. By the 
end of the 1950s that dream was fading 
fast. But in the period after the first 
Sputnik Communists everywhere were in an 
optimistic, aggressive mood. Khrushchev 
boasted that the Soviets would surpass 
the U.S. in production during the 1960s;
Mao Tse-tung claimed the East Wind was 
prevailing over the West Wind; Castro took 
control in Cuba; Moscow laid its ultimatum 
for Berlin. For Ho Chi Minh, there was 
unfinished business: to conquer Laos and:
South Vietnam.25
2 3Robert McNamara, "U.S. Policy in Vietnam," Department 
of State Bulletin 50 (April 13, 1964):566.
24Ibid.
25Johnson, Vantage Point, p. 22.
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This passage evokes an image of gallant frontiersmen em­
battled by nations of Indians: by the Blackfeet, Sioux,
Crow, and Cheyenne simultaneously. Though each tribe was 
distinct to American pioneers the threat was all Indians 
in general. America's failure to distinguish between the 
communist tribes of the twentieth century would prompt 
Johnson eventually to call on the cavalry to save the day 
in Southeast Asia.
3. The Road to Intervention:
A Chronology, 1964-1965
Throughout the first half of 1964, Washington’s unease
over South Vietnam's instability increased. On January 30,
1964, General Nguyen Khanh gained power by successfully
implementing a political coup. To its dismay, Khanh failed
to attain the political stability that Washington had hoped
for. Rumors of coups, renewed Buddhist-Catholic friction,
and student demonstrations characterized the first six
months of Khanh's rule. Recently appointed Ambassador to
Saigon, Maxwell Taylor, maintained that "the most important
and most intractable internal problem of South Vietnam in
meeting the Viet Cong threat is the political structure at
9ftthe national level." Consequently, an anonymous compiler 
of the so-called "Pentagon Papers" contends that for
9ftAmbassador to Saigon Maxwell Taylor, U.S. Mission 
Monthly Report, August 10, 1964, in U.S.-Vietnam Relations, 
Book 3, IV.C.l., p. 89.
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Washington "the central perception was one of impending
27chaos and possible failure in South Vietnam,"
Concurrently with the emphasis upon Saigon’s internal 
decay, there were efforts to concentrate upon Hanoi’s sys­
tematic aggression from the north. Walt Rostow presented 
a well-reasoned report to Johnson in December 1963, which
advocated a policy of gradual escalation to thwart Hanoi's
28efforts. This report represented the largely speculative 
perception gaining official credence that aggression from 
the north was increasing. A State Department memo comment­
ing on the first half of 1964, noted a "rise and change in
29the nature of infiltration in recent months." Still,
according to Taylor, the administration was "not ready to
bite the bullet and face the inevitability of either taking
military action against North Vietnam or running the very
3 0real risk of failing disastrously in Southeast Asia."
But events during the next year would push the administration 
over the brink.
In July 1964, Washington resumed the DESOTO (Destroyer 
Patrol of North Vietnam) patrols off the coast of North 
Vietnam. At the same time South Vietnam patrol boats were
27Anonymous editor, U.S.-Vietnam Relations, Book 4,
IV.C.2., (b), p. 24.
2 8State Department Counselor W. W. Rostow memorandum 
to the President, December 1963, in Gravel, Pentagon Papers, 
3:151.
29State Department Memorandum, August 24, 1964, in 
U.S.-Vietnam Relations, Book 4, IV.C.2., (b), p. 23.
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conducting raids (34~A operations) into North Vietnam. On
August 2, 1964, three North Vietnamese P.T. boats pursued
the U.S.S. Maddox, fired upon it with torpedoes, and then
withdrew after suffering damage. Apparently the North
Vietnamese mistook the Maddox for the South Vietnamese 
31patrols. On August 4, an incident still clouded and 
marred by controversy occurred. The Johnson Administra­
tion contended that North Vietnamese naval vessels attacked 
the Maddox and the U.S.S. Turner Joy. Collectively these 
two skirmishes comprise the famous Gulf of Tonkin incident. 
The United States retaliated immediately, bombing a main 
North Vietnamese P.T. boat base on August fourth and fifth.
Speaking at Syracuse University on August 5, President 
Johnson stressed two themes: America's historical role dur­
ing the Cold War and the insidious menace of unrestricted 
aggression. Johnson linked the recent incident to America's 
resolve during previous crises. "The challenge we face in 
Southeast Asia today," he stated, "is the same challenge we
have faced with courage and . . . strength in Greece and
32Turkey, in Berlin and Cuba." The episode revived heartfelt 
memories of the ravages of Hitler which continued to haunt
■?nTaylor, Swords and Ploughshares, p. 327.
Gravel, Pentagon Papers, 3:183-190.
32Lyndon Johnson, "United States Takes Measures to Repel 
Attack Against U.S. Forces in Southeast Asia," Department of 
State Bulletin 51 (August 24, 1964):261.
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the world. Johnson admonished his audience not to disregard
the recent past, "Aggression . has unmasked its face
to the world. The world remembers -- the world must never
forget -- that aggression unchallenged is Aggression un- 
33checked." On August 7, 1964, Congress passed the Gulf 
of Tonkin Resolution by an overwhelming margin of 504 to 2. 
With the resolution the duly elected representatives of the 
American people authorized President Johnson to "take all 
necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the 
forces of the United States and to prevent further aggres­
sion."3  ̂ The resolution declared that America regarded the
security of Southeast Asia "as vital to its national in-
35terests and to world peace." The resolution affirmed that:
the United States is, therefore; prepared, 
as the President determines, to take all 
necessary steps, including the use of 
force, to assist any member . . . of the 
Southeast Asia Defense Treaty requesting 
assistance in defense of its freedom.3"
Thus the resolution laid the basis for subsequent action and
United States intervention in Vietnam. Despite the later
protests of Congress, in actuality the President was given
a free hand. According to the historian Schandler, "The
33Ibid., 51:261.
34"Text of Joint Resolution, August 7," Department of 
State Bulletin 51 (August 24, 1964):268.
35ibid.
36Ibid.
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swift reprisal and the nearly unanimous congressional sup­
port demonstrated in dramatic fashion the U.S. commitment 
to South Vietnam."3^
With United States retaliation and the basis for future 
action approved by Congress, hopes for withdrawal receded. 
Hesitation, agonized planning, and indecisiveness on the 
part of the administration characterized Vietnam policy 
following the Tonkin incident. On November 6, an NSC 
Working Group on South Vietnam and Southeast Asia met for
70
the first time. The group reaffirmed the principles of 
the domino theory and maintained that Vietnam constituted 
a test case of America's ability to resist national wars of 
liberation. It suggested that the United States must cur­
tail communist ambitions and that a failure to do so, would 
undermine American prestige and power throughout the world.
The group neglected to propose any concrete program of ac­
tion. On January 27, 1965, McNamara and McGeorge Bundy ex­
pressed their distaste for a continuance of a policy of in­
action by urging the President to expand the role of America's 
military power in Vietnam:
37Herbert Y. Schandler, The Unmaking of a President: 
Lyndon Johnson and Vietnam (Princeton: Princeton. University 
Press, 1977), p. 5.
70
"NSC Working Group on SVN/SEA," in Gravel, Pentagon 
Papers, 3:210. The members: Assistant Secretary of State 
William Bundy; Marshall Green and Michael Forrestal from 
the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs; Robert Johnson from the 
Policy Planning Council; John McNaughton from Defense; Vice 
Admiral Lloyd Murlin of the JCS; and Harold Ford from the 
CIA.
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Both of us understand the very grave ques­
tions presented by any decision of this 
sort. . . . Both of Us have fully sup­
ported your unwillingness . . . to move 
out of the middle course. We both agree 
that every effort should still be made 
to improve our operations on the ground 
and to prop up the authorities in South 
Vietnam. . . . But we are both convinced 
that none of this is enough and the time 
has come for harder decision.^9
At 2:00 a.m. on the morning of February 7, 1965, a Viet Cong 
raid upon the barracks of American advisers in Pleiku would 
jolt Johnson from his lethargy and policy of holding the 
line. Nine United States soldiers were killed and the num­
ber of wounded and severe damage to equipment made it the 
heaviest communist assault on American installations in 
South Vietnam. Washington responded with a reprisal raid 
upon North Vietnamese barracks at Dong Hoi, a guerrilla 
training garrison forty miles north of the 17th parallel.
The planned and executed one-time tit-for-tat reprisal,
code named FLAMING DART, precipitated the transformation of
40the nature of the war. As Taylor indicated "a new phase 
of the war had begun" with the removal of the restrictions 
placed upon America's air power.^
7QDoris Kearns, Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream 
(New York: Harper and Row, 1976), p. 260.
40National Security Council Meeting, February 6, in 
Gravel, Pentagon Papers. 3:286, 302. The NSC meeting con­
cerning the February 7 attack on Pleiku took place on 
February 6, Washington time.
^Taylor, Swords and Ploughshares, p. 335.
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Unlike the reprisal following the Tonkin incident, and 
despite the original plan, the February 1965 raids were not 
considered as one-shot operations, the raids gradually 
changed the ground rules of the war. The sustained bombing 
policy escalated the war and tied America closer to the in­
terests of South Vietnam. A February 7 White House press re­
lease linked America's counter-measures to Hanoi's behavior:
these attacks were only made possible by the 
continuing infiltratonn of personnel and 
equipment from North Vietnam . . . infiltra­
tion markedly increased during 1964. . . .
'The key to the situation remains the cessa­
tion of infiltration from North Vietnam and
the clear indication that it is prepared to
cease aggression against its n e i g h b o r s . 142
Reporting from Vietnam on February 7, McGeorge Bundy re­
ported that like it or not, America's prestige was tied to 
South Vietnam, hence he recommended a policy of sustained 
reprisal.^ Bundy professed that "the situation in Vietnam 
is deteriorating, and without new U.S. action, defeat ap­
pears inevitable. . . . There is still time to turn around,
44but not much." During an NSC meeting on February 8,
Johnson decided to reverse the current trend. With only 
Vice President Hubert Humphrey in dissent, the NSC approved 
a policy of suistained reprisal and graduated pressure against
^White House Press Release, February 7, 1964, in 
Gravel, Pentagon Papers, 3:304-305.
4 3McGeorge Bundy, as cited in Kearns, Johnson, p. 261.
44McGeorge Bundy, as cited in Johnson, Vantage Point,
p. 126.
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Hanoi.4  ̂ Under Secretary of State George Ball reflected the
administration's resolve:
This was a test of the will, a clear chal­
lenge to the political purpose of both the 
United States and South Vietnamese govern­
ments. It was a test and challenge there­
fore which we could not fail to respond 
to . . . without misleading the North Viet­
namese to our intent and the strength of 
our purpose to carry out that intent.46
On February 10, the Viet Gong attacked a United States en­
listed men’s billet in Qui Nhon. Within twenty-four hours, 
American and South Vietnamese aircraft accomplished the 
largest retaliatory raid to that date. The raid was not 
linked to the immediate incident, but to Hanoi's behavior 
in general.
On February 15, 1965, Johnson formally approved a bomb­
ing program, project ROLLING THUNDER, which transformed the 
reprisal concept into a sustained graduated bombing opera­
tion. Bundy’s recommendation of February 7, that "once a pro­
gram of reprisals is clearly underway, it should not be neces­
sary to connect each specific act against North Vietnam to a 
particular outrage in the South" had been adopted as policy.4'7
4^Hubert H. Humphrey, The Education of a Public Man: My 
Life and Politics (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company,
1976), pp. 318-324.
46George Ball, as cited in Alexander George, David K. 
Hall, and William E. Simons, The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy: 
Laos, Cuba, Vietnam (Boston: Little, Brown and Company* 1971), 
p. 163.
4^Paper by McGeorge Bundy, Annex A, "A Policy of Sus­
tained Reprisal," in Gravel, Pentagon Papers, 3:688.
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Within a month, America's first ground combat units were 
committed to Vietnam. On March 8, 350G United States Marines 
landed on the shores of Da Nang with an assignment to pro­
tect its airfield against the Viet Cong. During another 
high-level conference at Honolulu on April 20, their mis­
sion was transformed and expanded. The United States adopted
an enclave strategy which stationed American troops in key
48South Vietnamese cities. But this defensive and static use 
of American troops combined with air power proved insufficient. 
By early June, General Westmoreland, the top military com­
mander in Vietnam, requested permission to grant offensive 
responsibilities to the United States troops. The time of 
decision had come for Johnson. As Johnson said himself:
I knew we faced a crucial question. . . .
If necessary would we use substantial U.S. 
forces on the ground to prevent the loss 
of that region to aggressive forces moving
illegally across international frontiers.49
Johnson therefore consulted with his advisers, Congressional 
leaders, and trusted friends from July 21 to 27 as he de­
liberated whether to commit troops to Vietnam on a massive 
scale.
4. The Crossroad of Decision
During those high-level meetings of that crucial week in 
July, as Johnson ruminated over America's options, much more
48Schandler, Unmaking of a President, pp. 21-28.
49Johnson, yantage Point, p. 144.
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than the recent events in Vietnam weighed upon his mind. 
Johnson's attitudes toward history, the United States, the 
communist threat, and of world politics could not be 
severed from the specifics of Vietnam. Taken together with 
the deterioration of South Vietnam, these attitudes would 
prove compelling.
Like Truman and the others before him, Johnson and the 
majority of his advisers took the lessons of the 1930s, 
symbolized by the futility of appeasement at Munich, to 
heart. Visions of another reign of terror sweeping the 
world tormented them relentlessly. Aggression, especially 
when practiced by communists, vividly recalled these deeply 
imprinted memories. To Johnson and his generation these 
lessons were not mere historical abstractions, rather they 
possessed a profound emotional and lasting quality. Harry 
McPherson, a member of Johnson's staff, described Johnson 
as having
come to political maturity in the late 
thirties, when fascist power threatened 
the world; the threat of Russian power 
followed; there, never had been a time, 
from his election to the House to his 
ascension to the Presidency when the 
democracies were not threatened by some­
body. He had no doubt about the human 
evil of communism, nor about Soviet andChinese aggressiveness.50
Johnson may stand corrected but his tendency to view events in 
Vietnam via the prism of his experience is understandable.
■^Harry C. McPherson, A Political Education (Boston: 
Atlantic Monthly, Little, Brown and Co., 1971), p. 445.
147
The administration, especially Dean Rusk, feared that 
as World War II faded in people's minds, its costly lessons 
would be forgotten. Rusk confided to a historian from 
Columbia University, Henry Graff, that Article I of the 
United Nations Charter and its goal of preventing aggres­
sion was becoming a relic of the past. "Few people read 
that article, which drew together the lessons of experience 
of my generation. It is the only guide we have to prevent 
World War III."^1 Aggression feeds on itself; therefore 
violent change in Southeast Asia threatened America's in­
terests throughout the world. America's Ambassador to the 
Federal Republic of Germany, George G. McGhee, aptly 
expressed this sentiment:
Freedom is . . .indivisible; what happens 
in the Mekong Valley Can have an important 
bearing on what happens in Berlin. Aggres­
sion anywhere must be made so expensive 
that those tempted to indulge in it will 
see the folly of their c o u r s e . 52
According to Rusk, Southeast Asia was the scene of a critical,
historical dilemma, "that is, whether a course of aggression
is going to be allowed to move ahead and whether appetites
53will be allowed to grow upon feeding."
^Dean Rusk, as cited in Henry F. Graff, The Tuesday 
Cabinet: Deliberation and Decision on Peace and War under 
Lyndon B. Johnson (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 
1970), pp. 134-135.
52George C. McGhee, "Some American Thoughts on Current 
Issues," Department of State Bulletin 51 (August 3, 1964):139.
53Dean Rusk, "A Conversation with Dean Rusk," Department 
of State Bulletin 52 (January 18, 1965)
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This fear of aggression was neither confined to histori­
cal lessons or to emotional reactions. The behavior of the
communists, especially that of the People's Republic of
China, alarmed Washington. On April 7, at Johns Hopkins 
University, President Johnson gave expression to this con­
cern when he said that "over this war -- and all Asia -- 
is another reality: the deepening shadow of Communist
C h i n a . T h e  Sino-Soviet split heightened America's 
apprehensions regarding China and increased the stakes in 
Vietnam. Washington dreaded a struggle between Moscow and 
Peking over who represented the vanguard of revolutionary
governments. Consequently, the administration feared a
vindication of China's militancy on the battlefields of . 
Vietnam. Leonard Unger, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Far 
Eastern Affairs, stated:
The 'wars of national liberation* approach 
has been adopted as an essential element of 
Communist China’s expansionistic policy. If 
this technique adopted by Hanoi should be 
allowed to succeed in Viet-Nam, we would be 
confirming Peiping's contention that mili­
tant revolutionary struggle is a more pro­
ductive Communist path than Moscow's doc­
trine of peaceful coexistence.55
Maxwell Taylor, William Bundy, and Dean Rusk soon echoed this
attitude publicly. Rusk mapped out the consequences Of the
loss of South Vietnam forcefully:
54Lyndon Johnson, "Pattern for Peace in Southeast Asia," 
Department of State Bulletin 52 (April 26, 1965):606.
"^Leonard Unger, "Present Objectives and Future Possibili­
ties in Southeast Asia," Department of State Bulletin 52 
(May 10, 1965):713.
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I should think they would simply move the 
problem to the next country and the next 
and the next. And, as I say, this is not 
dominoes. This is Marxism. This is the 
kind of Marxism which comes out of Peiping,
I mean it's all there to see. They make no 
secret of it,56
America's confidence in the purity of its motives and in
its power encouraged the administration to meet the communist
challenge in Southeast Asia with force.
In 1965, most of the administration's officials shared
a common faith in America's capabilities. "People ought to
know how strong the United States is, the Secretary of De- 
57fense boasted. Washington assumed America's power would
ultimately prevail and that other people would fold before
58America's military might. Recent events had legitimized 
this viewpoint. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, the United 
States had coerced a powerful foe to abandon its aggressive 
designs. If the powerful Soviets shuddered before America's 
strength, how could little Hanoi withstand an onslaught of 
American force?
Although the immediate impact of the Missile Crisis was 
beneficial, its legacy proved to be mixed. Tensions between 
the Soviet Union and the United States eased, but Kennedy's 
advisers also drew simple and dangerous lessons Concerning
5^Dean Rusk, Secretary Rusk's News Conference of Decem­
ber 23," Department of State Bulletin 52 (January 11, 1965):
39. : :
57Robert McNamara, as cited in Graff, Tuesday Cabinet,
p. 73.
58George, Coercive Diplomacy, p. 147.
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the use of force from the crisis. Kennedy's handling of the 
crisis left an impression that the use of force to pressure 
an adversary was an effective and legitimate tool of di­
plomacy. Forgotten was the anguish, uncertainty, and ten­
sion prevalent throughout the crisis. According to a 
leading specialist on coercive diplomacy, Alexander George,
this tactic "requires skill in tailoring the strategy to the
59special configuration of a particular situation." In other 
words, general principles of coercion could not be easily or 
simply drawn from an intricate and unique crisis. But despite 
Kennedy's counsel, his advisers derived improper conclusions 
from the President's diplomatic maneuvers during the crisis.^ 
Consequently, without appreciating the delicate nature of 
coercive diplomacy, the Kennedy-Johnson administration be­
came enthralled and enthusiastic about its unlimited potential 
in resolving international conflicts. This contributed to 
the willingness to use force to break Hanoi's will and attain 
America's objectives in Vietnam.
Johnson and his advisers were convinced that American 
power would force Hanoi to abandon its aggressive policy, 
accept the status quo, and negotiate accordingly. Bill 
Moyers, Johnson's Press Secretary, claims Johnson held the 
"conviction that we can see this thing through, that limited
f \ 1objectives with maximum resources can prevail." Or as
59ibid., p. 230.
6°Ibid., pp. x-xi.
GlBill Moyers, as cited in Graff, Tuesday Cabinet, p. 108.
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Johnson colorfully remarked, the United States had "to apply
the maximum deterrent till he £Ho Chi Minh] sobers up and
62unloads his pistol."
Whatever qualms Washington had regarding the use of 
force in Vietnam were eased by its duties and responsibili­
ties as the leader of the free world. America's mission and 
power justified the implementation of its awesome power. 
McGeorge Bundy reflected on America's role in world affairs 
since 1947 to Henry Graff:
Bundy said he had come to accept also what he 
had learned from Dean Acheson that, in 
the final analysis, the United States was 
the locomotive at the head of mankind, and 
the rest of the world the caboose--meaning,
I thought, that he was not expressing 
chauvinism but simply passing judgment on 
the usefulness to the world of American 
energies.63
The hope was that American energy could transform defeat into 
victory in Vietnam.
From July 21 to 27, the administration deliberated upon 
McNamara's report which stated in cool logic that only a mas­
sive commitment of United States ground troops could stem the 
tide and achieve victory in Vietnam. Finally, the moment of 
truth rested upon the shoulders of one man: Lyndon Baines 
Johnson. "When a President makes a decision," Johnson later
62Lyndon Johnson, as cited in Graff, Tuesday Cabinet,
p. 54.
McGeorge Bundy, as cited in Graff, Tuesday Cabinet,
p. 48.
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reflected, "he seeks all the information he can get. At the 
same time, he cannot separate himself from his own experi­
ence and m e m o r y . J o h n s o n ' s  personal experiences bore 
directly upon his decision to intervene in Vietnam:
You see, I deeply believe we are quar­
antining over there just like the smallpox.
Just like FDR and Hitler, just like Wiison 
and the Kaiser. You've simply got to see 
this thing in historical perspective. What 
I learned as a boy in my teens and in 
college about World War I was that it was 
our lack of strength and failure to show 
stamina that got us into the war. I was 
taught that the Kaiser never would have 
made his moves if he hadn't been able to 
count Uncle Sam out because he believed 
we'd never come in. Then I was taught in 
Congress . . . on defense preparedness and 
by FDR that we in Congress were constantly 
telegraphing the wrong messages to Hitler 
and the Japanese • that the Wheelers, the 
Lindberghs, the LaFollet.tes, and the America 
Firsters were letting Hitler know he could 
move without worrying about Uncle Sam. I 
remember those days in Congress.
Johnson was determined that Ho and other communists would read 
America's message loud and clear. The President expressed 
misgivings that similar inaction on his part would create a 
world climate similar to the one prior to World War II, "every­
thing I knew about history told me if I got out of Vietnam and 
let Ho . . . run through the streets of Saigon, then I'd be 
doing exactly what Chamberlain did.in World War II.
64Johnson, Vantage Point, p. 46.
^Lyndon Johnson, as cited in Kearns, Johnson, pp. 329-
330.
66Ibid., pp. 252-253.
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Johnson added, "I'd be giving a big fat reward to aggfes- 
67sion," but this was an anathema to a generation raised 
on war and international tensions. On July 28, 1965, 
President Lyndon Johnson approved McNamara’s recommendation 
to commit on a massive scale American ground troops to Viet­
nam and thus raised America's troop level to 125,000.
America's Ambassador to Saigon, Henry Cabot Lodge, 
cabled to Washington his reaction to the presence of United 
States troops:
I wish I could describe the feeling of 
hope which this great American presence is 
bringing. There can no longer be the 
slightest doubt that persistence will bring 
success, that the aggression will be warded 
off and that for the first time since the 
end of World War II, the cause of free men 
will be on the upward spiral.68
Past experience had ill-prepared America for the possibility
that its mighty locomotive would be derailed in the jungles
of Vietnam;
67Ibid., p. 253!
fi ftAmbassador Henry Cabot Lodge, as cited in Gravel, 
Pentagon Papers, 2:366.
CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
I believe that the Soviet has so often 
repeated the incorrect statement that 
we are planning to attack him, that he , 
has finally begun to believe it himself.
Douglas MacArthur
1. Lessons of the Past
A crucial element which influenced American policy in 
Korea and Vietnam was the refraction of the lessons of the 
recent past through a prism of American perceptions of its 
adversaries and of itself. Traumatic events often penetrate 
deep into the recesses of the mind and come to color every 
aspect of life and sometimes to dominate an era of history.
One need only think of the effect upon European civiliza­
tion of the destruction of its youth in the trenches of 
World War I. Erich Maria Remarque in All Quiet on the Western 
Front captured the profound bewilderment of a generation:
And men will not understand us - - for the 
generation that grew up before us, though it 
has passed these years with us already had 
a home and a calling; now it will return to 
its old occupations, and the war will be for­
gotten -- and the generation that has grown
iDouglas MacArthur, as cited in MacArthur Hearings, 1:6.
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up after us will be strange to us and 
push us aside. We will be superfluous 
even to ourselves, we will, grow older, 
a few will adapt themselves, some others 
will merely submit, and most will be be­
wildered; -- the years will pass by and 
in the end we shall fall into ruin.^
Thirty years later war once again ravaged the European con­
tinent inflicting its horrors upon another generation. Whereas 
World War I left in its wake a shocked and spiritually dead 
generation and one resigned to its fate, the survivors of 
World War II energetically dedicated themselves to construct 
a new world order which would wipe the horrors of the 
twentieth century from the earth. For the postwar American 
statesmen the touchstone of their experience was the West's 
abject failure to prevent Hitler from embarking upon his 
madman's schemes. The leaders of the United States dedicated 
themselves to the proposition that such an occurrence would 
not happen again.
To a world recently subjected to the brutality of a 
world war and sensitized to the dangers of unchecked aggres­
sion, the postwar behavior of the Soviet Union appeared 
omninous indeed. The abstract and emotional lessons of the 
past decade were now joined with a concrete threat: communist
Russia. The symbolic leader of the Munich generation, Winston 
Churchill, once again alerted the West.
?Erich Maria Remarque, All Quiet on the Western Front 
(Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett Publications, Inc., 1956), 
p. 254.
156
Last time«I saw it all coming and cried 
aloud to my own fellow-countrymen and to 
the world, but no one paid attention. Up 
till the year 1933 or even 1935, Germany 
might have been saved from the awful fate 
which has overtaken her and we might have 
been spared the miseries Hitler let loose 
upon mankind. There never was a war in 
all history easier to prevent by timely 
action than the. one that has just desolved
such great areas of the globe. It could
have been prevented in my belief without 
the firing of a single shot, . . . but no 
one would listen and one by one we were 
all sucked into the awful whirl pool.
The next time storm clouds gathered over the horizon the
West and the United States would be ready.
From 1947 to 1950, the United States concentrated its
effort of containing Soviet expansion on the European con­
tinent, responding with precise and limited programs such 
as the Marshall Plan. In this atmosphere of superpower 
confrontation, the return of French colonial rule to Indo­
china seemed of little consequence. There were those in 
government who asserted that the ambitions of the Soviets 
were unlimited and who perceived all Soviet acts and policy 
as integral to its coherent plan for world domination. NSC 
68 is a case in point. This view gained official credence 
and sanction after the events of June 24, 1950.
With the dramatic and unexpected invasion of South Korea, 
the supposition that the Soviets harbored ambitions of world
Winston Churchill, "The Sinews of Peace," March 5, 
1946, Winston S. Churchill; His Complete Speeches, 1897 -̂ 
1963; Volume VII, 1943-1949. ed. Robert Rhodes James, 8 
vols. (New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1974) :7292- 
7293.
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domination became an evident truth. The Chinese interven­
tion merely accentuated American fears of an aggressive 
communist bloc and transformed the containment policy into 
a global venture. The failure to distinguish between the 
varieties of communism in Asia would shape American policy 
accordingly.
In conjunction with the pervasive fear of the Soviet 
Union and communism, American decision makers viewed them­
selves and their policies as instruments of the forces of 
light battling with the forces of dark. As leader of the 
free world it was America's duty to ensure world peace and 
to prevent the outbreak of World War III. This purity of 
motive obscurred the implications of American policy. Con­
sequently, Washington often failed to anticipate that.other 
nations would interpret its acts as hostile and threatening. 
Truman’s sealing off Formosa and approval of the march to 
the Yalu are only two examples. Therefore when China did 
intervene, the Truman Administration perceived it as part 
of a well-coordinated counterattack planned by the Soviet 
Union and not as a nationalistic response to the policy of 
the United States. The prevailing perception of an aggres­
sive monolithic communism combined with America's pristine 
self-image would have profound implications for United States 
policy in Southeast Asia.
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2. Korea and Vietnam: A Comparison
Despite the differences in the nature of the Korean and 
Vietnamese conflicts, the administrations which favored in­
tervention perceived the fundamental issues at stake as being 
identical. The outbreak of hostilities on June 24, 1950, 
cannot be equated with the Gulf of Tonkin incident nor the 
mortar attack on Pleiku, yet the administrations of both 
Truman and Johnson considered the two wars in essentially 
the same way. Though lacking the drama of a frontal assault, 
Washington viewed the aggression against South Vietnam to be 
as formidable and threatening to world peace as the invasion 
of Korea. As Rusk testified in 1966: "We fought the Korean
War, which like the struggle in Viet-Nam occurred in a remote 
area thousands of miles away, to sustain a principle vital to 
the freedom and security of America."^ He later reflected, 
"Korea was not a civil war. In Vietnam the issue is the same 
one of aggression as in the cases of national frontiers that 
are well established. Aggression is at the heart of the 
issue.Therefore though one conflict was a conventional 
war supported by allied action while the other was a prolonged 
conflict nearly devoid of allied support, the response of the 
United States in both instances was intervention. The wars 
of national liberation were perceived to be as pernicious as
^Dean Rusk, "The U.S. Commitment in Vietnam: Fundamental 
Issues," Department of State Bulletin 54 (March 7, 1966):348.
5Dean Rusk, as cited in Graff, Tuesday Cabinet, p. 136.
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a frontal assault. Both had to be stopped.
America's designated role as leader of the free world 
required a united effort, or if need be unilateral action, 
against communist aggression. The lessons of Munich and the 
Cold War formulated the common dominator and perspective 
from which the two conflicts were examined. In 1950, a North 
Korean invasion was perceived as synonymous with aggression 
instigated by the Soviet Union and communism. America's 
fears were accentuated by the Chinese intervention and by 
increased communist activity in Asia. Even as American 
leaders slowly acknowledged, with great reluctance, the 
Sino-Soviet split and other indications of factionalism in 
the communist world, in times of crises the general fear of 
communism showed its head. Though the source of the immedi­
ate communist threat shifted from Moscow to Peking, or even 
to Hanoi, the fear of communism in general remained steadfast. 
Communism was by its nature aggressive. Dean Rusk remarked:
I have noted criticism of the so-called 
analogy between Hitler and Mao Tse-tung. .
. . We do ourselves no service by insisting 
that each source of aggression is unique.
My own view is that we have learned a good 
deal about this phenomena and its poten­
tiality for leading into catastrophe if 
the problem is not met in timely fashion.
Regardless of the variety of faces in which it may appear, 
aggression was aggression. Consequently,, when both adminis­
trations perceived aggression by communists their options were
^Dean Rusk, "United States Policy Toward Communist China," 
Department of State Bulletin 54 (May 2, 1966):698.
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considered limited. Johnson later revealed that "I realized
7that doing nothing was worse than doing something." Both 
Truman and Johnson felt compelled to commit American ground 
forces to Asia.
The momentum of military operations in shaping subse­
quent policy is common to the two conflicts. The original 
purpose to repel the North Korean invasion and to restore 
the ante bellum status quo eventually fell victim to the 
administration's vision of a unified Korea. MacArthur's 
magnificent victory at Inchon presented Washington with a 
golden opportunity for a clear-cut success. Not to capitalize 
on the recent turn of events seemed an act of supreme folly. 
Hence, despite the warnings of the People's Republic of China, 
Truman authorized United Nations troops to cross the 38th 
parallel and to push toward the Yalu.
Though lacking the swiftness of momentous decisions 
associated with Korea, nevertheless a pattern of military 
momentum can be ascertained in respect to American policy 
in Vietnam. Until 1961, America restricted it's support of 
Vietnam to economic and military aid. From this commitment 
of its prestige, the United States eventually sent military 
advisers to Vietnam, planned covert operations, and sent 
bombing missions into North Vietnam in reprisal for the P.T. 
boat strikes in the Gulf of Tonkin. The limited nature of
7Lyndon Johnson, as cited in Kearns, Johnson, p. 263.
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the reprisal to the Tonkin incident gave way with the attack 
upon Pleiku to a policy of sustained, graduated pressure 
bombing of North Vietnam. Finally, the troops sent to pro­
tect American air bases were assigned offensive missions and 
reinforced by the massive introduction of American ground 
forces. Superficially the pattern of increased military 
involvement appears planned or inevitable, but none of the 
steps were irreversible. A reversal may have required an 
act of statesmanship but Anwar Sadat's later "sacred mission" 
to Israel in 1978 was deemed unthinkable until it happened.
3. Conclusion
This observation by Dean Rusk is representative of the
attitude that characterized American policy in Asia from
Truman to Johnson: "The situation we face in Southeast Asia
is obviously complex but, in my view, the underlying issues
8are relatively simple and are utterly fundamental." America's 
reading of the recent past, the omnipresence of the ghosts of 
Hitler and Stalin, and the genuine concern over the inten­
tions of the Soviet Union captured the imagination of the 
American people and their leaders. As the issue of slavery 
dominated almost every aspect of life in the United States 
during the mid-1800s, so also the thirties and the early Cold 
War shaped the mood of subsequent decades. The perception
8Dean Rusk, "The U.S. Commitment in Vietnam: Fundamental 
Issues," Department of State Bulletin 54 (March 7, 19(56-): 34-7.
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that the world was a battleground between the forces of free­
dom and slavery hardened and crystallized.
The outbreak of war in Korea transformed this ideologi­
cal struggle into a physical battle. Communism now was seen 
as posing a global threat to America's interests and security. 
All other concerns receded to the background and issues such 
as Vietnamese history and independence were not given the 
attention they warranted. Truman perceived the invasion of 
Korea and China's intervention as part of a larger scheme of 
communist expansion: "We are seeing a pattern in Indo-China
and Tibet timed to coincide with the attack in Korea as a
gchallenge to the Western world." The tendency to view the 
world through a bipolar lens would blur America's vision, 
blinding its leaders from appreciating the unique aspects 
and qualities of the Vietnamese conflict. Unfortunately, 
nuance and complexity were not recognized as attributes dur­
ing the height of the Cold War and American leaders preferred 
solids such as black and white over shades of gray.
In 1947, Dean Acheson compared the Cold War to the 
struggle between Cathage and Rome. We know Rome eventually 
prevailed in its war against Carthage. Rome's victory may 
have spelled its gradual decline as a vibrant civilization 
and world power. By concentrating on external threats Rome 
lost its inner strength; by becoming an empire obsessed with 
total security, Rome lost the spirit which had guided its
9Truman, Memoirs, 2:381.
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republic. The democracy of Athens fell victim to this com­
mon affliction. A careful re-reading of the "Melian Dialogue," 
reveals that any cause, however intrinsically just or moral, 
can degenerate into a policy of expediency or a fascination 
with power.
Quite understandably, the ghost of Hitler and then 
Stalin haunted the postwar world. In fact, the historian 
Ernest May suggests that for a generation of American states­
men the proclivity to compare the acts of Hitler with the 
aggressions in Korea and Vietnam was probably "inescapable.
The ideological hostilities of the Cold War reinforced this 
tendency.
Philip Caputo's memoir of his experience as a young
marine stationed in Vietnam indicates in human terms the
dangers of policies justified in moral abstractions and 
11absolutes. As did many of America's leaders, the ordinary 
citizen also became imprisoned by its own perceptions and 
rhetoric. Seduced by the idealism of John F. Kennedy's 
speeches, Caputo's beliefs--and perhaps those of the nation-- 
were shattered in the jungles of Southeast Asia. In part, 
this was due to the failure of American statesmen to probe 
deeply the lessons of the past. In 1963, John F. Cady warned
^®May, "L e s s o n s p. 85. See also p. 113.
11Philip Caputo, A Rumor of War (New York: Holt, Rine­
hart and Winston, 1977).
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that the United States must 'View both American policy and
the Communist threat through Southeast Asia eyes, however
12difficult and sometimes painful this process may be." 
Caputo's ordeal attests that America's failure to broaden 
its perspective was ultimately mdre painful.
"^John P. Cady, "The Historical Background of United 
States Policy in Southeast Asia*" in Southeast Asia: Prob- 
lens of United States Policy (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT 
Preds, 1963)/p. 25. "  ’
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